United States v. Fisher. 2 C. of the plaintiff is pointed out, and a speedy trial provided; on the part of the defendant, a limited right to oppose the claim by offsets is provided, and the claim of the United States is to have a preference of other creditors, where the debtor is unable to satisfy the whole. Here, then, is one entire connected subject, the different provisions of the law constituting the links of the same chain, the members of the saine body. It will not, I presume, be denied, that the three first sections of the law apply to those only who are declared by the title to be the objects of its provisions. The 4th section is the first which uses general expressions, without a reference to those who had before been spoken of; and yet I think it will hardly be contended that this section is not closely and intimately connected with the same subject. When we come to the 5th section the reference to the three first sections is again resumed, with the addition of the words "or any other person." So that instead of the words "revenue officers, or other persons accountable for public money," used in the 1st section, this section uses the words "revenue officers, or other persons indebted to the United States." Now it is obvious that these expressions may have precisely the same meaning, so as to comprehend the same persons, although the latter may be construed to include persons not within the meaning of the 1st section. For persons accountable for public money are also other persons than revenue officers indebted to the United States; and the latter may, by a construction conformable to the other parts. of the law, mean persons accountable for public money; and by an extended construction, they may comprehend others, who in no sense of the expressions used, can be said to be accountable for public money. It is, then, to be inquired, is the court bound by any known rules of law to give to the words thus used in the 5th section a meaning extensive enough to comprehend persons never contemplated [*402] by the title of the law, and most *sedulously excluded by the three first sections? Does justice to the public, or convenience to individuals demand it? Is such a construction necessary in order to give effect to any one expression used by the legislature? Shall we violate the manifest intention of the legislature, if we stop short of the point to which we are invited to go in the construction of this section? To all these questions I think myself warranted in answering in the negative. As to the first. Do the principles of equity, or of strict Justice, discriminate between individuals standing in equali jure and claiming debts of equal dignity? United States v. Fisher. 2 C. The nature of the debts may well warrant a discrimination; but not so, if the privilege be merely of a personal nature. The sovereign may, in the exercise of his powers, secure to himself this exclusive privilege of being preferred to the citizens, but this is no evidence that the claim is sanctioned by the principles of immutable justice. If this right is asserted, individuals must submit ; but I do not find it in my conscience to go further in advancement of the claim, than the words of the law fairly interpreted, in relation to the whole law, compel me. But I do not think that congress meant to exercise their power to the extent contended for. First, because in every other section of the law they have declared a different intent; and, secondly, because it would not only be productive of the most cruel injustice to individuals, but would tend to destroy, more than any other act I can imagine, all confidence between man and man. The preference claimed is not only unequal in respect to private citizens, but is of a nature against which the most prudent man cannot guard himself. As to public officers, and receivers of public money of all descriptions, they are, or may be known as such; and any person dealing with them, does it at the peril of being postponed to any debts his debtor may owe to the United States, should he become unfortunate. He acts with his eyes open, and has it in his power to calculate the risk he is willing to run. But if this preference exists in every possible case of contracts between the United States and an individual, there [* 403] is no means by which any man can be apprized of his danger in dealing with the same person. 2. Is this broad construction necessary in order to give effect to the expressions of the law? I have endeavored to show that all accountable agents are other persons than revenue officers indebted to the United States. The words, then, "other persons," are satisfied by comprehending all those persons to whom the first section extends. 3. Is this construction rendered necessary to fulfil the manifest intent of the legislature? So far from it, that to my mind, it is in direct opposition to an intention plainly expressed by all the other parts of the law. To prove this, I again refer to the title of the law; to the three first sections, which are in strict conformity with it, and that too, by express words; and to the fourth section, which is so plainly a part of the same subject, that it cannot be construed to go farther than those which precede it. Is the fifth section a stranger to the others, unnaturally placed there without having a connection with the other sections? If this be the case, I have already admitted rules of construction strong enough to condemn the opinion I hold. But let us examine this point. United States v. Fisher. 