PATENT LAWS AND DECISIONS. CONSTITUTION. ART. I, SEC. 8. The Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. The word "secure" does not mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. No State can in any form interfere with the right of private persons under the copyright laws of the United States. Little v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 165, 362. The Constitution does not authorize the protection of a dramatic composition which is grossly indecent and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people. Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady 216; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 356. In the exercise of this power Congress is limited to authors and inventors only. This clause, therefore, never can admit of so extensive a construction as to prohibit the respective States from exercising the power of securing to persons introducing useful inventions, without being the authors or inventors, the exclusive benefit of such inventions for a limited time. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507. The power is general to grant to inventors, and it rests in the sound discretion of Congress to say when and for what length of time, and under what circumstances, the patent for an invention shall be granted. There is no restriction which limits the power of Congress to cases where the invention has not been known or used by the public. All that is required is that the patentee shall be the inventor. An act which gives a patent for an invention which was in public use and enjoyed by the community at the time of its passage, is not for that reason unconstitutional. Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story 164; s. c. 3 Sum. 535; s. c. 1 Robb 734, 742; Evans v. Jordan, 1 Brock 248; s. c. 9 Cranch 199; s. c. 1 Robb 20, 57; Jordan v. Dobson, 4 Fish. 232; s. c. 7 Phila. 533; s. c. 2 Abb. U. S. 398. The power thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of the United States. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183; s. c. 2 Curt. 371. This constitutional power might have been fully exercised by Congress in making special grants of patents. Congress might have spent much time by such a course, and may not be the most competent body to investigate the facts and do equal justice to inventors, but this would be a question of expediency and not of constitutional power. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158. The machinery through which the right to a patent is ordinarily applied for and obtained may be dispensed with, and the title may be conferred by a legislative grant, and this may be done in regard to the extension of an exclusive right the same as in originally granting it. No constitutional restriction appears to exist against the exercise of this power by Congress. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158. Congress has the power to confer a new and extended term upon the patentee, even after the expiration of the first. Jordan v. Dobson, 4 Fish. 232; s. c. 7 Phila. 533; s. c. 2 Abb. U. S. 398; Blanchard v. Haynes, 6 West. L. J. 82; Blanchard's Factory v. Warner, 1 Blatch. 258; Evans v. Robinson, 1 Car. L. Rep. 209. The power of Congress to secure the rights and privileges of assignees upon extending a patent is incidental to the general power conferred by the Constitution on Congress to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing to inventors for limited times the exclusive right to their discoveries. The assignees of the original patentee are frequently most instrumental in putting the invention into general use and bringing it successfully before the public by the expenditure of their time and money. More than half probably, of the useful patented inventions have been thus brought into general public use, the successful results operating directly or indirectly for the benefit and interest of the patentees. Although this would not authorize the renewal of a grant to assignees, as no such power exists in the Constitution, still in exercising the power in favor of the inventor it would be going too far to say that Congress has no right to regard incidentally the interests of meritorious assignees. Blanchard's Factory v. Warner, 1 Blatch. 258. It is not the province of the judiciary to inquire into the reasons which induced the passage of the law, with the view of testing its validity. If constitutional, it must be enforced without regard to the policy or justice which dictated it. No inquiry as to the expenses and labor need be made when a patent is extended by a special act of Congress. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158. It does not follow from this power that Congress may, from time to time, as they think proper, authorize an inventor to recall rights which he has granted to others, or reinvest in him rights of property which he has before conveyed for a fair and valuable consideration. Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539. Though changes in the patent laws may be retrospective in their opera tion, that is not a sound objection to their validity. The power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary, by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise there can be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents. M'Clurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202; s. c. 2 Robb 105. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power of "securing" to inventors the exclusive right to "their discoveries." Congress is not empowered to grant to inventors a favor, but to secure to them a right; and the "term to secure a right" by no possible implication carries with it the opposite power of destroying the right in whole or in part by appropriating it to the purposes of government without complying with that other condition of the Constitution, the making of "just compensation." M'Keever v. U. S., 14 Ct. Cl. 396. The property in inventions exists by virtue of the laws of Congress, and no State has a right to interfere with its enjoyment, or to annex conditions to the grant. If the patentee complies with the laws of Congress on the subject, he has the right to go into the open market anywhere within the United States and sell his property. An act of a State legislature that attempts to direct the manner in which patent rights shall be sold in the State is void. Ex parte Robinson, 4 Fish. 186; s. c. 2 Biss. 309; s. c. 3 A. L. T. (U. S.) 112; Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; Helm v. First National Bank, 43 Ind. 167; Crittenden v. White, 9 C. L. N. 110. If a corporation is the owner of a patent, and its transactions in another State are connected with the sale, use or manufacture of the invention described in the patent, it is not subject to the provisions of the State laws relating to foreign corporations. Grover & Baker S. M. Co. v. Butler, 53 Ind. 454; Shook v. Singer Manuf. Co., 61 Ind. 520. No State can require that the consideration of a note given for a patent shall be expressed on the face thereof, and make such a note subject in the hands of third parties to all defenses which could have been made against the payee. Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309; State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403; Bowen v. Kemerer, 2 Pearson 250. An inventor is protected only in the incorporeal right to his invention or discovery against State legislation. This right must be enjoyed in subordination to the general authority of the State over all property within its limits. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; s. c. 33 Gratt. 898; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; s. c. 11 Bush. 311. A State cannot impose a license tax upon the sale of a patent. State v. Butler, 3 Lea 222. Although an inventor has obtained a patent, yet he cannot sell articles made according to the patent in a State without complying with the tax and license laws of the State, if those laws do not make any discriminations between those articles and articles on the manufacture of which there is no patent. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; s. c. 33 Gratt. 898. A State may require a patentee to take out a license, although he only sells articles made according to his patent. People v. Russell, 49 Mich. A State law regulating the sale of an article manufactured in pursuance of a patented invention, because it is dangerous, is valid, for there is a manifest distinction between the right of property in the patent and the right to sell the property resulting from the invention or patent. son v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; s. c. 11 Bush 311. Patter The end of the statute is to encourage useful inventions, and to hold forth the exclusive use of his invention for a limited period as an inducement to the inventor. The sole operation of the statute is to enable him to prevent others from using the products of his labor except with his consent. But his own right of using it is not enlarged or affected. There remains in him, as in every other citizen, the power to manage his property or give direction to his labor at his pleasure, subject only to the paramount claims of society, which require that his enjoyment may be modified by the exigencies of the community to which he belongs, and regulated by laws which render it subservient to the general welfare, if held subject to State control. An attempt by the legislature in good faith to regulate the conduct of a portion of its citizens in a matter strictly pertaining to its internal economy is a legitimate exercise of power, although the law may sometimes indirectly affect the enjoyment of rights flowing from the Federal Government. A patent for a medicine does not confer upon the patentee the right to prescribe it for the sick without complying with the State laws for licensing physicians. Jordan v. Dayton, 4 Ohio 294; Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. 395. A party who has a patent for a plan of constructing and drawing lotteries has no right to establish a lottery in a State whose laws prohibit lotteries, because they are pernicious and destructive to frugality and industry, and introductive of idleness and immorality, and against the common good and welfare. Vannini v. Paine, 1 Harring. 65. Congress has no power to grant a copyright to any other person but an author or inventor or a person representing an author or inventor. Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97. Congress has no power under this clause to authorize the registration of trade marks. U. S. v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 82; Leidersdorf v. Flint, 8 Biss. 327. The only writings that can be protected are those which require originality. While the word "writings " may be liberally construed to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind; the writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings and the like. U. S. v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 82. PROVISIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES REVISED STATUTES TITLE IV. SEC. 178. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the chief of any bureau, or of any officer thereof, whose appointment is not vested in the head of the department, the assistant or deputy of such chief or of such officer, or if there be none, then the chief clerk of such bureau shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, as provided by section one hundred and seventynine, perform the duties of such chief or of such officer until a successor is appointed or such absence or sickness shall cease. Statute Revised-July 23, 1868, ch. 227, § 2, 15 Stat. 168. The actual incumbent of a public office is presumed to be in the lawful possession of it, and no affirmative proof of his title is required to support his official acts; therefore the contingency upon which the assistant commissioner is authorized to assume the duties of commissioner is primarily to be taken to exist from his actual discharge of these duties. The burden of showing the non-existence of the prescribed contingency is upon the party who denies the validity of the ostensible officer's acts. Dorsey Co. v. Marsh, 6 Fish. 387; s. c. 9 Phila. 395; Smith v. Mercer, 5 Penn. L. J. 529; s. c. 4 West. L. J. 49. SEC. 179. In any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding sections, except the death, resignation, absence or sickness of the Attorney General, the President may, in his discretion, authorize and direct the head of any other department or any other officer in either department whose appointment is vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the duties of the vacant office until a successor is appointed or the sickness or absence of the incumbent shall cease. Statute Revised-June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. |