A certified copy of an assignment is prima facie evidence of the genuineness of the original, and is competent evidence, and absolute evidence of the correctness of the copies from the record. Lee v. Blandy, 2 Fish. 89; s. c. 1 Bond 361; Parker v. Haworth, 4 McLean 370; s. c. 2 Robb 725; Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean 432. A certified copy of a transfer of an interest in a patent which is not required by law to be recorded is not legal proof of such transfer. Sherman v. Champlain Co., 31 Vt. 162. A transcript of certain documents on file in the patent office is competent evidence although it does not purport to be a copy of the whole proceeding. Tookey v. Harding, 1 Fed. Rep. 174; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 92. A copy of a specification alone is not competent evidence to prove what was contained in the patent, for it affords no proof of the granting, or of the existence of a patent based upon the specification. Nor is the mere certificate of the commissioner, though authenticated by his official seal, that such patent was issued and remains in full force, competent evidence of the facts so certified. The proper evidence of the patent is a copy of the patent itself duly authenticated by the official seal and certificate of the commissioner. Davis v. Gray, 17 Ohio St. 330. Patents are public records. All persons are bound to take notice of their contents, and consequently should have a right to obtain copies of them. These records being in the care and custody of the commissioner of patents, it is his duty to give authenticated copies to any person who shall demand the same, as soon as he conveniently can, on payment of the legal fees. Where there is a right on the one side and a corresponding duty on the other, a refusal to perform such duty on the reasonable request of the party entitled to demand it, will subject the officer to an action. But the party entitled to such services must request in a proper manner. He has no right to accompany his demand with personal insult or vulgar abuse of the officer. Those to whom the people have committed high trusts are entitled at least to common courtesy, and are not bound to submit to the insolence or ill temper of those who disregard the decencies of social intercourse. A demand accompanied with rudeness and insult is not a legal demand. Boyden v. Burke, 14 How. 575. The commissioner is in error in refusing to comply with a second demand on account of former misconduct, or to enforce an apology by withholding the party's rights. Ill manners or bad temper do not work a forfeiture of men's civil rights. While the want of an apology for previous rudeness and insult may well justify the commissioner in refusing all social intercourse with the party, yet it cannot release him from the obligations imposed upon him by his official station, or entitle him to disregard the rights guaranteed to others by the laws of the land. Boyden v. Burke, 14 How. 575. A clerk whose employment consists chiefly in making examinations in relation to assignments and other papers recorded and filed in the office, is a competent witness to prove that no assignment has ever been recorded. Stone v. Palmer, 28 Mo. 539. A certificate that diligent search has been made, and that it does not appear that a patent has been issued is not competent evidence. Bullock v. Wallingford, 55 N. H. 619; Stoner v. Ellis, 6 Ind. 152. If a party desires to prove the negative fact that there is no record, he must do so in the usual way, that is, by the deposition of the proper officer or by producing him in court, so that he may be sworn and crossexamined as to the thoroughness of the search made. Bullock v. Wallingford, 55 N. H. 619; Stoner v. Ellis, 6 Ind. 152. Certified copies of the assignments of a patent are not evidence that there is no other title of record. Am. D. R. B. Co. v. Sheldon, 17 Blatch. 208; s. c. 4 Ban & Ard. 551. An abstract of the title to the patent is not evidence that the person to whom the reissue was granted did not acquire a perfect title by another line of conveyance. Am. D. R. B. Co. v. Sheldon, 17 Blatch. 208; s. c. 4 Ban & Ard, 551. The mere production of a certified copy of the application with a defective affidavit is not competent evidence that no sufficient affidavit was taken. Hoe v. Kahler, 11 Fed. Rep. 111. SEC. 893. Copies of the specifications and drawings of foreign letters patent, certified as provided in the preceding section, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of the granting of such letters patent, and of the date and contents thereof. Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 57, 16 Stat. 207. If a foreign patent is certified by the officer of the foreign patent office that corresponds to the commissioner of patents, it is admissible in evidence. Schoerken v. S. & C. & B. Manuf. Co., 19 O. G. 1493, 19 Blatch. 209; s. c. 7 Fed. Rep. 469. A certificate of the commissioner of the correctness of a translation of a foreign patent contained in a volume in the library of the patent office is not competent evidence. Gaylord v. Case, 1 C. L. B. 382. SEC. 894. The printed copies of specifications and drawings of patents, which the commissioner of patents is authorized to print for gratuitous distribution, and to deposit in the capitols of the States and Territories, and in the clerk's offices of the district courts, shall, when certified by him and authenticated by the seal of his office, be received in all courts as evidence of all matters therein contained. Statute Revised-Jan. 11, 1871, Res. 5, 16 Stat. 590. SEC. 972. In all recoveries under the copyright laws, either for damages, forfeitures, or penalties, full costs shall be allowed thereon. Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 108, 16 Stat. 218. Prior Statute-Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 12, 4 Stat. 438. SEC. 973. When judgment or decree is rendered for the plaintiff or complainant, in any suit at law or in equity, for the infringement of a part of a patent, in which it appears that the patentee, in his specification, claimed to be the original and first inventor or discoverer any material or substantial part of the thing patented, of which he was not the original and first inventor, no costs shall be recovered, unless the proper disclaimer, as provided by the patent laws, has been entered at the patent office before the suit was brought. of Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 60, 16 Stat. 207. If the plaintiff on trial abandons one claim, he can not recover costs. Proctor v. Brill, 16 Fed. Rep. 971. If the verdict was rendered upon all the claims, affirming their validity and the novelty of the invention claimed in each, the mere fact that the plaintiff disclaimed one or more of the claims after the trial and verdict, does not deprive him of his right to costs. Peek v. Frames, 5 Fish. 211. Although a patentee files a disclaimer as to one division of a reissue, yet if the validity of the other division is sustained, he is entitled to recover costs. Elastic Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U. S. 110. If the disclaimer was unnecessary and inoperative, the complainant is entitled to costs. Sharp v. Tifft, 17 O. G. 1282; s. c. 18 Blatch. 132; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 399; s. c. 2 Fed. Rep. 697. If the disclaimer is not filed until after the commencement of the suit, the complainant can not recover any costs at all in the case, not even those incurred after the filing of the disclaimer. Burdett v. Estey, 16 Blatch. 105; s. c. 4 Ban & Ard. 141; s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 545; Matthews v. Spangenberg, 23 O. G. 92. SEC. 4883. All patents shall be issued in the name of the United States of America, under the seal of the patent office, and shall be signed by the Secretary of the Interior and countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and they shall be recorded, together with the specifications, in the patent office, in books to be kept for that purpose. Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 21, 16 Stat. 200. Prior Statutes-April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.-Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.-July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 118. Principles of Construction. Patent laws should be liberally construed to meet the wise and beneficent object of the legislature. Patentees are a meritorious class, and the courts will give them all the aid and protection which the law allows. Commissioner v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522; Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean 432; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218; s. c. 1 Robb 604. The right of property which a patentee has in his invention, and his right to its exclusive use, are derived altogether from the statute. An inventor has no right of property in his invention upon which he can maintain suit, unless he obtains a patent for it according to the statute, and his rights are to be regulated and measured by its provisions, and can not go beyond them. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183; s. c. 2 Curt. 371. When Congress are legislating to protect inventors, their attention is necessarily attracted to the authority under which they are acting, and it ought not lightly to be presumed that they intended to go beyond it, and exercise another and distinct power conferred on them for a different purpose. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183; s. c. 2 Curt. 371. A special act extending a patent must be construed in connection with the statute. They are statutes in pari materia, and all relate to the same subject, and must be construed together. Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539; Jordan v. Dobson, 4 Fish. 232; s. c. 7 Phila. 533; s. c. 2 Abb. U. S. 398. A special act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time beyond that originally limited, must be considered as engrafted on the general law. Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539. An act of Congress which gives a patent for an invention will, if it is ambiguous, be construed to give damages for the construction or use of the invention only after the grant of the patent, so that it may not be deemed to create rights retrospectively, or make men liable for damages for acts lawful at the time when they were done. Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story 164; s. c. 3 Sumner 535; s. c. 1 Robb 734, 742. The courts can never presume that Congress intended to decide that an individual is an author or inventor in a general act, the words of which |