A word which has been registered by another can not be registered as an essential element in a trade-mark. Strasburger & Co., 20 O. G. 155. The minor non-essential elements of a composite symbol of trade can not be registered as a trade-mark. Coats, 16 O. G. 544.

A combination of two symbols can not be registered if each has been previously registered separately. Smith, 16 O. G. 679.

A representation of a kernel of corn and the word "corn" can not be joined in one registration as a trade-mark. Peper, 16 O. G. 678.

A combination of two symbols may be registered, although another has previously registered one of them as a trade-mark for the same article. Cornwall et al., 12 O. G. 138.

If a trade-mark is so nearly like that owned by another as to mislead the public, it can not be registered. Coggin, Kidder & Co., 11 O. G. 1109.

An arbitrary combination of numerals, having no other meaning than to distinguish the applicant's goods in the market and indicate to purchasers that all goods having this mark have one and the same origin, may be used as a trade-mark. Dawes & Fanning, 1 O. G. 27.

The designation "lion," whether used pictorially, or written or printed, is a lawful trade-mark for a medicine for a particular disease. P. G. Weaver, 10 O. G. 1.

The registration of the mere name of a person, firm, corporation, place, or article, or a word or words indicating kind or quality, will be refused. Rowe & Post, 9 O. G. 496; Dundas, Dick & Co., 9 O. G. 538; Roach, 10 O. G. 333; Eagle Pencil Co., 10 O. G. 981.

If a person succeeds another in business he may register his name in connection with an arbitrary symbol as a trade-mark. Frieberg & Workum, 20 O. G. 1164.

The name of a person can not be registered as a trade-mark without his consent. Sullivan v. Burke, 16 O. G. 765

A trade-mark which consists merely of the name of the applicant can not be registered. Fairchild, 21 O. G. 789.

The name of a person can not be registered as a trade-mark, although it is accompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from the same name when used by others. Adriance Platt & Co., 20 O. G. 1820.

If the name of a patentee has become a generic name to describe the thing patented, the owner of the patent can not have the name registered as a trade-mark. Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., 14 O. G. 269.

If a patentee has several patents for similar articles, an owner of one patent can not have the name registered as a trade-mark. Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., 14 O. G. 269.

The assignee of a trade-mark may have it registered, although it was connected with a patent. Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., 16 O. G. 679.

A geographical name can not be registered as a trade-mark. Farnum & Co., 18 O. G. 413.

A geographical name can not be registered as a trade-mark, although it is joined with something else. Farnum & Co., 18 O. G. 413.

The name of a foreign place which is neither descriptive nor deceptive, but used in a merely fanciful signification, may be registered as a trademark. Cornwall Brothers, 12 O. G. 312.

The word "London" can not be registered as a trade-mark if its application is descriptive or deceptive. Knapp, 16 O. G. 318.

The word "Raleigh " can not be registered as a trade-mark for manufactured tobacco. Oliver, 18 O. G. 923.

An unlawful grant of a registration to one party is no reason why an unlawful grant of a registration of the same trade-mark should be made to another. Wright v. Simpson, 15 O. G. 968.

A trade-mark can not be registered to be used on "fancy goods," for the term has no well-known and ascertained meaning. There is therefore no practical or substantial limitation of the use. George Lisner, 13 O. G. 455.

If a name which originated with a party has been so frequently used that it has become generic to denote a certain article, it can not be registered. J. H. Hall & Co., 13 O. G. 229.

If a party having a trade-mark on a class of goods concedes that another is entitled to it on a particular description, the latter may have his registered. Sorg v. Welsh, 16 O. G. 910.

If the application does not set forth a lawful trade-mark, the applicant can not amend it by introducing a new trade-mark that is lawful. Elias Block & Co., 14 O. G. 235.

The applicant must designate the particular nation or Indian tribe in commerce with which the trade-mark has been used. Strasburger & Co., 20 O. G. 155.

The symbols and emblems of secret or other organizations may be registered as a trade-mark. W. C. Thomas, 14 O. G. 821.

The word "Masonic can not be registered as a trade-mark. Smith, 16 O. G. 764.

