Clarke v. Russell. 3 D. of jurisdiction and the right of soil may depend on very different words, charters, and foundations. A decision of that issue can only determine the controversy as between the private citizens, who are parties to the suit, and the event only* give the [* 415 ] land to the plaintiff or defendant; but could have no controlling influence over the line of jurisdiction; with respect to which, if either State has a contest with the other, or with individuals, the State has its remedy, I suppose, under the constitution and the laws, by proper application, but not in this way; for she is not a party to the suits. If an individual will put the event of his cause in a plea of this kind, on a fact which is not essential to his right, I cannot think it can prejudice the right of jurisdiction appertaining to a State. I agree with the rest of the court, that neither of the motions can be granted. BY THE COURT. Let the rule be discharged. 1 P. 110; 5 P. 284; 12 P. 657; 2 H. 9. CLARKE v. RUSSELL. 3 D. 415. A promise to answer for the duty of another must be wholly in writing, and cannot be varied, explained, or added to, by parol evidence. When the action is founded on non-payment of bills of exchange, it is not necessary to produce protests for non-acceptance. Semble. A letter of introduction, containing the general statement, "you may be assured of their complying fully with any contracts or engagements they may enter into with you," does not import an undertaking of guaranty. THIS was a writ of error to the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island. The action was founded on a promise to indemnify the plaintiffs for indorsing certain bills of exchange for the accommodation of Robert Murray & Co. The evidence relied on to prove the promise, was two letters signed by the defendants and addressed to the plaintiffs, and also certain parol evidence, which was put in without objection, though before the case went to the jury the defendant's counsel prayed an instruction, that the letters could not be explained by this parol evidence. The letters were as follows: [*418 ] Clarke v. Russell. 3 D. NATHANIEL RUSSELL, ESQ. * PROVIDENCE, 20th January, 1796. DEAR SIR,- Our friends, Messrs. Robert Murray & Co., merchants in New York, having determined to enter largely into the purchase of rice and other articles of your produce in Charleston, but being entire strangers there, they have applied to us for letters of introduction to our friends. In consequence of which, we do ourselves the pleasure of introducing them to your correspondence, as a house on whose integrity and punctuality the utmost dependence may be placed. They will write you the nature of their intentions, and you may be assured of their complying fully with any contracts or engagements they may enter into with you. The friendship we have for these gentlemen induces us to wish you will render them every service in your power, at the same time we flatter ourselves this correspondence will prove a mutual benefit. We are, with sentiments of esteem, dear sir, CLERK & NIGHTINGALE. PROVIDENCE, 21st January, 1796. NATHANIEL RUSSELL, ESQ DEAR SIR,- We wrote you yesterday a letter of recommendation in favor of Messrs. Robert Murray & Co. We have now to request that you will endeavor to render them every assistance in your power. Also that you will immediately, on the receipt of this, vest the whole of what funds you have of ours in your hands, in rice, on the best terms you can. If you are not in cash, for the sales of china and nankeens, perhaps you may be able to raise the money from the bank until due, or purchase the rice upon a credit until such time as you are to be in cash for them. The truth is, we expect rice will rise; [*419] and we want to improve the amount of what property *we can muster in Charleston, vested in that article at current price. Our Mr. Nightingale is now at Newport, where it is probable we shall write you on the subject. We are, &c., CLERK & NIGHTINGALE. The bill of exceptions raised three questions. 1st. Whether the plaintiff could recover without producing protests for non-acceptance, the bills and protests for non-payment being produced. 2d. Whether the two letters imported a guaranty. Clarke v. Russell. 3 D. 3d. Whether parol evidence was admissible to explain the letters. The cause was argued by the Attorney-General, Howell, and Inger. soll, for the plaintiff in error, and by E. Tilghman, Dexter, and Robbins, for the defendant. ELLSWORTH, C. J. This cause comes up on a bill of [* 424 ] exceptions, on the face of which three exceptions appear. 1. First, that bills of exchange, which had been non-accepted, and protested for non-payment, were admitted in evidence unaccompanied by protests for non-acceptance. According to a general rule laid down by this court, in the case of Barry and Brown, from Virginia, and from which rule there appear no special circumstances to exempt the present case, this exception will not hold. 2. A further exception is, that the judge, in his charge to the jury, held that the two letters from the defendants to the plaintiff below, of the 20th and 21st of January, 1796, which were set up to prove an undertaking or guarantee, might be explained by parol testimony, of which kind of testimony some had passed to the jury without objection, but for what purpose does not now appear, as there were divers counts, some of which parol testimony might have supported. The undertaking declared upon, in the count to which the verdict applies, being for the duty of another, it must, to save it froin the statute of frauds and perjuries, be in writing, and wholly so. The two letters, therefore, which are relied upon as the written agreement, cannot be added to, or varied by parol testimony. Nor can they be so far explained by parol testimony as to affect their import * with regard to the supposed undertaking. The charge [425 ] then, of the judge, that "they might be explained by parol testimony," expressed as a general rule, and without any qualifications or restrictions, was too broad, and may have misled the jury. On this ground there must be a reversal. 