17. Removal of Building Unlawfully Erected. The demolishing or removal of a wooden building erected within the fire limits at a time when such construction was unlawful under the city charter and ordinances does not violate the United States Constitution.-Maguire v. Reardon, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 256.

18. Statute Requiring Use of English Language.-Acts 38th Gen. Assem. c. 198, prohibiting the use of any but the English language in teaching children under the eighth grade in private and public schools secular subjects, held not unconstitutional as an infringement on personal liberty in violation of Const. art. 1, § 1State v. Bartels, Iowa, 181 N. W. 509. 19.

of

V.

Contracts—"Information."-Disclosure possibility of sellng advertising space did not entitle plaintiff to percentage of receipts under contract to furnish "information."-Masline New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., Conn., 112 Atl. 639. 20. Mutuality. In a contract whereby one party agreed to establish plants for the bottling of the syrup manufactured by the other party as a carbonated beverage, the promise of the manufacturer to sell the syrup at a stipulated price was not given alone in return for the agreement to buy at that price, which stated no quantity, so as to be void for want of mutuality, but was supported also by the agreement of the bottling company to establish plants, which it had performed, even though the title to those plants was retained by the bottling company, since the consideration is the matter of inducement to a contract whether it be the compensation which is paid, or the inconvenience which is suffered by the party from whom it proceeds.-The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., U. S. D. C., 269 Fed. 796.

Creditors.

Only those

21. Corporations creditors who extend credit to the corporation on the faith of its capital stock being paid up can complain of the fact that it is unpaid.-Bobb v. Walmar Theatre Co., Mo., 227 S. W. 841.

22. Repurchase of Stock.-One employed as superintendent by a corporation, who purchased under his contract of employment stock of the corporation, which agreed to repurchase it on the superintendent's discharge, was not entitled to recover on his discharge from a new corporation formed by purchasers of the tangible property of the old corporation, including its contracts, in the absence of a showing that the new corporation had knowledge of the contract or what relation the organizers of the new corporation had to the corporation.-Buehler v. United States Fashion Plate Co., Pa., 112 Atl. 632.

23. Drains-Drainage District Not "Corporation."-Drainage districts, created under statutory by county boards for special tax purposes only, unless expressly made so by the statute, are not corporations, with capacity to sue and be sued.-Bates County, Mo. v. Wills, U. S. C. C. A., 269 Fed. 734.

24. Revetment.-Instead of one-man riprap, much heavier stone was used in a considerable portion of the revetment work, which was more substantial and better construction and cost less than if one-man riprap had been used. Held that, as the work was being done for the benefit of the railroad company, the stipulation as to the character of the stone to be used might be waived without the consent of the drainage district, and further held that there was a substantial compliance with the terms of the contract, and held also that appellant was estopped by its conduct to contend otherwise.-Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Kans., 195 Pac. 983.

25. Electricity-Proximate Cause of Injury.Where defendant strung electric light wires on the same poles beneath telephone wires, one of which broke and fell across an electric wire defectively insulated, the end of the telephone wire resting upon the ground, and plaintiff took hold of it to remove it from his yard and was

injured, the hazard must have been visible to defendant, and plaintiff, if not negligent, was entitled to recover; the failure to insulate, and not the breaking of the telephone wire, being the proximate cause.-Godbey v. Grinnell Electric & Heating Co., Iowa, 181 N. W. 498.

26. Executors and Administrators Judgment Liens-The exclusive right of a personal representative to institute a suit for subjection of the real estate of his decedent to payment of the debts of the latter, in view of insufficiency of the personal estate for such purpose, within six months after qualification, accorded by section 7 of chapter 86 of the Code, does not stay, nor constitute ground for staying, prosecution of a suit for enforcement of judgment liens, instituted against such decedent in his lifetime, under the provisions of chapter 139 of the Code. nor does the commencement of a suit by the personal representative under said section 7 of chapter 86, within such six-month period, constitute ground of dismissal of the suit so previously instituted.-First Nat. Bank of Webster Springs v. De Berriz, W. Va., 105 S. E. 900. 27. Machinery and Sawmill on Government Property Not Fixture.-Machinery placed in a sawmill erected on piles on the tideland, within a forest reservation, so that the title to the land remained in the government, and which could be removed from the mill without injury to the building, are not fixtures; but the seller can reclaim them under his conditional sale contract from the trustee in bankruptcy of the millowner.-In re Craig Lumber Co., U. S. C. C. A., 269 Fed. 755.

