ter when taken up and carried forward by a State carrier to a destination in the State in which such carrier operates, or when so carried to be delivered to another carrier in the same State for further transportation beyond the limits of the State, but that the traffic remains interstate throughout its transit, with whatever incidents pertain to such commerce, and that the various sucessive carriers engaged in it are subject to the authority of Congress in that business and are embraced in the regulations of the Act. And furthermore, that when a carrier in one State engages in interstate commerce, it becomes a National agency and subjects itself necessarily to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce for all the legitimate purposes of such commerce, and must accept and forward the traffic offered indifferently, without unjust discrimination or undue preference.

Another theory is, and on this the respondent is understood to rely, that a State carrier which has not entered into arrangements for continuous carriage among the States does not become subject to the Act to regulate commerce by engaging in the carriage within one State of interstate traffic and that it incurs no obligations under that Act either in respect to the traffic actually carried or other interstate traffic offered for carriage, but may, as an independent carrier, wholly in one State, accept or refuse interstate traffic in its discretion, and fix such conditions with regard to rates or otherwise as it may desire.

This is claimed to be the necessary effect of the proviso in the first section of the Act, and under that proviso it is said that the service by a carrier wholly in one State, when not under an arrangement for a continuous carriage, is an independent employment of a separate agency to which the Act does not apply.

The extent of the regulation contemplated by the Act to regulate commerce is therefore directly presented, and perhaps the intention of Congress in the use of the language employed may more clearly appear by some reference to the principles that have been judicially declared to apply to interstate commerce, in the light of which the statute was framed.

The commerce intended to be regulated by the Act is that over which the jurisdiction of the law-making power extends and the regulations provided must be deemed co-extensive with the scope of the power, and with only such limitations as the Act itself makes. The jurisdiction to regulate applies to commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. In defining commerce among the States the courts have declared that "among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States can not stop at the external boundary of each State, but may be introduced into the interior." (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194.)

The immunity of interstate commerce from all interference by State authority has been declared in a variety of forms in which the question has arisen. This immunity applies from the beginning to the end of the transportation, alike to the passage out of the State in which it originates, through any other State, and into the State to which it is shipped to its point of destination. While in transit, and until it reaches the consignee and becomes mingled with his general property, it is clothed with the rights and subject only to the rules. of interstate commerce. The freedom of its movement may not be impeded, nor rates and charges prescribed for its carriage by any action of a State. (Wabash Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.)

This principle has been further applied as follows: "Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity has commenced. The fact that several different agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one State and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress." (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565.) In the same case it was further said: "We are unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of Congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the States, when that agency

extends through two or more States, and when it is confined in its action entirely within the limits of a single State. If its authority does not extend to an agency in such commerce when that agency is confined within the limits of a State, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of a State and leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the Federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter."

The immunity of interstate and foreign commerce from the taxing power of a State has also been applied. When goods have begun to be transported from the State in which they are produced they have become the subjects of interstate commerce and as such are subject to National regulation and cease to be taxable by the State of their origin, nor can they be taxed by another State while on the route to their destination, though detained temporarily within a State by some impediment to transportation or other cause. (Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517.)

A State can not impose a tax upon the gross receipts of railroads for the carriage of freights and passengers out of, into, or through the State, for the reason that it imposes a burden upon commerce among the States. (Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230.)

The same principle was applied to a telegraph company in a case arising under a State statute imposing a general license tax. It was held that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that such a tax is a burden on that commerce and amounts to a regulation of it. (Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 641.)

The exclusive authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is not restricted to goods, but applies to, instrumentalities and persons as well, and alike on the navigable waters and on the land. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9

Wheat. 229, it is said: "Commerce in its simplest signification means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care and various mediums of exchange become commodities and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations become the objects of commercial regulation." In Sherloch, &c. v. Alling, &c., 93 U. S. 103, it is said: "The commercial power conferred by the Constitution is one without limitation. It authorizes legislation with respect to all the subjects of foreign and interstate commerce, the persons engaged in and the instruments by which it is carried on." In 114 U. S. 196, it is said in reference to the commerce power of Congress: "It is the power to prescribe the rules. by which it shall be governed—that is, the conditions upon which it shall be conducted. That it embraces within its control all the instrumentalities by which that commerce may be carried on, and the means by which it may be aided and encouraged."

And in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the States Congress has authority to construct, or authorize individuals or corporations to construct, railroads across the States or Territories of the United States. (California v. Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1.) The same power also embraces the construction of bridges across navigable rivers, their form and character, and the extent to which they may affect navigation. (Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470.) This power may be exercised without the consent and against the protest of a State to authorize a State railroad company to erect bridges over navigable waters, piers, and other instrumentalities to be used for interstate commerce, and to take lands belonging to a State or to individuals necessary for these purposes. (Stockton v. Balt. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9.)

In Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, and other cases following that decision, the principle is declared that the exclusive powers of regulation by Congress are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce in use when the Constitution was adopted, but keep pace with the pro

gress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances.

The reasons for exclusive regulation by Congress are set forth in many cases. In the case of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 279, it is stated in substance that whenever the subjects affected by the regulation of Congress are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are within the exclusive authority of Congress. That transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of this nature, and that it is of national importance, in order to prevent oppressive State interference, and guard against commercial embarrassment, that over that subject there should be but one regulating power.

The commerce not subject to National regulation has frequently been defined. In one case it was said: "The rule that the regulation of commerce which is confined exclusively within the jurisdiction and territory of a State and does not affect other nations or States or the Indian tribes, that is to say, the purely internal commerce of a State, belongs exclusively to the State, is as well settled as that the regulation of commerce which does affect other nations or States or the Indian tribes belongs to Congress." (Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 466.)

And in another case the court said: "The internal commerce of a State-that is, the commerce which is wholly confined within its limits-is as much under its control as foreign commerce or interstate commerce is under the control of the General Government." (Sands v. Manistee, &c. 123 U. S. 295.)

In the elaborate report of the Senate Committee, made in January, 1886, reference is made to some of the foregoing cases, and the case of Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission of Tenn., 19 Fed. Rep. 679, is referred to approvingly. In this case it was decided that the power of the States relating to commerce and its incidents "is limited to domestic transportation, which means that carried on exclusively within the boundaries of a State, and transportation can be domestic only when it begins and ends within