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An interest in the net proceeds of collections under a patent does not necessarily amount to legal ownership of the patent itself. Jordan v. Dobson, 4 Fish. 232; s. c. 7 Phila. 533; 2 Abb. U. S. 398.

An assignment by a patentee in such general terms as are usual in speaking of the thing to which the patented part is attached, conveys the right to make and use the thing actually patented. Myers v. Turner, 17 Ill. 179; Hill v. Thuermer, 13 Ind. 351.

Although an assignment grants only the right to manufacture and sell, yet it passes the legal right to the entire patent, for the right to sell carries with it the right to use the machine sold. Nellis v. Pennock Manuf. Co., 22 O. G. 1131; s. c. 13 Fed. Rep. 451.

If the patentee assigns the patent to two persons as trustees, with power to them to sell and assign it, an assignment by one alone is void, for the power is joint. Wescott v. Wayne Agricultural Works, 11 Fed. Rep. 298.

An instrument can not be construed as an assignment unless it contains some operative words showing an intention to assign. Campbell v. James, 18 Blatch. 92; s. c. 18 O. G. 1111; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 354; 2 Fed. Rep. 338.

An assignment of the patent, excepting counties previously sold, is not void for uncertainty, because it is capable of being made certain by evidence showing what counties have been actually sold. Washburn & M. Mfg. Co. v. Haish, 19 O. G. 173; s. c. 4 Fed. Rep. 900.

If an assignment is conditional, a license by the assignee after a breach of the condition is void. Abbett v. Zusi, 5 Ban & Ard. 38.

If an assignment is a grant upon a condition precedent, an offer on the part of the grantee to perform the condition does not give effect to the grant so as to vest the title in the grantee. Pitts v. Hall, 3 Blatch. 201. If the purchaser, in consideration of an assignment, agrees to pay a certain sum within a certain time, or reassign the interest so received, and fails to pay within the time, the patentee acquires the right to demand a reassignment, and if not reassigned he can recover the value. All that the purchaser is bound to do is to offer to reassign the interest. Manvel v. Holdredge, 45 N. Y. 151.

If a patentee agrees to sell an interest in an original patent, he does not comply with the contract by an assignment of an interest in a subsequent patent for an improvement. Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278.

If the contract is to pay a certain sum as soon as a decree is obtained establishing the validity of the patent, the money is not payable upon obtaining a decree pro confesso, for that is interlocutory merely. Russell v. Lathrop, 122 Mass. 300.

If a patentee agrees to allow another to use the thing patented, he breaks the contract by suing out an injunction against the latter as an infringer. Sullings v. Goodyear D. V. Co., 36 Mich. 313.

If an inventor having a pending application for several modes of manufacturing an article, sells the exclusive right to all the modes to another, he can not compel the latter to accept a patent for only one mode. Serviss v. Stockstill, 30 Ohio St. 418.

When the payment is to be made upon an assignment of the patent, the purchaser is not bound to accept an assignment and make the payment after the patent has been declared void on an interference proceeding. Peck v. Collins, 70 N. Y. 376.

If a patent is taken in the name of another in trust for the inventor, but with the right to purchase at a price to be fixed by arbitrators, the inventor can not maintain an action prior to an award. Perkins v. United S. E.

L. Co., 24 O. G. 204; 16 Fed. Rep. 513.

Limitations in respect to territorial limits, extent of use, and the like, may be, and in general are, provided by express terms or stipulations. Steam Cutter Co. v. Sheldon, 5 Fish. 477; s. c. 10 Blatch. 1.

The assignment of an exclusive right to make and use, and to vend to others the patented machine within a certain territory, authorizes the assignee to vend the products of the machine elsewhere. The restriction in the assignment is to be construed as applying solely to the using of the machine. There is no restriction as to place of the sale of the product. Simpson v. Wilson, 4 How. 709; s. c. 2 Robb 469.

A special grant of the right of vending, over and above that of making and using, in an assignment, is wholly unnecessary where the assignment contemplates the exclusive right within a certain district, so as to give the assignee the whole interest. The exclusive right of fabricating and using necessarily comprises the whole beneficial interest, and the right of parting with it, or any part of it, is incident to the right of property. The latter was specially secured by the statute ex majori cautela to obviate all difficulty on the subject. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R. 427.