Fixtures

28.- -Ownership of Chattel. Purchaser of land to which a chattel has been annexed is not bound by an agreement between the previous owner of the land and the owner of the chattel that annexation should not change the legal character of the chattel or affect its ownership, without notice or knowledge of such agreement, but is entitled to the chattel so annexed as a part of the land.-Atlantic Refining Co. v. Feinberg, Del., 112 Atl. 685.

29. Food-Adulteration.-It is not necessary that an article of food, in order to be unlawfully adulterated or misbranded, within the Pure Food and Drugs Act (Comp. St. §§ 8178728), be dangerous to the public.-United States v. Krumm, U. S. D. C., 269 Fed. 848.

30. Gas-Not Public Utility.-A corporation owning and operating gas wells, and selling its product to industries and public service corporations, held not a "public utility," within the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, and not subject to the authority of the State Corporation Commission.-Nowata County Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co., U. S. C. C. A., 269 Fed. 742. 31. Gifts-Bank Deposit. Where decedent deposited $600 in bank to the credit of herself "or" another, with intention that on her death the deposit should go to the other, though either of them could have checked out the deposit, decedent had the right to revoke the gift to the other, which she did effectually by having the name of the other stricken from the account on the books of the bank and on the passbook. Swedesboro Nat. Bank v. Richman. Ñ. J., 112 Atl. 595.

32. Guaranty-Accommodation Indorser.-An accommodation payee and indorser of a note, indemnified against loss resulting from his indorsement, by a deed of trust on property of the principal debtor, which also secures payment of the note, and further indemnified against such loss by a guaranty agreement be tween him and other persons, which contains a clause obligating them to repay to him any sum he should be compelled to pay by reason of his indorsement, cannot actively participate in, or cause, such a disposition of the property on which the debt is secured as will inflict direct and inevitable loss upon the guarantors, and still hold them liable to him upon their contract of guaranty.-Miller v. Lilly, W. Va. 105 S. E. 826.

33. Highways-Purpose of Good Roads.-The purpose of the Good Roads Act was to obtain roads of a durable or permanent character, and

durable is not limited to roads capable of withstanding the wear of the traffic upon them, but must be considered in reference to availability for public travel and general road purposes, so that a road which would be subject to inundation at periodic intervals, and which would be buried by proposed levee work in connection with a drainage district and reclamation project, cannot be considered durable.-Gammon V. McKevitt, Cal., 195 Pac. 726.

34. Side Path-The state, which by Highway Law, § 176, has assumed liability for damages from defects in county highways maintained by the state by the patrol system, county highways being defined by section 3, subd. 2, as those constructed or imposed at the joint expense of state, etc., is not liable for injury from defect in sidepath over sluiceway; neither being part of the county highway which the state had constructed, and maintenance of which it had assumed.-Kibner v. State, N. Y., 186 N. Y. S. 654.

35. Insurance-Fidelity Bond.-In a bond insuring an employer against losses sustained by reason of conduct of an employee constituting embezzlement the word "embezzlement" is to be constructed broadly in its general and popular sense, rather than in a narrow and technical spirit with specific reference to the local statute; and a loss occasioned by the employee's speculating on the market in the name of the employer, but without his knowledge or consent, is within the protection of the bond.-Mitchell Grain & Supply Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Kans., 195 Pac. 978.

36. Lex Loci Contractus.-A policy issued by an insurance corporation of a certain state to a person within such state was a contract of such state, and matters pertaining to construction and validity of the policy were to be determined by the laws thereof.-Headley v. Central Life Ins. Co. of Illinois, Mo., 227 S. W. 920.

37. Parol Contract.-A parol contract for present insurance made by a local agent of an insurance company, if within the scope of his authority, is binding upon the company.-Koivisto v. Bankers' & Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., Minn., 181 N. W. 580.

