Subjects of Copyright.

The provisions of this section in relation to photographs are constitutional. Sarony v. Burrow G. L. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 591; Schreiber v. Thornton, 17 Fed. Rep. 603; s. c. 15 C. L. N. 424.

The statute was passed for the encouragement of learning, and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with learning or science. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382.

Literary merit is not a necessary element of a legal copyright. Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond 540.

The word "chart" as used in this section refers to a form of map. Ehret v. Pierce, 18 Blatch. 302; s. c. 10 Fed. Rep. 553.

An advertising card used to display the different colors of paints is not a subject of copyright. Ehret v. Pierce, 18 Blatch. 302; s. c. 10 Fed. Rep. 553.

Blank account books are not the subject of copyright. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99; s. c. 17 O. G. 1029.

The copyright of a book on bookkeeping does not confer upon the author the exclusive right to make, sell and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 ; s. c. 17 O. G. 1029.

A compilation of information that is useful in a counting-room is a proper subject of a copyright. Bullinger v. Mackey, 15 Blatch. 550.

A new arrangement of an old piece of music is a valid subject of copyright. Schuberth v. Shaw, 28 A. L. Reg. 248.

The word "print" is used in connection with "engraving, cut, and photograph." It means apparently a picture; something complete in itself, similar in kind to an engraving, cut or photograph. It clearly does not mean something printed on paper that is not intended for use as a picture, but is itself to be cut up and embroidered, and thus made into an entirely different article, as a balloon or a hanging basket. Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, 17 O. G. 1153; s. c. 2 Fed. Rep. 217.

If a chromo is clearly a work of artistic merit it is the subject of a copyright, although the person claiming the copyright expects to obtain his reward indirectly through an increase of profits in his business to be obtained through its gratuitous distribution. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97; s. c. 20 Blatch. 452.

The proprietor of a chromo which was wholly designed, manufactured and completed in a foreign country is not entitled to a copyright thereof. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97; s. c. 20 Blatch. 452.

The word "proprietor" has been used in the copyright laws in the limited and restricted sense of a person who has lawfully acquired the exclusive right of some native or resident artist or author. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97; s. c. 20 Blatch. 452.

The proprietor of a chromo which was invented by another can not claim a copyright therein, unless he shows an exclusive right lawfully derived from the inventor. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 27; s. c. 20 Blatch. 452.

The word "print" embraces lithographs. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97; s. c. 20 Blatch. 452.

Before an author can claim a copyright in the plan of arranging his materials, he must make it appear that his book exhibits a substantially new and original system of arrangement of such a character as to require invention. Bullinger v. Mackey, 15 Blatch. 550.

There may be a valid copyright in the plan of a book as connected with the arrangement and combination of the materials, and the mode of displaying and illustrating the subject, although all the materials employed and the subject of the work may be common to all other writers. Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 87.

A party who first brings together materials drawn from different sources is entitled to a copyright for a compilation. Gray v. Russell, 1 Story 11; Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine 393.

Where there is nothing immoral or improper in a print itself, the fact that it may be used by persons to violate the law does not of itself deprive it of the protection of the law. To do this it must appear either that there is something immoral, pernicious, or indecent in the thing per se, or that it is incapable of any use except in connection with some illegal or immoral act. Richardson v. Miller, 15 A. L. J. 340; s. c. 12 O. G. 3. A dramatic composition which is grossly indecent and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people is not the proper subject of a copyright. Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady 216; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 356.

No reporter can have any copyright in judicial decisions. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Wheat. 591; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 165.

A reporter of judicial decisions is entitled to a copyright of his work to the extent of his authorship of the composition contained therein. Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 165; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 362; Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 726; s. c. 10 Biss. 139.

Copyrights of the additions of a work other than the original editions are granted for additions to emendations of or improvements in the work, and every copyright should bear date of the day when it was secured. Lawrence v. Dana, 7 O. G. 81; s. c. 4 Cliff. 1; s. c. 2 A. L. T. (N. S.) 402.

The term "book" does not carry with it the requirement that it shall be printed. A book may exist without printing, and such book, when made or composed, is to be entitled to copyright. Roberts v. Myers, 23 Law Rep. 396; s. c. 17 Leg. Int. 405.

The literary property intended to be protected by the act is not to be determined by the size, form or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject-matter of the work. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382.

A daily or weekly publication of the state of the market is not the subject of a copyright. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382.

The preliminary steps required by law can not be reasonably applied to a work of so ephemeral a character as a newspaper. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382.

X

A book need not be a book in the common and ordinary acceptation of the word, viz., a volume made up of several sheets bound together. It may be printed only on one sheet. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382; Scoville v. Toland, 6 West. L. J. 84; Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond 540.

A chart which contains a series of diagrams interspersed with printed instructions as to the mode of using them in taking measurements for and cutting garments is the subject of copyright. Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond 540.

A label intended for no other use than to be pasted on vials or bottles containing a medicinal preparation is not the proper subject of a copyright. Scoville v. Toland, 6 West. L. J. 84; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean 516.

A written work consisting wholly of directions set in order for conveying the ideas of the author on a stage or public place by means of characters who represent the narrative wholly by action, is as much a dramatic composition as if language or dialogue were used in it to convey ideas. Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatch. 256.

A spectacular piece which consists almost wholly of scenic effects or representations, and in which the dialogue is very scant and meaningless, is not a dramatic composition. Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady 216; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 356.

Playing cards may be a proper subject of copyright. Richardson v. Miller, 15 A. L. J. 340; s. c. 12 O. G. 3.