If the use of a name is entirely fanciful and arbitrary, the name may be registered as a trade-mark. Pace, Talbott & Co., 16 Ö. G. 909.

A waved band of ribbon attached to a cigar box may be registered as a trade-mark. Stratton & Storm, 18 O. G. 923.

If the applicant files a fac-simile of his trade-mark, the language of his description is restricted to such a symbol as will conform to the fac-simile. Duke v. Green, 16 O. G. 1094.

A likeness of a kernel of corn is not a fac-simile of the word "corn." Peper, 16 (). G. 678.

If one partner after the dissolution of a firm alone continues to use it upon the same article, he is entitled to have it registered. Simpson v. Wright, 15 O. G. 248.

If a firm which has acquired a trade-mark is dissolved, each becomes a tenant in common thereof, although one possesses the secret of manufacturing the article and neither is entitled to a registration. Wright v. Simpson, 15 O. G. 968.

When matter that is the proper subject of a trade-mark is apparently claimed by another, the applicant must establish his right to it before he can have it included in a register of a label. Jno D. Park, 12 O. G. 2.

If it appears that each party to an interference is entitled to an undivided half of a trade-mark, the applicant can not obtain a registration, for the law grants registration only to those entitled to the exclusive use of a trade-mark. McElwee v. Blackwell, 15 O. G. 658.

The word "French" to be applied to bronze paints can not be registered as a trade-mark, for it tends to deceive the public. J. Marsching & Co., 15 O. G. 294.

If one party has registered the word " swan as a trade-mark, another party can not have the words "black swan" registered as a trade-mark, for it tends to deceive the public. Jules E. Caire, 15 O. G. 248.

If a trade-mark so nearly resembles a prior trade-mark that has been registered as to be calculated to deceive the public, it can not be registered. Weisert Bros., 16 O. G. 680.

An applicant whose application for a trade-mark is refused can not have the fee refunded. Elias Block & Co., 14 O. G. 235.

A newly coined word may be registered as a trade-mark, though it is suggestive of the material from which the article stamped with it is made. Francis & Mallon, 3 Dec. Com. 283.

A person has no right to employ a sign or symbol which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth, and therefore with equal right. Pratt & Farmer, 10 Ó. G. 866.

Generic names and words descriptive of quality are common property, and no one has a right to an exclusive use of them. C. L. Hauthaway, 3 Dec. Com. 284; Solon Palmer, 3 Dec. Com. 289; C. E. Richardson et al., 3 O. G. 120.

Initial letters add nothing to a phrase which is not a lawful trade-mark without them; neither does the addition of a date help it any. J. G. Johnson & Co., 2 O. G. 315; Blakeslee & Co., 3 Dec. Com. 284.

Where the only essential portion of the trade-mark is descriptive and not distinguishing, registration should be denied. B. Graham, 2 O. G. 618; C. L. Hauthaway & Sons, 3 Dec. Com. 97; Robert J. Roberts, 3 Dec. Com. 113; E. Kane & Co., 9 O. G. 105; Dundas, Dick & Co., 9 O. G. 538.

Every emblem or device that can not be divested of its ordinary signification, and would be either descriptive or deceptive, is unlawful as a trade-mark. John F. Tolle, 2 O. G. 415; The American Sardine Co., 3 O. G. 495; American Lubricating Oil Co., 9 O. G. 687; Bennage v. Phillippi, 9 O. G. 1159.

A compound trade-mark, one of whose distinguishing features has already been appropriated and registered by another as applied to the same class of merchandise, can not be registered. J. Bush & Co., 10 O. G. 164.

It is no objection to a trade-mark that the several parts of which it is composed have been used separately, provided it is so distinct as not to deceive or mislead the public. Joseph P. Imbs, 10 O. G. 463.

It is sufficient if a trade-mark has an original and a distinctive signification as appertaining to the article. India Rubber Comb Co., 8 O. G. 905. Phrases which are merely descriptive of the quality of the article, or its destined use, can not be registered as trade-marks. Lawrence & Co., 10 O. G. 163; Edward Warburg & Co., 13 O. G. 44.