An assignee can not assign the entire right for a particular territory, and then sell single machines to be used in the same territory after the expiration of the patent. Union Paper Bag Co. v. Nixon, 9 O. G. 691; s. c. 1 Flippin 491; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 244.

If a patentee sell a territorial right, he can not use another machine substantially the same within that territory. Ferree v. Smith, 29 La. An. 811.

A covenant that the covenantee shall enjoy the exclusive use of the patent within a certain territory, such use being limited to a certain number of machines, passes the entire interest of the patentee in the thing patented for the territory, and vests it in the covenantee. Ritter v. Serrell, 2 Blatch. 379.

This section refers to the grant of an exclusive right in a patent, and the term exclusive comprehends not only an exclusive right to the whole patent, but an exclusive right to the patent in a particular section of the country. A limitation of the number of the machines to be manufactured by the grantee, or a reservation of a right by the patentee to construct machines within the territory, does not destroy the exclusive character of a grant. Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story 122; s. c. 2 Robb 206.

The assignment of a patent does not carry with it a transfer of the right to damages for an infringement committed before such assignment. Moore v. Marsh, 7 Wall. 515.

A claim for damages arising from an infringement may be assigned. The profits are not regarded in the light of unliquidated damages. The right to recover rests upon the principle that the party complained of has unlawfully appropriated to himself the benefits of an improvement or discovery which belongs to another, and that so far as he has made profit by such appropriation, he is liable to the party injured. This profit is ascer tainable by evidence, and does not, like the claim for damages in an action for a tort, rest in the mere discretion of a court or jury. Jenkins v. Greenwald, 2 Fish. 37; s. c. 1 Bond 126; Campbell v. James, 18 Blatch. 92; s. c. 18 0. G. 1111; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 354; s. c. 2 Fed. Rep. 338; Shaw v. Colwell Lead Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 711; Consolidated O. W. P. Co. v. Eaton, 12 Fed. Rep. 865; Hamilton v. Rollins, 5 Dill. 495; s. c. 3 Ban & Ard, 157; Campbell v. James, 5 Ban & Ard. 630; s. c. 5 Fed. Rep. 806.

The right to the damages which accrued in the lifetime of the patent is a mere chose in action after the expiration of the patent, and not assignable. Bell v. McCullough, 1 Fish. 380; s. c. 1 Bond 194.

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An assignor may prove by parol that he sold the patent to another who then sold it to the assignee, and that the assignment was made directly from him to the assignee to save the expense of two assignments. Tillotson v. Ramsay, 51 Vt. 309.

Although a party is the assignee of several patents for combinations, yet he has no greater rights than the assignors, for each patent must rest on its own merits alone. Washburn & M. Manuf. Co. v. Griesche, 16 Fed. Rep. 669.

Agent.

An agency is revocable, but an agency coupled with an interest is not revocable. Burdell v. Denig, 2 Fish. 588; s. c. 92 U. S. 716.

Where an assignment is executed by an agent, there must be proof of the agent's authority. Stone v. Palmer, 28 Mo. 539.

An agent can not

execute an assignment under seal unless he has authority under seal. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R. 427.

The execution of an assignment by affixing the name and seal of the agent, and not the name and seal of the principal, is not a good execution of the authority. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R. 427.

No confirmation of an assignment defectively executed in the name of an agent, can make it the deed of the principal short of affixing the name and seal of the principal. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. R. 427.

Corporation.

A corporation has the power to purchase a patent if such purchase is necessary to carry into execution the purposes and objects for which it was created. Blanchard's Factory v. Warner, 1 Blatch. 258; Dorsey Harvester Rake Co. v. Marsh, 6 Fish. 387.

Although the assignor adds the word "president" to his name, yet it is a good execution of the deed for himself, but will not convey any interest of the corporation. Campbell v. James, 17 Blatch. 43; s. c. 18 O. G. 979; s. c. 4 Ban & Ard. 456.

A certificate of an interest in a patent, purporting to be signed by the secretary of a corporation to be subsequently organized, is not such an assignment as the statute requires. Hope Iron Works v. Holden, 58 Me. 146.

A contract will bind a corporation, although its officer uses his private seal instead of the corporate seal, if he was duly authorized to make it, or his act was subsequently ratified. Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 11 Wall. 488.

An assignment to an incorporated company not at the time organized will inure to its use when organized, at least by way of estoppel, and be good against the grantor, whether it took effect on its delivery to pass any property or not. Dyer v. Rich, 42 Mass. 180.