A person who translates a dramatic composition with the consent of the author is entitled to a copyright. Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477.

A person who deposits in the copyright office the title of a drama not original with himself, can not secure to himself such title to the exclusion of others who have applied such title to a dramatic composition founded on the same story before the date of such deposit. Benn v. Leclercq, 30 Leg. Int. 185.

The musical composition contemplated by the statute must be substantially a new and original work, and not a copy of a piece already produced, with additions and variations which a writer of music with skill and experience might readily make. Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatch. 618; Reed v. Carusi, Taney 72.

If an engraving does not involve invention it is not a subject of copyright. Collender v. Griffith, 11 Blatch. 212; s. c. 3 O. G. 689.

A photograph is not a print, cut or engraving. Wood v. Abbott, 5 Blatch. 325.

A publication of a new and revised set of rules regularly adopted by the court is not a republication of the prior rules. Banks v. McDivett, 13 Blatch. 163; s. c. 8 O. G. 860.

Parties.

To constitute an author, the person must, by his own intellectual labor, applied to the materials of his composition, produce an arrangement or compilation new in itself. Atwell v. Ferrett, 2 Blatch. 39.

No person is entitled to a copyright in alterations and improvements made by others at his procurement and for him. Atwell v. Ferrett, 2 Blatch. 39.

No person is entitled to a copyright of an historical print which he did not invent or design, but which was invented, designed and engraved by others, although he employed them to do so. Binns v. Woodruff, 4

Wash. 48.

Although an author produces a work while in the general employment of another, yet he will not be deemed to have parted with his right and transferred it to his employer unless there is a valid agreement to that effect. Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 87.

If an actor agrees with the proprietor to write a drama and allow it to be performed at the theatre so long as it draws good audiences, he is entitled to copyright, and the proprietor is a mere licensee. Roberts v. Myers, 23 Law Rep. 396; s. c. 17 Leg. Int. 405; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 87.

If a person give contributions to the proprietor of a work, the title thereto is vested in the proprietor as the work is done, to the extent of the gift, and no assignment thereof is necessary. Lawrence v. Dana, 7 O. G. 81; s. c. 4 Cliff. 1; s. c. 2 A. L. T. (N. S.) 402.

If contributions are given to the proprietor of a work, he may take a copyright. Lawrence v. Dana, 7 O. G. 81; s. c. 4 Cliff. 1; s. c. 2 A. L. T. (N. S.) 402.

If contributions are given to be used in one edition of a work, the proprietor acquires no right to use them in any other edition. Lawrence v. Dana, 7 O. G. 81; s. c. 4 Cliff. 1; s. c. 2 A. L. T. (N. S.) 402.

The legal assignee of an author is competent to take out a copyright, although he takes it in trust for others. Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 362.

If a person accepts the office of reporter under a law which prohibits him from having any pecuniary interest therein or taking a copyright therefor, he thereby surrenders his rights as author, and can not confer them on another. Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 165.

If a person enters the employ of the government under a stipulation that all drawings and sketches made by him shall belong exclusively to it, and Congress orders them to be published, he is not entitled to a copyright. Heine v. Appleton, 4 Blatch. 125.

Unless there is a most unequivocal dedication of private letters and papers to the public or to some private person, the author has the exclusive right to a copyright thereof. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100.

The acts of the author in compiling the book may be proven by the testimony of others. Bullinger v. Mackey, 15 Blatch. 550.

Aliens.

The publisher of the work of a foreign author can secure the exclusive right to such publication only by the voluntary and unconstrained forbearance of the trade. Sheldon v. Houghton, 5 Blatch. 285.

The term "resident " means a permanent inhabitant. A mere transient visitant whose family, business, intentions and relations are all abroad can not be considered a resident, and the filing of a declaration of an intention to become a citizen can not make him one. Carey v. Collier, 56 Niles Reg. 262.

Residence ordinarily means domicile, or the continuance of a person in a place, having his home there. It is not actually necessary that he shall be the occupant of his own house. He may be a boarder or lodger in the house of another. The main question is as to the intention with which a man or person is staying in a particular place. In order to constitute residence it is necessary that a man shall go to a place with the intention of remaining, making it his home or place of abode. Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34; s. c. 16 A. L. Reg. 539.

If a party takes a house in this country with the intention of remaining here, he is a resident, although he may subsequently return to his own country. Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34; s. c. 16 A. L. Reg. 539.

In order to become a resident, the intention to remain must exist at the time when the party takes up his abode. Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34; s. c. 16 A. L. Reg. 539.

Infringement.

An author may be said to be the inventor or creator both of the ideas contained in his book and the combination of words to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive possession of his invention. But when he has published his book and given his thoughts, sentiments, knowledge or discoveries to the world, they become the common property of his readers, who have the right to use them and communicate them to others clothed in their own language, by lecture or treatise. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547; Keene v. Clarke, 5 Robt. 38.

The claim of literary property after publication can not be in the ideas or sentiments as dissevered from the language, idiom, style, or the outward semblance and exhibition of them. The author's exclusive property in the creation of his mind is only in the concrete form which he has given to it, and the language in which he has clothed it. When he has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. That is what the law terms copy or copyright. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186.

In questions of infringement of copyright, the inquiry is not whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions, information or discoveries promulgated by the original, but whether his composition may be considered a new work requiring invention, learning and judgment, or only a mere transcript of the whole or parts of the original, with merely colorable variations. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547.

A translation of an author's ideas and conceptions into another lan