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It was doubtless on this basis and theory that Mr. Galbraith made his statement to claimant and upon which the claimant relies. On this basis there would be an undercharge of five cents per one hundred pounds west of Vicksburg, only $1.18 per one hundred pounds having been charged instead of $1.20 per one hundred pounds, and overcharges on the other roads, as follows:

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and deducting the undercharge of five cents west of Vicksburg, would leave $1.80 as the amount to be deducted from this freight bill in the proportions above stated.

But this theory and basis of computing the rates in this transaction can not be sustained as against the real facts involved. These facts are that there were no through rates established from Vicksburg to Fort Lawn, and this being true these carriers had the right under the law to charge their published rates upon this freight for transporting it from Vicksburg to Fort Lawn; and under such circumstances, if they were to charge the claimant less than these published rates, they would be guilty of a violation of the statute, in unjustly discriminating in his favor, and of giving him an unlawful preference over other shippers at these points. The Commission therefore finds that there is justly due to the defendant, The Richmond & Danville Railroad Company, for the transportation charges of this freight, the sum of $8.66, and directs that upon the payment of this sum within thirty days from this date by the claimant that this property be turned over to him at Fort Lawn.

Another phase of this case remains to be noticed. If this freight had been shipped as directed by complainant from Troupe, Texas, via Shreveport, Vicksburg, Meridian, Birmingham, Atlanta and Augusta to Fort Lawn, the aggregate transportation charge upon it would have been, per 100 pounds:

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or $7.80 for 270 pounds. The way-bill for this freight issued at Troupe, Texas, on the 10th of October, 1888, specifies, amongst other things, that it is consigned to J. B. Pankey, Fort Lawn, South Carolina, via Vicksburg, Mississippi. This is all there is in the way-bill to indicate the route over which it was to go. If the way-bill had specified that it was to be transported from Troupe, Texas, via Vicksburg, and Augusta, Georgia, to Fort Lawn, South Carolina, then the freight would have gone this route, and the charges upon it would have been $7.80 instead of $8.66. From the evidence before us it is apparent that the agent at Troupe, Texas, in making up the way-bill should have indicated that the freight was to go via Vicksburg, Mississippi, Atlanta, Georgia, Augusta, Georgia, to Fort Lawn, South Carolina. This was the route by which Pankey had directed the freight to be shipped and it should have been billed and shipped in that way; but as it was billed only via Vicksburg to Fort Lawn, South Carolina, without showing anything about Augusta, Georgia, it seems that at Vicksburg it was shipped through via Meridian, Birmingham, Chattanooga and Atlanta, and was consigned to the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company at Atlanta. At Atlanta the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company received the freight, paid all the charges on it up to that point, and carried it to Fort Lawn, South Carolina, at its local rates, which, as we have seen, under the circumstances, it had a right to do, because the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company was not responsible for the freight not having been billed according to Pankey's direction at Troupe, Texas. The complainant is mistaken in supposing that any additional charge in the transportation of this freight was imposed on him by reason of the fact that it was carried by way of Chattanooga instead of having been carried by way of Birmingham and the Georgia Pacific Railroad to Atlanta, which last would have been a shorter route, but

the freight rate was the same from Vicksburg to Atlanta whether the freight was carried by either of these routes.

The point of most consequence involved in this proceeding is the duty of the freight agent of the initial road at the point of origin of the freight to so way-bill it that it will go by the route directed by the shipper, where the shipper has given direction to him as to such route. In a case where the shipper gives no such direction, but leaves it to the freight agent to select the route for him and to ship it by that route, such freight agent is the agent of the shipper as well as of the company in selecting the route which will be best and least expensive to the shipper, and should in every instance, to the best of his knowledge and information, select such route as will be best and least expensive to the shipper, and make such notation on the way-bill as will properly carry the freight by that route. An observance of these plain and simple rules by freight agents would prevent numerous claims made for overcharges in shipments of freight, as well as confusion in such shipments.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, and we so find, that the International & Great Northern Railroad Company should refund to the complainant, upon request, the sum of 86 cents overcharge, which he has been compelled to pay on account of the manner in which this freight was way-billed at Troupe, Texas, from which should be deducted the five cents undercharge made between Troupe, Texas, and Vicksburg, leaving 81 cents to be refunded to complainant.

At the hearing and decision of this case the Chairman was absent because of illness, and did not in any way participate.

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INDEX.

ABSTRACT QUESTIONS.

OPINIONS ON.-The Commission will not render opinions on abstract ques-
tions.

Bishop v. Duval, receiver, etc., 128.

Harris v. Duval, receiver, etc., 128.

Lincoln Board of Trade v. Union Pacific R'y Co. et al., 221.

Pennsylvania Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R'y
Co., 223.

Chicago, St. Louis and Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Cleveland, Cincin-
nati, Chicago and St. Louis R'y Co., 223.

American Wire Nail Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas
Pacific R'y Co. et al., 224.

Rawson v. Newport News and Mississippi Valley Co. et al., 266.
See CONCESSION OF RELIEF.

ACCOMMODATIONS.

Heard v. Georgia Railroad Co., 111.

ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE.

ADMINISTRATION OF.

Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 428.

AMENDMENT OF MARCH 2, 1889.-Does not apply to proceedings then pending.
Rawson v. Newport News and Mississippi Valley Co. et al., 266.

AMENDMENTS TO, RECOMMENDED.

Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 432.

BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF.

Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 329.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE WORKINGS of.

Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 398.

COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS.

Rice v. Cincinnati, Washington and Baltimore R. R. Co. et al., 186.
Rice v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co., 186.

CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SECTION.-Carriers subject to its jurisdiction. In-
Instrumentalities of shipment or carriage.

terstate commerce.

In re Acts and Doings of the Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada, 89.
White v. Michigan Central Co. et al., 281.

Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 314, 381, 432.

Mattingly v. Pennsylvania Co., 592.

CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST SECTION.-Reasonable charges.

In re Tariffs and Classifications of Atlanta and West Point R. R. Co.
et al., 19.

Sanger v. Southern Pacific Co. et al., 134.

James & Abbott v. East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia R'y Co., 225.
Leonard v. Chicago and Alton R. R. Co., 241.
Chappelle v. Chicago and Alton R. R. Co., 241.

McMorran et al. v. Grand Trunk R'y Co. of Canada et al.,

252.

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