3. It is, therefore, unnecessary to decide the remaining question, whether the two letters did, of themselves, import an undertaking or guarantee? It may be proper to suggest, however, that a majority of the court at present incline to the opinion that they do not. Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. 7 P. 113; 18 P. 89; 22 H. 28. Irvine v. Sims's Lessee. 3 D. IRVINE V. SIMS'S LESSEE. 3 D. 425. A military right to unappropriated land in America, acquired under a royal proclamation of 1763, was made assignable by the law of Virginia, to an inhabitant of that State. Obtaining a warrant and so locating it as to describe a particular parcel of land, gave to the assignee a complete equitable title, which was confirmed by the compact between Pennsylvania and Virginia. A survey in Pennsylvania, and payment of the consideration, gave a legal right of entry, which supports an ejectment. This right remains legal, though it may have originally been held so from a defect of equitable powers, and though the courts of the United States now possess those powers. THIS was a writ of error to the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania. The action was ejectment to try the title to an island in the Ohio river, called Montour's Island. The court below, by consent, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, upon a special verdict, which found and set out in hæc verba, a great number of documents and laws of Virginia and Pennsylvania. The facts upon which the opinion of the court rested, are stated succinctly by the chief justice. The land was within the territory in dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia, which formed the subject of the compact between those States of the 23d of September, 1780. All that is of any general interest, or importance, in this case, can be understood without the details of the special verdict. The cause was argued by Lewis, E. Tilghman, and Dallas, for the plaintiff in error, and by the Attorney-General, Ingersoll, and Rawle, for the defendant. [ *456 ] The chief justice, on the last day of the term, delivered the opinion of the court as follows: ELLSWORTH, C. J. It appears that William Douglas, for services rendered, acquired under the king's proclamation of 1763, a right to five thousand acres of unappropriated land in America; which right he assigned to Charles Sims, the lessor of the plaintiff below. And although by the terms of the proclamation, the personal application of Douglas was requisite to obtain a land warrant on the said right, yet the laws of Virginia, passed subsequent to her independence, dispensed with such personal application, and made a warrant issuable to the assignee, Sims, he being an inhabitant of that State on the 3d of May, 1779. A warrant he accordingly obtained, and the same Irvine v. Sims's Lessee. 3 D. duly located on Montour's Island, the land in question; which his warrant was more than sufficient to cover, and which, from its description as an island, was perfectly separated and distinguished from all other land; by which means Sims acquired to the said island a complete equitable title, and one which needed only a patent of confirmation to render it a complete legal title. A confirmation of this equitable title, as effectual as that of any patent could have been, was afterwards comprised in the compact between Virginia and Pennsylvania, and in the ratification of the same by the legislative act of the latter. The terms therein of "reserve and confirmation" of the "rights" which had been previously acquired under Virginia, in the territory thereby relinquished to Pennsylvania, must, from the nature of the transaction, be expounded favorably for those rights, and so that titles, before substantially good, should not, after a [457] change of jurisdiction, be defeated or questioned for formal defects. * It further appears, that Sims, since the said compact and ratification, has, without any laches that would prejudice his claim, obtained a legal survey of the said land under Pennsylvania; in which State, payment, or as in this case consideration passed, and a survey though unaccompanied by a patent, give a legal right of entry, which is sufficient in ejectment. Why they have been adjudged to give such right, whether from a defect of chancery powers, or for other reasons of policy or justice, is not now material. The right once having become an established legal right, and having incorporated itself as such, with property and tenures, it remains a legal right notwithstanding any new distribution of judicial powers, and must be regarded by the common law courts of the United States, in Pennsylvania, as a rule of decision. The judgment of the circuit court affirmed. IREDELL, J. Though I concur with the other judges of the court in affirming the judgment of the circuit court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for affirmance, I think it proper to state my opinion particularly. In order to do this with the greater distinctness, it is necessary that I should observe upon the nature of this title according to my ideas of it, from its origin to what may be deemed its consummation, at least for the purpose of maintaining this ejectment. My observations, therefore, will be under the following heads of inquiry : 1st. Whether it sufficiently appears that William Douglas was entitled to a military right, such as it was, under the proclamation of |