An assignment of a patent by a corporation is valid, although it is not under the corporate seal. Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521; s. c. 21 O. G. 711; s. c. 10 Fed. Rep. 471.

Personal Representatives.

If the court which pronounced a judgment has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, a proper case for its exercise will be presumed to have been sufficiently presented, and the adjudication to be right. The granting of letters of administration to a party, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of his legal right to the grant of them. Northwestern Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 6 O. G. 34; s. c. 1 Ban & Ard. 177.

The right of an executor or administrator of the patentee will be determined according to the law of the patentee's domicile at the time of his decease. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 2 Fish. 499; s. c. 9 Wall. 788; s. c. 2 Cliff. 351.

The right of an administrator in a patent is not acquired, and can not be assigned under State laws. The act of Congress directs the mode in which an assignment shall be made and where it shall be recorded. The administrator may sell the patent the same as any other personal property of the estate, and there is no reason why the right may not be conveyed in parts so as to suit purchasers. Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean 432.

Administrators of an estate are not, properly speaking, trustees in whom is vested the legal title. The law clothes them with certain powers, by which they are enabled to transmit the legal title of property. Acts done by one of them, which relate to the delivery, gift, sale or release of the decedent's goods or personal property, are deemed the acts of all. An assignment by one administrator will therefore pass the whole interest in the patent. Wintermute v. Redington, 1 Fish. 239.

The purchaser of personal property from an administrator need not show that the formality required by the law has been complied with, for he can hold it unless the transaction is fraudulent. Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean 432.

An assignment by a person as administrator will pass the right held by the person as executor. Newell v. West, 13 Blatch. 114; s. c. 8 0. G. 598; s. c. 9 O. G. 1110; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 113.

Estoppel.

A man can pass by grant or assignment only that which he now possesses, and which is in existence at the time either actually or potentially. His grant or assignment is therefore by its natural interpretation limited to the rights and things which are then in existence, and which he has power to grant, unless he uses other language which imports an intention to grant what he does not now possess and what is not now in existence. In the latter case the language does not even then operate strictly as an assignment or grant, but only as a covenant or contract which a court of equity will carry into full effect when the right or thing comes in esse. Woodworth v. Sherman, 3 Story 171; s. c. 2 Robb 257.

If a party making an assignment at a time when he has no title, subsequently acquires title, and then testifies in an action brought by the assignee that the assignee became the owner under such assignment, he will be estopped from setting up a title against the respondent. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; s. c. 7 O. G. 964; Sherman v. Champlain Co., 31 Vt. 162; Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521; s. c. 21 O. G. 711 ; s. c. 10 Fed. Rep. 471.

An assignment made by one who has no title, with the written assent of the party in whom the title is vested, is effective as a transfer of the title. Sherman v. Champlain Co., 31 Vt. 162.

A mere assignment of the right, title and interest of the assignor, without anything more, will not operate as an estoppel to pass a title subsequently acquired by the assignor. Perry v. Corning, 7 Blatch. 195.

If a patent is issued to a corporation after it is incorporated it is estopped from proving that it had no corporate existence at the time of the assignment of the invention to it in order to defeat a claim for royalty. Bommer v. American Spring Co., 44 N. Y. Sup. 454.

If there is a controversy as to whether the article made by the respondent is the same as the patentee's, an agreement will not operate as an estoppel. Roemer v. Simon, 12 O. G. 796; s. c. 95 U. S. 214; s. c. 1 Ban & Ard. 138.

If the inventor did not know that others were making any advancements or investments of either capital or skill on faith that the ground he had begun to occupy was open to all, he is not estopped from setting up his invention. Sprague v. Adriance, 14 O. G. 308; s. c. 3 Ban & Ard. 124.

Warranty.

The vendor of a patent impliedly warrants the validity of the patent. Faulks v. Kamp, 17 O. G. 851; s. c. 17 Blatch. 432; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 73; s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 898.

A person who sells a patent impliedly warrants the title, and is estopped from alleging the invalidity of the patent in an action by the grantee. Faulks v. Kamp, 17 Blatch. 432; s. c. 17 O. G. 851; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 73; s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 898; Onderdonk v. Fanning, 5 Ban & Ard. 85; s. c. 4 Fed. Rep. 148; Consolidated M. P. Co. v. Guilder, 9 Fed. Rep. 155.

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