An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark may include in his specification either a whole class of merchandise or several specified descriptions thereof. Frank Boehm & Co., 8 O. G. 319.

If an individual permanently ceases to use his trade-mark, and consents to its use and adoption by another, he relinquishes his right to it. Kidd & Co., 5 0. G. 337.

If two or more applicants claim the same trade-mark, the matter may be referred to the Examiner of Interferences. Duke v. Green, 16 O. G. 1094.

On an interference proceeding the inquiry may extend to the ownership of the trade-mark as well as the priority of adoption. Hoosier Drill Co. v. Ingels, 14 O. G. 785.

An interference in trade-mark cases can properly be declared in accordance with the usual practice governing interference cases between applicants for patents. Lautz Bros. v. Schultz, 9 O. G. 791; McElwee, 13 O. G. 963.

If the applicant is not entitled to the trade-mark, it is not necessary to determine whether another is or not. Swift v. Peters, 11 O. G. 1110.

Although a party shows that he once used a trade-mark, yet he must show a continuous use in order to establish a present right to it. Jacobs v. Lopez, 23 O. G. 342.

In the absence of evidence, the party who files the first application is entitled to a trade-mark. Jacobs v. Lopez, 23 O. G. 342.

SEC. 4940 (Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 4, 22 Stat. 503). That certificates of registry of trade-marks shall be issued in the name of the United States of America, under the seal of the Department of the Interior, and shall be signed by the commissioner of patents, and a record thereof, together with printed copies of the specifications, shall be kept in books for that purpose. Copies of trade-marks and of statements and declarations filed therewith and certificates of registry so signed and sealed shall be evidence in any suit in which such trade-marks shall be brought in controversy.

Construction.

A certified copy is evidence only that what is shown by it to have been filed was filed. It is not evidence that anything required by the statute to be filed, and not shown by the certificate or by the statement annexed to it to have been filed, was filed. A general certificate of the commissioner can not be taken as evidence that the requirements of the law have been met. Smith v. Reynolds, 10 Blatch. 85; s. c. 3 O. G. 213.

The statement required by the statute is a separate and distinct thing from the declaration, and when the statute speaks of certified copies of the statement, it does not thereby include the declaration. Walker v. Reid, 2 C. L. B. 133.

A certificate which gives a copy of the statement and shows that a declaration was filed, is sufficient. Walker v. Reid, 2 C. L. B. 133.

SEC. 4941 (Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 5, 22 Stat. 503). That a certificate of registry shall remain in force for thirty years from its date; except in cases where the trade-mark is claimed for and applied to articles not manufactured in this country, and in which it receives protection under the laws of a foreign country for a shorter period, in which case it shall cease to have any force in this country by virtue of this act at the time that such trade-mark

ceases to be exclusive property elsewhere. At any time during the six months prior to the expiration of the term of thirty years such registration may be renewed on the same terms and for a like period.

SEC. 4942 (Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 6, 22 Stat. 503). That applicants for registration under this act shall be credited for any fee, or part of a fee, heretofore paid into the Treasury of the United States with intent to procure protection for the same trade-mark.

SEC. 4943 (Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 7, 22 Stat. 503). That registration of a trade-mark shall be prima facie evidence of ownership. Any person who shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any trademark registered under this act and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those described in the registration, shall be liable to an action on the case for damages for the wrongful use of said trade-mark, at the suit of the owner thereof; and the party aggrieved shall also have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the wrongful use of such trade-mark used in foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, as aforesaid, and to recover compensation therefor in any court having jurisdiction over the person guilty of such wrongful act; and courts of the United States shall have original and appellate jurisdiction in such cases without regard to the amount in controversy.

Construction.

If the trade-mark is for a combination, there is no infringement unless the whole combination is used. Tucker Manuf. Co. v. Boyington, 9 O. G. 455.

If a person who has acquired the exclusive use of a mark for particular kinds of paints, obtains a registration of it as a trade-mark for paints generally, this will not enable him to restrain another from its use upon certain paints to which he had been in the habit of affixing the same mark prior to registration. Smith v. Reynolds, 13 Blatch. 458.

The protection given by the statute is to the exclusive use of the trademark only so far as regards the particular description of goods set forth in