The question then arises whether it is a "device" within the meaning of section 2 of the Act to regulate commerce. From the connection in which the word "device" occurs in section 2 of the statute it is evidently used in a criminal sense, because it imputes to the carrier guilty of it conduct which is violative of law. It is used in the statute in the sense of being a crafty, shifty stratagem, project, scheme, design, invention, or contrivance to give one person an unlawful preference over another for doing on the part of the carrier "a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." The evidence in this proceeding shows without conflict that this method of doing business on the part of the defendant originated about twenty-five years ago and has been continued ever since. This evidence shows that all shippers at Grand Rapids, equally and alike, have the benefit of it, and that none of them are preferred over others. All the facts shown by the evidence in relation to the origin and continuance of this method of business on the part of the defendant are fully stated in a preceding part of this opinion and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. They utterly negative the idea that this is a "device" invented by the defendant for the purpose of avoiding the law or preferring one shipper over another, either at Grand Rapids or elsewhere on its line. They show that this method of business on the part of the defendant originated in good faith and has continued in good faith up to this time.

The intent with which a "device" is invented and perpetrated as declared and denounced by the statute is the very essence of the Act. I understand it to be a cardinal rule of the law that a criminal act in violation of law, such as this would be if it were really a device intended, designed, or perpetrated for the purpose of violating the second section of the Act to regulate commerce, can never be imputed to a party where all the facts and circumstances show that it is consistent with honesty and good intention. Again, it is equally as well settled a rule of law in a matter of this kind,

that if, upon all the evidence, there is an hypothesis that the act done was intended by the defendant in a criminal sense or in violation of law, and, on the other hand, that there is another hypothesis, equally reasonable and warranted by all the evidence, to the effect that the act done was not done for the purpose of violating law or in any criminal sense, then any tribunal which is to determine the question must proceed upon the rule that the act done was not done in a criminal sense or with any intent to violate law.

But aside from the fact of intent, the question arises, does it violate the statute; because if such is its effect then it can not stand. The grounds upon which it does not violate the statute have been fully set forth in a preceding part of this opinion and it is unnecessary to repeat them here in all their details. They bear quite as much upon the subject as to whether it is a "special rate, rebate, drawback, or device as they do upon the question of whether it is a violation of the long and short-haul feature of the fourth section of the Act to regulate commerce, or whether it is a violation of the third section of that statute. They show that it is not "a like and contemporaneous service done under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" with the service rendered by the defendant in transporting freight to and from Ionia, but, on the contrary, that it results from circumstances and conditions which are substantially dissimilar at Grand Rapids to what they are at Ionia.

That it is not in violation of any public policy of the United States is equally true. The public policy of the United States is found in its laws as enacted by the law-making power or adopted by it, or in cases confided to the President and indicated in his proclamations, or to one of the great departments of the Government and established by its regulations. But if the statute which we are required to administer does not indicate what the public policy is to be upon any given point, then I do not understand that we have. authority by any mere opinion of our own to create and declare what shall be the public policy upon that subject, and that an innocent and proper business method of a carrier

is in violation of the public policy that we have thus created and defined. Whatever public policy there is bearing upon this subject must be found in the Act to regulate commerce, and if it is not there, then it does not exist.

As to rates the only public policy indicated by the Act to regulate commerce is that these shall be reasonable and just, published and open alike to all, without unjust discrimination for a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions; that there shall be no undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, nor shall there be any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsover to any person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic; that a carrier shall not discriminate between connecting lines in receiving, forwarding, and interchanging freight; and that it shall be unlawful for a tommon carrier to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or like kind of property under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance. The statute has left no doubt on the subject as to the public policy thus declared, because it is plainly expressed in the language of the statute. Whether a common carrier, subject to the provisions of the statute, has violated it in any of these respects depends upon the facts of each particular case, and severe penalties are provided in the event there is such a violation.

A feature of this statute that is manifest even upon a casual reading is that it expressly defines in its own language any act that shall be a violation of its provisions. To violate section one in any charge made for the service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, such charge must be unreasonable and unjust. To violate section two there

must be a special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device by which a greater or less compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property subject to the provisions of this Act by a carrier for doing a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions which is defined to be unjust discrimination. To violate the first clause of section three a common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act must make or give an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to some person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or particular description of traffic, or must subject some person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or particular description of traffic to some undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. To violate the second clause of section three, a common carrier, subject to the provisions of the Act, mast refuse, according to its powers in that respect, to afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between its respective connecting lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering passengers and property to and from such lines and those connecting therewith, or must discriminate in its rates and charges between such connecting lines. To violate section four, the carrier must charge or receive a greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or the like kind of property under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance. To violate section six, with reference to the printing and posting of schedules of rates, fares, and charges, the carrier must fail to comply with some one of the express requirements of this section. There are, of course, other provisions of the Act regulating and defining the duties of carriers, but it is unnecessary to refer to these as they have no bearing whatever upon the questions involved in this proceeding.

The rule of statutory construction is well settled that when a statute thus defines in express terms what shall constitute a

violation of its provisions, and makes such violation penal, this definition is conclusive upon every tribunal whose duty it is made to enforce the statute. Such tribunal can add no terms of description to the definition so made by the lawmaking power, and can take no terms away from that definition. That definition expresses the will of the legislature and it can not be enlarged or reduced by construction. When the will of the legislature is plainly expressed, there is no room for construction, and it must be obeyed and enforced as expressed.

The words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions," found in the second section of the statute, are words of controlling import, and so are the same words found in section four. It is not enough that the circumstances and conditions should be similar, but they must be substantially similar. So in section 3 the words "undue " or 66 unreasonable" are words of controlling import. It is not enough under this section that the preference or advantage, or prejudice or disadvantage, should exist, but in each instance it must be "undue or unreasonable." Congress in each of these sections has used apt and well-selected words to define what shall constitute a violation of each of these sections.

Every word in a statute must, if possible, be given some operation, but this is the more true of words which deal with the substance of things, and which are of controlling import. By giving to the words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" the field of operation they occupy in this statute, the carrier is enabled to adjust its business methods to its traffic in such way as that it may properly and fairly serve the public under the various exigencies of transportation and commerce without injustice to shippers or localities and without crippling its own legitimate business. The same is true of the words "undue or unreasonable" as they occur in the first clause of section three. One shipper may obtain better or larger cars than another from causes that are purely accidental or without any intention to give him a preference. For illustration, because he applies first for cars, and the carrier may furnish them to him without knowing that the other