38.- -Standard Form.-Parties to a fire insurance contract are not prohibited, by Laws 1917, c. 440, amending Insurance Law, § 121, and the standard fire insurance policy thereby adopted, from agreeing, in consideration of a reduced rate for the insurance to the assured, that an 80 per cent, average or co-insurance clause shall be attached to the standard form of policy. whereby, if assured does not carry insurance to the extent of 80 per cent, or more, of the value of the property, the insurer shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the sum insured bears to 80 per cent of the actual value of the property at the time of the loss.-Aldrich v. Great American Ins. Co., New York, N. Y., 186 N. Y. S. 569.

39. Intoxicating Liquors-Possession of Unusual Quantity.-The presumption from the possession of unusual quantities of intoxicating liquors, that such liquors are kept for illegal sale, arising under Code, § 2427, as amended by Acts 37th Gen. Assem. c. 323, is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by competent and sufficient proof; but in determining whether or not injunction should be granted as against a liquor nuisance the court is not limited to the presumption arising from possession of the quantity of liquor, but may consider other competent and proper evidence.-McMillan v. Sumner, Iowa, 181 N. W. 464.

are

40. Landlord and Tenant-Negligent Repairs. -If repairs undertaken by the landlord made in a careless and negligent manner, he is liable to the tenant for such damages as are the proximate result of such negligence.-Oscar Ruff Drug Co. v. Western Iowa Co., Iowa, 181 N. W. 408.

41. Recovery of Personalty.-In an action by a tenant to recover the value of personal property alleged to have been wrongfully withheld from him by the landlord after plaintiff relinquished possession, plaintiff should have shown that the personalty in question could not

have been secured by him had he requested their delivery from the person in possession.-Kull v. Mastbaum & Fleisher, Pa., 112 Atl. 631.

42. -Termination of Lease.-Where, on July 17th, a lessor exercised her option to terminate a lease because of the nonpayment of rent on demand, the lessees' possession thereafter was wrongful and the lessor's interference therewith could furnish no legal basis for the recovery of damages because the lessees were compelled to sell their merchandise at a loss and move from the premises.-Parish v. Studebaker, Cal., 195 Pac. 721.

a

(

43. Mandamus - Want of Funds. Want of funds is a complete answer to petition for mandamus to compel governing authorities of to political corporation pay a judgment against the corporation unless the corporation has authority to collect revenues with which to pay the judgment.-State v. New River Drainage District, La., 87 So. 310.

44. Master and Servant-Course of Employment. Where train crew had been relieved from service under the Hours of Service Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8678) but had obtained permission from train dispatcher to ride into a terminal on the first train going in that direction, and where under the rules of the company the employees were paid while deadheading into the terminal, the employees, though not on duty within the Hours of Service Act while deadheading into the terminal, were in the employ of the railroad at such time within the Workmen's Compensation Act.-Payne v. Industrial Commission, Ill., 129 N. E. 830.

-

45. Policeman a Public Officer. One appointed as policeman of the city of Elhart by the board of metropolitan police commissioners in accordance with the Metropolitan Police Act of 1897 (Laws 1897. c. 59), as amended by the acts 1907 (Laws 1907, c. 175), 1909 (Laws 1909, c. 56), and 1911 (Laws 1911, c. 75), was a "public officer," and not an "employee," of the city. as defined by Workmen's Compensation Act, § 76, el. "b."-Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 129 N. E. 878.

46. -Regular Employment. Plaintiff, employed for a particular job of unloading and placing heavy machinery on foundations, was not in "regular or stable employment" within the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois, so that injuries to him did not fall within the act. -Ray v. Commercial Acid Co., Mo., 227 S. W. 851. 47. Risk of Negligence. An assistant brakeman riding on the rear of a string of cars does not assume the risk of negligence by the brakeman in control of the movements of the cars while employed in interstate commerce, since to charge him with assumption of such risk would in effect nullify the provision of the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) authorizing recovery a showing that one of the co-operating causes of the injury was a negligent act or omission of a co-employee.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Porter, Ala., 87 So. 288.

on

48. Violation of Ordinance.-A boy under 16. employed by defendant in violation of ordinance to operate a power freight elevator, who was told by defendant's superintendent when he left the elevator to lock it, and that if a horn blew it was a signal that some one else wanted to use it, and that he should go to the shaft and release the locking device, was engaged in the performance of his duties when so unlocking the elevator, so that his injury would not have occurred had the ordinance relative to his employment been complied with.-Plate v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., Mo., 227 S. W. 899.