2 C. The object of the four first sections is to enforce by suit, where necessary, the payment of debts due to the United States from a particular class of debtors. It points out the officer who is to order the suit, declares at what term the cause shall be tried, lays down rules of evidence to be regarded in support of the action, extends to the defendant the benefit of making offsets under certain qualifications; and then most naturally, as I conceive, comes the 5th section relating to the judgment, which the court is to render in case a contest should ensue between the United States and individual creditors on account of inability in the debtor to satisfy the whole. What if What if an individual creditor should attach the property of the debtor before the United States had taken steps to recover their debt? Or if the debtor should assign away his property, or it should be [*404] claimed * by assignees under a commission of bankruptcy; or the defendant, being an executor, should plead fully administered, except so much as would be sufficient to satisfy judg ments, bond debts, or other debts superior in dignity to that of the United States? This section establishes a plain rule by which the court must proceed in rendering its judgment whenever those cases occur. What would have signified all the other provisions of the law, unless a rule of decision had been prescribed in cases where otherwise the United States might never obtain the fruit of those steps which their officers were pursuing? Can a section in a law which professes to afford a remedy in a particular case by process of law, be said not to belong to the law, when it leads to the point of a judgment, which is the consummation of the proceedings in the case? I think not; and, therefore, I cannot acquiesce in the opinion that the 5th section is unconnected with the other parts of the law. I have before observed that the 4th section is the first which uses general expressions, without reference to those which had before been particularly mentioned; but that when we come to the 5th section, the reference is again taken up, with the addition of those words which produce the difficulty of the case. Now I ask, in the first place, what necessity was there for departing from the mode of expression used in the 4th section, which, for the first time, is general, without particular reference to any of the persons before described. Would it not have been as well in the 5th as in the 4th section, to say, "that where any individual becoming indebted to the United States shall become insolvent," &c. What reason can be assigned for the specification of revenue officers, one class of persons mentioned expressly in the 1st section, intended in the 2d and 3d by plain words of reference, and clearly meant in United States v. Schooner Sally. 2 C. the 4th, when it must be admitted that the words used in the 4th section, or the words "other persons," in the 5th, would have comprehended revenue officers if they were broad enough to include every description of persons indebted to the United States. * Unless they are construed to limit and restrain the gen- [*405 | erality of the words "other persons," they are absolutely without any use or meaning whatever. If the preceding sections had applied only to revenue officers, then from necessity we must have construed the words "other persons" as broad as their natural import would warrant, because otherwise they would have been nugatory, and we would have found no rule in the law itself, by which to limit the generality of the expression. But when the law professes in its title to relate to all accountable agents besides revenue officers, and the 1st section specifies, amongst these agents, "revenue officers," we have a rule by which to restrain the sweeping expressions in the 5th section, namely, " or other person accountable, or indebted as aforesaid." This construction renders the law uniform throughout, and consistent with what it professes in every other section. 2. In confirmation of this construction, the 62d section of the bankrupt law does, in my opinion, deserve attention. If the United States were, at the time that law passed, entitled to a preference in every possible case, by virtue of the general expressions in the law I have just been considering, what necessity was there for limiting the saving of the right of preference to debts due to the United States, "as secured or provided by any law heretofore passed." This mode of expression leads me to conclude that the legislature supposed there were some cases where this preference had not been provided for by law. If not, it would certainly have been sufficient to declare, that the bankrupt law should not extend to, or affect, the right of preference to prior satisfaction of debts due the United States. 2 W. 396; 1 P. 386; 8 P. 271; 11 P. 420; 12 P. 102; 4 H. 37; 7 H. 283. THE UNITED STATES v. Schooner SALLY, of Norfolk. [*406] 2 C. 406. In this case the court, without giving any opinion, on the authority of the case of United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dallas, 297, affirmed the jurisdiction of the admiralty over a question of forfeiture, arising Graves v. Boston Marine Insurance Co. 2 C. under the act of March 22, 1794, (1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 347,) prohibiting the slave trade. 4 C. 443; 1 W. 9; 8 W. 391; 5 H. 441; 6 H. 344; 20 H. 296; 6 Wal. 766. [*407 ] TELFAIR et al., Executors of Rae and Sommerville, v. STEAD'S EXECUTORS. 2 C. 407. THIS was a writ of error to the circuit court for the district of Georgia, in a suit in equity, to charge the lands of a deceased debtor, the heir not being made a party. [* 418 ] * MARSHALL, C. J. The only doubt which the court had, was whether, by the laws of Georgia, the land could be We have received information as to the construction given by the courts of Georgia, to the statute of 5 Geo. 2, making lands in the colonies liable for debts, and are satisfied that they are considered as chargeable without making the heir a party. Decrees affirmed. [*419] * GRAVES and Barnewall v. BOSTON Marine Insurance COMPANY. 2 C. 419. One partner effecting insurance in his own name on property on board a certain vessel, as property may appear, cannot recover indemnity for a loss sustained by his firm. A policy of insurance will not be reformed by a court of equity after a loss upon doubtful proof of the intention of the insured, or of its communication to the underwriter. THIS was an appeal from the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, in a cause in equity, the object of which was to have an alleged mistake, in a policy of insurance, corrected, and relief given thereon. The inaterial words in the policy are: "do cause John Boonen Graves to be assured, lost or not lost, ten thousand dollars, on property on board the ship Northern Liberties, as property may |