vating their own fictions. Thus the fiction involved in the "post dated" check, is becoming very popular in certain business, in which it would hardly have been considered respectable when the Negotiable In struments Law was written.19 It is not necessary to talk here of such stretching of words as the Interstate Commerce clause in the Constitution has suffered to meet the needs of modern life, or to discuss the sins and acts of benevolence committed by the courts in the name of interpretation. Spurious interpretation is now pretty well understood,20 and though exposed, it still thrives. In a word, codification may block legislation, but it cannot stop law-making.

Yet, notwithstanding the insinuations of the New York Judge with the "average lay mind," the chief business of lawyers is not to evade the law nor, except in periods of aggravated glossation, to make burdens too grievous to be borne, with their fine distinctions. There comes a time in the history of every code that endures, when its meaning becomes established, when verbal quibbling is practically ended, when the incidence of the law is shifted like that of an old tax to the shoulders that must bear it, when it is understood or at least generally acted upon, even by those who have made no special study of it, when in short, it becomes an integral part of the civilization of the land. Even its arbitrary provisions at such a time cease to be matters of indifference. One need only think of those European countries where keeping to the left became the fashion instead of keeping to the right. To change the rule today would involve a rebuilding of cars and buses, railway stations and switches, the substitution of left-drive automobiles for right-drives and most important of all a complete change in the habits of the people. So far as the codes represent no departure from the old law, this process of integration may

(19) N. I. L. Section 12 is only permissive. Cf. note on postdated checks in Yale Law Journal, Jan., 1920.

(20) Cf. Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Columbia Law Review, 379.

be very rapid; it may be nearly accomplished at the very outset. It can never be fully accomplished in a dynamic society; but as this condition is approached, men of law readily turn their attention from the words and become students of principles. They look behind the words to realities-to the social meaning-to living facts to the spirit that giveth life to purpose-it is all the same.

The Glossators have been followed by Commentators not only in the history of Justinian's code in the Middle Ages, but also under slightly different guises in the application of practically every code from

our Bible to our Constitutions.21

Commentaries are, however, a new season's planting-though the threshing has reached to the next sowing time, we have passed beyond the aftermath of codifica

of the minor as to his age is disposed of adversely to plaintiff by the ruling in Stetz v. F. Mayer Boot & Shoe Co., 163 Wis. 151, 156 N. W. 971, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 675. A strong appeal and an able argument is presented to the court to overrule its decision in Brenner v. Heruben, 170 Wis. 565, 176 N. W. 228, holding that chapter 624, Laws of 1917, providing for treble compensation in cases where a minor of permit age is allowed to work without a permit, is constitutional. Counsel for plaintiff presented a brief as amici curiae in that case, and made an oral argument therein. We have carefully considered the briefs filed in this case, and find that the arguments but supplement those made in the Brenner Case. A reconsideration of the subject-matter but confirms us in the view that the Brenner Case was correctly decided, and should be adhered to.

Judgment affirmed.

KERWIN and ESCHWEILER, JJ., took no

part.

NOTE-Penalizing Employer of Minor in Workmen's Compensation Act.-The case of Brenner v. Heruhen, 170 Wis. 565, 176 N. W. 228, was dissented from by two of the seven judges. In the dissenting opinion by Eschweiler, J., there is presented very strong reasoning to the effect that the Workmen's Compensation Act, being a statute not based upon fault, at all, or even on proximate cause, an amendment basing right for recovery of treble damages for employing a minor without permit is to recover upon a tort and, therefore, is an amendment (1) not germane to such an act, and (2) involves proximate cause.

The majority opinion, in that case, reasons that as under the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act there need be no delict on the part of employer to give a right of action to employee, you may classify so that a minor working with out permit may be entitled as the statute provides for treble damages. But in this, it seems to us, there is a classification of employers at fault, in some cases, when the general scheme is that fault is not considered in any case. It seems to this annotator, therefore, that the scheme of Workmen's Compensation Act is departed from, and while single damages may be recovered for, because the question of fault is not involved in their recovery, yet when additional damages are sought, you must rely on fault contributing to injury of employee. In other words, the statute may provide, that fault by employer in employing a minor does not exclude the minor from the benefits of Workmen's Compensation Act, but, if he applies for relief thereunder this is his privilege, but the recovery should be pro tanto only as to his actual damages.