49. Mortgages-"Deficiency."-Where, in a suit brought for the foreclosure of a mortgage, there is a cross-bill to foreclose a senior mortgage upon a portion of the same property, which cross-bill, contains a prayer for a "deficiency" decree against a party defendant in said suit, who is a former owner of such senior mortgage and the indebtedness secured thereby, for moneys received by such former owner in part payment of such indebtedness, but not applied

thereon, which he has no right to retain, the word "deficiency," being inapt, may be disregarded, and a decree entered in accordance with such prayer. Commercial Bank v. First Nat. Bank, Fla., 87 So. 315.

50. Municipal Corporations - Railroad Property. A railroad roadbed and right of way is held for a public use, and its value for such use is not enhanced by the improvement of an adjacent street, so that, as a general rule,

such property cannot be assessed for the improvement of the street.-People v. City of Buffalo, N. Y., 186 N. Y. S. 590.

as

51.- -Specifications for Materials. Laws 1919, p. 884 permitting patented articles to be specified and used for constructing public highway, if the specifications are drawn so to provide for an alternative method of construction, so that competition may be had, is constitutional and not invalid as permitting contracts for such improvements to be made without competition.-City of Rockford v. Schultz, Ill., 129 N. E. 865.

52. Nuisance-Joint Tort-Feasors. - Separate companies who wrongfully operated their cement plants so that deposits of cement dust were incrusted on the leaves of plaintiff's orange trees were not joint tort-feasors merely on account of the commingling of the dust from their plants; each being liable only for its particular proportion of the damage resulting from the dust emitted into the atmosphere from the plants of both.-California Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., Cal., 195 Pac. 694.

53. Principal and Agent Salesman's Lost Profits. In an action against the manufacturer of gasoline engines for breach of its contract employing a salesman, whereby it agreed to pay him commissions, the amount of the profits or commissions lost by plaintiff salesman on account of defendant manufacturer's breach held for the jury under the evidence.-Huntington v. Jacob Haish Co., Iowa, 181 N. W. 480.

54. Principal and Surety-Release.-Where a creditor releases or permits to be lost a security for a debt, other sureties are thereby released to that extent.-Alexander Lumber Co. v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., Ill., 129 N. E. 871.

55. Property Secret Process Salable Property. A secret process or formula for the manufacture of an article is one in which property rights can exist, and such rights can be sold in whole or in part, so long as the process remains valuable because it is secret. The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., U. S. D. C., 269 Fed. 796.

56. Public Service Commissions.-Change of Prices. The price fixed in a contract between a public service corporation and its customers may be changed, and a different rate fixed, by a public service commission created under the police power of the state, even though the contract was in existence before the state commission was created and given such authority.Nowata County Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co., U. S. C. C. A., 269 Fed. 742.

57. Railroads - Negligence. Evidence that, after an engineer saw cattle strung out across a highway crossing he merely blew the whistle and turned open the steam cocks to scare them off and instead of slackening the speed of the train increased it, made a question of fact for the jury as to his negligence, though he testified that as soon as he saw the danger he began to slow up.-Murray v. Hines, Mo., 227 S. W. 860. 58. Proximate Cause of Injury.-A drunken man sleeping on a trolley track can recover for injuries inflicted by a car only by showing that his continuing passive negligence was not the proximate cause of his injury, but that the supervening negligence of defendant's servants in failing to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him after they had knowledge, actual or imputed, of his peril, and of his inability to save himself, was the sole proximate cause.-Carson v. Connecticut Co., Conn., 112 Atl. 646.

59.-Side Track Connection.-A shipper's agreement to execute a side-track contract, the terms of which are not stated, as a condition of a railroad company's relocation of a side track

and its extension to his grain elevator to be built is without consideration, and is unenforceable because his right to side-track connection with his elevator built on expectation of connection is secured by Public Utilities Act, § 45, and he is not precluded from invoking the action of the commission to compel the company to furnish a side track, because he refused to execute a contract authorizing the company to discontinue connection on its own volition without his fault and requiring him to assume liaPublic bility for the company's negligence. Utilities Com'n v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., Ill., 129 N. E. 869.

