go beyond those principles which have been established by the English legislation and decisions as above summarized. In other words, it is conceived that facilities conceded to a through route only become reasonable and proper when they are demanded in the interest of the public and when the route of itself is fairly reasonable. As is stated in the decision above referred to, "It is sufficient that it should be such a route as we might fairly expect, other things being equal, a substantial portion of the traffic to go by, neither unnecessarily long nor unreasonably complicated, nor having any other decided disqualification; but certainly it need not be the best route." And in the same opinion the question of public interest is said to turn upon the consideration that "it is the interest of the public that there should be at least two routes open between any two given places, provided that those routes are practically independent of one another, fairly alternative, and reasonably calculated to keep one another in check. Mere paper competition would not be for the public interest; nor would such competition be for the interest of the public if it could only be maintained on terms ruinous to one or both companies. Healthy competition such as I have described would be generally in the public interest."

In the light of these considerations there can be little doubt that the line here in question is one that under the English law would be regarded as a reasonable route, and one the retention of which would be considered to be in the interest of the public; in fact it is fifteen miles shorter than the route now in use between Memphis and Little Rock, and it is a route of long standing, only recently discontinued. A new line has been established by a powerful competitor which is physically competent to handle the traffic; the interest of the public, however, fairly seems to require that the old line should be kept open as part of a through route from Memphis and points east thereof to Little Rock, and points west and south thereof. The East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railway, in selling its tickets to points beyond Little Rock, discriminates against the Memphis and

Little Rock Railroad, by refusing to sell tickets reading over this line; this results in exacting higher rates from passengers seeking this route than for through tickets sold via Bald Knob. Such passengers are compelled to buy tickets from point to point at local rates, and they are deprived of the facilities which through tickets and through checking of baggage afford.

Giving to the words of the third section the interpretation received by the present English Statute, and applying that interpretation to the facts of the present case, it would require the two defendant roads to afford complainant equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers to and from their several lines; faciilties "equal" to those afforded any other line, provided only that the proposed route is a reasonable route and one the opening or the maintaining of which is fairly in the interest of the public. Our law also adds the prohibition against discrimination in rates and charges between connecting lines-a prohibition which easily fits the present case, in view of the fact that travel seeks the cheapest route, and that the through rates in force over the Bald Knob route are in many cases considerably lower than the local rates which are alone available to passengers choosing complainant's line.

The contention would still remain open to the defendants, however, that a carrier has a right to discriminate in its own favor; that it is not intended to be restrained by the law from taking to itself all possible traffic that its own line can advantageously handle; and that it is not to be compelled to divide business with a competitor by affording equal facilities therefor between points where its own road is parallel.

In this aspect the defense of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia is, that the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Company, controlling the various routes beyond Little Rock, requires it to sell tickets via Bald Knob exclusively, for the purpose of throwing all the through travel between Memphis and Little Rock upon the new line of the Iron Mountain

Company; and it says that it would not be justified in selling tickets to passengers via the Little Rock & Memphis road, knowing in advance that such tickets would not be accepted when offered for transportation beyond Little Rock. This position is admitted by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company to be correct, and it justifies its action by saying, in substance, that it refuses to accept through tickets from the East Tennesse, Virginia & Georgia, over the Little Rock & Memphis road when tendered by passengers coming upon its cars at Little Rock, in the exercise of a right to do so, which it claims upon the theory that while discrimination between connecting lines is forbidden, the law does not forbid it to discriminate in favor of a section of its own line as against a competing line.

This claim presents an aspect of apparent justice, which has a tendency to conceal from view the public considera-tions which may be conceived to have been present in the framing of a law designed to promote and facilitate the unrestricted ebb and flow of the internal commerce of the United States; an Act which contains a provision apparently designed to insure to the people every facility of equal choice. which franchises granted in the public interest can by any combination of reasonable routes afford. The section contains no proviso excluding lines owned by the discriminating carrier; the terms of the law are general; the language used in this respect cannot fairly be given any different interpretation from that which the English statute of 1854 should receive; and there has been no hesitation whatever in the affirmation that the English law applies as well to cases. where business is sought to be divided with the carrier con-trolling the rate, as to cases where the rights of other carriers. only were involved.

The case of the Swindon, Marlborough & Andover Railway Company v. The Great Western Railway Company and the London & South-Western Railway Company; 4 Railway and Canal Traffic Cases, 349; decided by the English Railway Commissioners in July, 1884, is directly in point. This was an application under the procedure prescribed in the English Act of 1873, for participation in certain traffic from which the

complainant company had been theretofore excluded. The proposed route was 21 miles shorter than the route in use, between points 120 miles apart by the existing route. The defendant companies contended, however, that—

"The difference of distance notwithstanding, the proposed route and rates would be of no benefit to the public,

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and that it would be hard upon them that a third company should be admitted to participate in the receipts from its .business."

The Commission say:

"But we doubt if the Act of 1854 would allow us to give weight to this consideration of the hardship. The disadvantage to the Great Western of the new route is that the junction at which the traffic turns off from their lines is at a less distance from Gloucester than Basingstoke, and that, receipts from through traffic being divided by mileage, their proportion would be materially less on traffic sent by this route than on traffic carried by Basingstoke. They would carry in the one case 86 miles out of a total distance of 120 miles, and in the other only 36 miles out of a total of 100. But these interests of the Company would not entitle them, as to traffic of the same description going between the same. places, to treat it so unequally on their own line as to work it at through rates if passing off their line at one point, but if at another to refuse it that facility. That would be to give an undue preference to one portion of it. Rates then that exclude traffic from the shorter of these two through routes, and confine it to the longer, cannot but be at the expense of public policy; and though the quantity of the traffic may be insignificant, and equal rates may not have much effect in developing through traffic by Andover, we think it a principle of importance to the public that a route between places affording the best opportunities for railway carriage, as far as distance is concerned, should not be placed at a disadvantage merely because portions of the route belong to railway companies which have an alternative route and make lower charges in favor of the latter."

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The proposed through rates were allowed by the Commis

sion, and the case is an unqualified affirmation that under the English Act of 1854 an illegal preference may be wrought by a discrimination in favor of a line worked by the very carrier which refuses to unite in the through rate desired.

The same case proceeds to consider other proposed rates, upon coal, in respect to which it finds that the proposed route is ten miles longer than the existing route; that it has a greater length of single track; that it has a steep rising gradient; that the tendency of these circumstances is to give a slower service, that it is not "important in this case to have a second railway route to secure the benefit of a free competition, for the traffic can be and is carried by sea from Cardiff and other ports, and the freights which are charged not only regulate the charges of other modes of conveyance, but are almost below remunerative rates for land conveyance. As far, therefore, as competition is a motive to give facilities for railway transit, and operates to ensure good management for the traffic, the Severn Bridge route has this stimulus already."

The conclusion reached was that the granting of the latter rates was not a facility in the interest of the public, and that they ought consequently to be refused.

This case in its two branches very clearly illustrates the method pursued by the English tribunals in dealing with the question under consideration. There can be no doubt but that the principles there adopted would be held sufficient to entitle the Little Rock & Memphis Company to the establishment of the through route desired; its line unquestionably affords a reasonable route for the traffic in question, and the preservation of a competing route is in the public interest. The distance is a trifle shorter than the distance over the line now worked; and the fact that the maintenance of the through route desired would operate to divide the traffic with the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern road is no reason for refusing the extension of equal facilities.

The Commission believes that it was the intention of Congress in the third section to substantially re-enact the requirements of the English Statute. This is not the only instance