But should his damages be treble as the statute provides? It seems to me they should be, but the question of fault and of fault being the proximate cause of injury is to be considered, and, if found to exist, the recovery should be three times that under the Compensation Act less what the minor realizes in his judgment thereunder; in other words, the recovery under negligence of employer should be for double damages.

We have discovered no legislation of the kind except in Wisconsin, and the main and dissenting opinions in the Brenner case do not cite any but Wisconsin cases.

The majority opinion there says: "It was no doubt a consideration of those (certain) facts that induced the Legislature to permit injuries to minors of permit age employed without a permit in direct violation of law, to be compensated for under the Workmen's Compensation Act upon condition that treble compensation should be paid. It was within the legislative field to prescribe reasonable conditions for permitting injuries under such employments to be so compensated. But this could be effectuated by giving the minor his single recovery where no question of fault would be involved and allowing recovery as to the two-thirds where fault had to be shown on the part of employer. That being shown the jury could be instructed that if there was a finding for plaintiff, his damages should be twice that of his recovery under the Compensation Act. In this way the employer could have his ordinary judicial day in court and the only burden put upon the minor would be that put on any other suitor not coming under the Compensation Act. except that his damages could not exceed or come below what is the measurement under the Compensation Act. State policy as to minors would be given force and the scheme of the Compensation Act also recognized. It also would not involve a sort of double rule in classification in remedies as regards employees under an act putting all on the same footing. The question, while not capable of much annotation, is interesting in the matter of right of classification of employees under Workmen's Compensation

Acts.

Act, § 57n, denying to claims not proved within one year the right to share in the bankrupt estate, does not deny to any creditor the right to share in a fund offered by the bankrupt to his creditors in composition and distributed under 12. In re Englander's, Inc., U. S. D. C., 267 Fed. 1012.

4. Discharge. Discharge in bankruptcy will not bar the right of a surety who paid debt due from the bankrupt, where the surety was not given the required notice, and had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings prior to payment, even though the debt was scheduled and other creditors given notice.Dodgen v. McCrea, Tex., 225 S. W. 71.

5.- -Misrepresentation.-A false statement on which a bankrupt obtained money or propert on credit, which will bar his discharge, under Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, subd. 3, must be a financial statement, as distinguished from a mere misrepresentation.-In re Morgan, U. S. C. C. A., 267 Fed. 959.

6. Moral Obligation.-A debt discharged in bankruptcy is not in fact paid but the debtor is relieved from payment while the moral obligation remains unsatisfied, and is a sufficient consideration to support a promise to revive and pay the debt.-Holden v. Chamberlain, N. D., 179 N. W. 707.

7. Preference.-Generally a creditor holding two debts at the same time, on one of which he has received a preference, may not prove the other in bankruptcy proceedings without surrendering his preference on the first.-In re Dix, U. S. D. C., 267 Fed. 1016.

8. Surety. The surety on the bond of road contractors was not released because two of the principals became bankrupt and were discharged.-Kimmel v. State, Ind., 128 N. E. 708. 9. Bills and Notes-Negotiation.-A negotiable note being payable to the order of a specified person, the indorsement of such person is necessary to the further negotiation of the instrument, and when the same is indorsed in blank, not specifying any indorsee, it is thereafter payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery. Stevens v. Pierce, Okla., 193 Pac. 417. 10. Brokers-Binding Contract.-Before he is entitled to a commission, a broker must obtain a binding written contract from his client, obligating him to purchase the owner's land on the terms specified in the contract of employment, or bring to the owner a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on those terms.-Cook v. Salisbury, Mo., 225 S. W. 112.

11. Dual Employment.-A broker cannot recover a commission for furnishing a purchaser for land, where he was under employment by the proposed purchaser at the same time he was acting for the seller, without disclosing to the seller that he was the agent of the purchaser.Gardner v. Buechler, Conn., 111 Atl. 589.

12. Revocation.-One who contracts with a broker to procure a purchaser for property. without time prescribed within which the broker must exercise his authority to procure a buyer. after a reasonable time may revoke the authority in good faith, and end the broker's right to commission; but if negotiations are pending with a buyer procured by the broker, and i latter's authority is revoked in bad faith, and to evade payment of commission, the employer is not relieved from such payment.-Baskett v. Jones, Ky., 225 S. W. 158.