60. Receivers Counsel.-A receiver has not the power to employ counsel without leave or sanction of the court which appointed him. Nevertheless, where a receiver employs counsel without specific order authorizing the employment and such counsel performs services for the receiver during the term of the receivership, counsel fees are within the just allowance that may be made by the chancellor.-Keating v. Fuller, Ga., 105 S. E. 844.

61.

Sales-Delay in Delivery.-Mere acceptance of a thing sold will not bar defendant's counterclaim for damages for delay in an action for the purchase price, but defendant's willingness to cancel the order and subsequent expressed satisfaction with delivery on a certain date would authorize a finding that acceptance of the things sold constituted a waiver of the delay down to such date.-J. F. Pennell, Inc., v. New Jersey Brass Corporation, N. Y., 186 N. Y. S. 606.

62. Indefinite Contract.-An alleged contract of sale of cattle in which the purchaser agrees to pay for the cattle "the best price obtainable" is so indefinite and uncertain as to be unenforceable.-Schreiner v. Shanahan, Neb., 181 N. W. 536.

63.- -Vesting of Title. When a bale of worsted clippings was made up, tagged, and put aside in a deliverable state awaiting the call of defendant buyer's truckman, there was an unconditional appropriation of the goods to the contract for their purchase with the implied consent of the buyer under Sale of Goods Act (Personal Property Law) § 100, rule 4.-George Boike & Co. v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, N. Y., 186 N. Y. S. 624.

64. Taxation Assignment of Deposit. Where, in satisfaction of a debt, a depositor shortly before his death drew a check, intending it as an assignment of the deposit, the inheritance tax law did not apply to the transfer. -Dunlap v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, Cal., 195 Pac. 688.

65. Double.-To levy a tax on lands owned by corporations and then to take the value of shares owned by a bank into account in estimating the tax to be levied on the bank's stock would be double taxation, not warranted by the statutes.-State v. Harris, Mo., 227 S. W. 818.

67. Usury-Renewal Note.-The giving of a new note in renewal of a previous one is not a payment thereof as contemplated by section 3 of article 14 of the Constitution, and section 1005, Rev. Laws 1910. These sections contemplate an actual payment, and not a promise to pay in the future.-Elson v. Walker, Okla., 195 Pac. 899.

-

68. Waters and Water Courses Inequality of Rates.-The fact that the rates fixed by the Public Utility Commissioners for all municipalities served by a water company, except a city with which such company had a contract fixing rates, gave the company a return of 7 per cent on its property serving the outside municipalities, while the contract rate gave a return of less than 22 per cent on the value of the property serving the city, shows discrimination which calls for immediate action by the Utility Commissioners, so that an order refusing to consider the rates in the city having the contract must be reversed, though it might be found after a hearing that the situation in that city, including the contract, justified the discrimination.-Hackensack Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs., N. J., 112 Atl. 595.

Central Law Journal.

St. Louis, Mo., May 20, 1921.

THE CAMPAIGN TO MODERNIZE FEDERAL PROCEDURE AT LAW.

Our esteemed friend and Associate Editor, Mr. Thomas W. Shelton of Norfolk, Va., has again been appointed by the American Bar Association to lead the fight for the passage through the present Congress of the bill approved by the Association to give the Supreme Court power to make rules of procedure for the federal courts at law, as they have already done in equity. This bill, which has been approved over and over again by bar associations with ever increasing enthusiasm, has been introduced in every Congress for the last six years, and each time has passed the House but failed in the Senate. For the information of our readers we set out this bill in haec verba:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time and in any manner, the forms of writs and all other process; the mode and manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings; of giving notice and serving writs and process of all kinds; of taking and obtaining evidence; drawing up, entering, and enrolling orders; and generally to regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and the kind and character of the entire pleading, practice, and procedure to be used in all actions, motions, and proceedings at law of whatever nature by the district courts of the United States and the courts of the District of Columbia. That in prescribing such rules the Supreme Court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of pleading, practice, and procedure in said courts, so as to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits.

Sec. 2. That when and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall be promulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force and effect.

This bill would follow the English reform of 1873, in turning over to the Supreme Court the responsibility as well as the power to make rules of procedure which would not have the quality of being rigid and inelastic like a statute. The result in England has been to so simplify pleading and practice that cases no longer stick in the bark or ride off to defeat over some mistake in preparing or presenting the case for trial, but each case is decided upon its merits. Justice Darling at one time expressed surprise that American. courts of last resort were kept so busy deciding points of pleading, practice and evidence. He said that rarely do such questions ever present themselves to an appellate court in England. Once when Mr. John D. Lawson was sitting with the English Appeals Court as a representative of the American Bar Association which had sent him to England to investigate procedure under the Judicative Act, an attorney raised the objection that certain qualified and competent testimony had been excluded in the trial court. To his surprise, said Mr. Lawson, the presiding justice ordered the witness, whose testimony had been excluded, brought in and, after hearing his testimony, decided that it was merely cumulative and would not have affected the verdict, and therefore affirmed the decision.

Under English rules of court, if a rule of evidence or pleading does not work well the Rules Committee of the Court immediately changes it. In other words, no one can base any rights on a rule of procedure. He must present his case to the court on its merits. Many of the obsolete and indefensible common law rules of pleading and evidence have been abolished in England so that the solicitor's clerks are able to take care of such matters. The demurrer is abolished and in its place the Rules Committee substituted the more intelligible "objection in point of law." This is usually raised after the facts are heard, or when both parties submit the case on practically an agreed statement. Demurrers to

form are unknown and therefore there is little trouble getting into court with your case and staying there. A special master, however, representing the Court, gets the issues ready for trial and he, rather than the parties, is responsible for the state of the pleadings, as he has authority to bring the parties to a real issue before the case gets in court at all, since the pleadings are not filed with the court until the case is ready for trial. (See Rosenbaum's Rule Making Authority p. 93).

It would be interesting to review Mr. Rosenbaum's book (just cited) to show the tremendous advantage the English lawyer has over the American lawyer in the mere matter of preparation of pleadings alone. The author's assurances that no case can be lost in England because of a defective pleading, that variances are practically unknown in view of the liberal rule as to amendments and that the master and not the lawyers control the pleadings and make up the issues, will indicate that so far as procedure is concerned, a lawsuit is no longer a battle of wits but a sincere effort to present to the court the heart of every case and secure a judgment on the merits. To American lawyers, this is an ideal worthy of their best efforts.

No one has worked harder to realize this ideal of simplifying and modernizing procedure than has Mr. Shelton. He has traveled from one end of the country to the other, interesting lawyers and laymen

alike in the American Bar Association's bill to simplify procedure in the federal courts. He secured for it the endorsement of forty-five state bar associations and many civic and commercial organizations. He presented it in four successive sessions of Congress, supported it with briefs and personal appearances. He has been ably supported by Mr. Root and Mr. Taft, who appeared with him before the Senate Committees. He is now on the eve of departure for Canada and England, where he will study the English procedure at first hand and bring back more facts with which to

start a real fire under the Senate Judiciary Committee, where one or two men, by reason of senatorial courtesy, have been able to hold up this reform.

We wish to say that we are heartily behind Mr. Shelton and the American Bar Association in their effort to secure the adoption of this reform and wel urge our readers to support the unselfish efforts of Mr. Shelton's Committee by writing their Congressmen and Senators to support the bill which will be introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, and in the House by Congressman Andrew Volstead, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. In support of the present campaign Mr. Shelton contributes an article in the American Bar Association Journal in which he states the purposes of the bill for which the Association is making its supreme effort this year. He says:

"This bill should be passed in the shortest time. It has been so long before Congress (eight years) that it is familiar to every statesman. Its purpose and effect is to give to the Supreme Court of the United States the authority to make rules governing the procedure in cases at law to the same extent that it now has power to regulate the procedure in equity, admiralty and bankruptcy. Nothing novel is involved.

"To the student it is the key that will unlock the door to a new era of scientific judicial relations. It will set the judges and lawyers free to perfect the machinery of the courts for which they are obviously held sorely responsible by laymen. Congress at present receives no censure while it is wholly responsible for bad procedural conditions. Upon the passage of the bill a united bench and bar will co-operate with the Supreme Court in first constructing and then in gradually perfecting a simple, correlated, scientific system of rules of procedure and practice, in lieu of the present complicated so-called "federal practice." It is intended that this system of rules shall embrace all the merits and none of the vices of both "common law" and "code" pleading.

"Its featural merit will be a patriotic effort to administer, instead of impeding, jus tice by the lawyer who is now sworn to up