13. Carriers of Live Stock-Delay.-Before carrier can be held liable for delay of interstate shipment, shipper must show negligence or some other fault on carrier's part.-Miller v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co., Mo., 225 S. W. 116.

14. Carriers of Passengers-Proximate Cause. -In an action by a passenger against a carrier to recover for personal injuries, recovery will not be barred by reason of negligence of the plaintiff unless the evidence establishes that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.-Guilfoile v. Smith, Conn., 111 Atl. 593.

21. Holding Out Agent.-Where a corporation conducted business through its secretary. such a way as to induce those with whom it dealt to assume that secretary had power as its general agent and could contract on its behalf, the corporation, as it can act only throug. agents, would be estopped to deny the secretary's authority.-Hopkins v. Paradise Height. Fruit Growers' Ass'n, Mont., 193 Pac. 389. 22.-Secret Profits.-In corporation's action against promoter to recover secret profits realized on sale to corporation, the promoter, occupying a fiduciary relation toward the corporation and his associates therein, has the burde of showing that he made full disclosure of fact that he was profiting by the transaction.Victor Oil Co., v. Drum, Cal., 193 Pac. 243.

for

23. Slander.-A corporation is liable oral defamation by an agent only when it expressly authorized the agent to utter the defamation or ratified it thereafter.-Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. v. Lillich, Ala., 86 So. 383.

24.- -Subscriptions to Stock.-One who is induced by false and fraudulent representations to subscribe to the stock of a corporation, and promptly repudiates such subscription, and attempts to have it cancelled, upon the discovery of the fraud in its procurement, cannot be held liable, after the insolvency of such corporation,

for an assessment against him for the purpose of raising a fund to pay its debts.-Stalnaker v. Gum, W. Va., 104 S. E. 730.

25.

There is no

Covenants-Restrictions. valid difference in principle between a restrictive covenant made by a vendee for the benefit of land retained by the vendor, and one made by vendor touching his remaining land for the benefit of that conveyed to his vendee.-Cole v. Seamonds, W. Va., 104 S. E. 747.

26. Criminal Law-Accomplice.-An "accomplice" is a person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly participates in the commission of the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, or, not being present, has advised or encouraged its commission.-State v.. Grimmett, Ida., 193 Pac.

380.

27.Accomplice. The term "accomplice" means a partaker in the commission of a crime, a person who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal offender unites in the commission of a crime; one of the tests of an accomplice being that, if the partaker can be indicted and punished for the crime for which the accused is being tried, he is an accomplice; otherwise not.-State v. Turnbow, Ore., 193 Pac.

485.

28.Good Faith.-In prosecution for grand larceny by stealing sawlogs, instruction that if the jury found the defendant took the logs but claimed ownership and manifested by words and acts at the time, then this would rebut any felonious taking under the law, and defendant was not guilty, was properly refused, since it disregarded the element of good faith in the claim of ownership.-Bridgman v. State, Ark., 225 S. W. 1.

29.- -Subornation of Perjury.-"Subornation of perjury" consists in procuring or instigating another to commit the crime of perjury, and, though it is accessorial in its nature, it is an offense separate and distinct from perjury, su that a defendant accused of that offense may be tried before the conviction of the perjurer.--State v. Chambers, N. C., 104 S. E. 670.

30.- -Suspended Sentence. Where accused seeks the benefit of the suspended sentence act. it is not necessary that the fact that he had never been convicted of a felony be proved by the record, since a record may be the best evidence of an affirmative fact but is not required to negative the existence of a given fact. Rogers v. State, Tex., 225 S. W. 57.

31. Death-Damages.-The measure of damages to parents for the death of a minor son never been convicted of a felony be proved by maintaining himself, is the amount they would have had a reasonable expectation of receiving to negative the existence of a given fact.Williams, Tex., 225 S. W. 89.

32. Deeds-Delivery.-There can be no delivery of a deed by a dead hand, since a deed as such must operate, if at all, inter vivos.-Mumpower v. Castle, Va., 104 S. E. 706.