export controls are a failure. What I don't think we have focused sufficiently on, however, are some instances which I hope will become clear today in your detailed look at both the failures and successes, where our export control efforts did pay off.

I think we need to focus on these to some extent, if only to figure out what we can do better by building on what works. What I'd like to do today then is to focus on one such success. I put that in quotes, because I think we need to explain in what sense we mean it to be a success. And I want also to spell out what went into making it happen.

The specific case I have in mind is slowing the Condor Missile program. This is a case in which my own office, the Office of NonProliferation Policy, and the Defense Trade and Security Trade Administration, which supports us on nonproliferation played a role, along with Treasury, ACDA, State, Commerce and our intelligence agencies.

The Condor II program was, at one time, a missile effort by Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq, supported by suppliers from advanced industrial nations in Europe. It originally was scheduled and on-line, producing missile in Argentina, Egypt and Iraq, well before Desert Storm. However, as you know, this particular missile was never fielded in any of these nations, much less fired at us in the gulf. Had the program been completed, our missile problems would have been much, much more daunting and considerable than those that we, in fact, faced in Desert Storm. I do not mean to belittle what we did face, but only emphasize how much worse it would have been if this program had been completed.

To understand why, we need only compare this Condor II program with the Iraqi SCUD program. Roughly speaking, SCUDs, even the upgraded ones, are basically World War II vintage technology. The Iraqis, in fact, had acquired several hundred from the Soviets and went about modifying and upgrading these. The Condor II, on the other hand, is similar to one of the most advanced missiles ever fielded, the Pershing II. It would have been manufactured and been available possibly in much larger numbers than the SCUDs within Iraq. Also the Condor II missile was intended to be much, much more accurate than existing SCUDs, and, indeed, even more so than upgraded SCUDs. This, in turn, would have made it orders of magnitude more lethal against point targets than the SCUDs that were actually fired at our troops and allies. Instead of missing their targets by kilometers, in most cases, the Condor II miss distance was supposed to be measured in hundreds of meters or less.

With such accuracies, and the numbers serial indigenous production would have involved, Condors could have been used to perform some of the strategic functions Iraq's air force and their SCUDS could not: to knock out or stun our air operations from local airfields, paralyze our local logistical support from ports, and destroy major air defense units and fixed command centers. These missions, moveover, could have been accomplished-and I emphasize this point-without necessarily having to resort to chemical, biological or nuclear warheads. Conventional munitions would have probably been sufficient if this program had been completed, to accom

plish the missions I have just listed, which would have spelled strategic failure for Desert Storm.

Finally, because the Condor was designed as a solid-fuel, multistage missile we knew it would be more mobile-that is harder to find-fly further and faster, and be much harder for our Patriot radars to detect than any SCUD.

For these reasons, even before the U.S. formally announced its adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987, we assigned a high priority to blocking the missile's development. Using an enforcement infrastructure, that I will shortly describe, we cracked down on U.S. exports that might have otherwise have supported the Condor, urged other supplier nations to do likewise, and discussed our concerns with the customer Governments of Argentina and Egypt.

Several key rules were followed in this effort. First, we blocked exports even though peaceful civilian applications were claimed. In fact, the Condor was alleged by its developers to be a peaceful scientific sounding rocket. Despite this, the United States joined other supplier nations in denying exports to the Condor program and continued to do so to similar programs whether overtly military or allegedly for scientific purposes, as sounding rockets or spacelaunch vehicles.

Second, we focused our efforts on blocking as many critical technologies as we could. Example: guidance technology was perhaps the most critical single determinant of whether a missile will be militarily effective. It was a key focus in the interdiction of Condor and it is a key constraint still with regard to blocking development of other missiles today. Thus, for example, we have just begun intense discussions with our allies, in the MTCR, to add items to the control list, such as global positioning satellite navigation receivers that might be useful for ballistic missile applications.

We also targeted production-related items for the Condor program trying to keep as much of this equipment from the Condor and other similar production projects as possible. Numbers matter. If they get large numbers of accurate missiles anywhere, the military operational consequences are much more profound.

Of course, we tried to block as many other exports to the Condor as we could. This point I want to emphasize. We understood, however, that we might not succeed in blocking all of them, indeed, we didn't. And this brings us to the third rule, which is that our aim was, and still is, to block enough technology to make a difference. Successful development in the case of ballistic missiles, like the Pershing, involves the integration or harmonizing of some 250,000 parts and it is a very expensive proposition. I think, to some extent, this is luckily the case not just for ballistic missiles, but a good number of other significant military systems.

We consciously aim then to prevent enough of the key items from being shipped long enough until either the targeted program's financial or political support dried up, or until we, at least, had some effective means to cope with the threat once it arrived. I think by this criterion-and I emphasize this is a little different criterion than we normally assign to ourselves the efforts concerning Condor were not only worthwhile, but had security payoffs

that were significant. Even though some components slipped through, enough were denied or delayed to impact the program.

Additionally, Argentine and the Egyptian Governments actually decided to help slow the program.

It was at this point that Iraq started to try and take whatever they had gotten in the way of technology and apply it toward their SCUDS. Consen, the multinational organization behind the missiles development, continues to have difficulty securing all the technology needed to complete the program. Meanwhile the United States, Israel, and others are working on followons to the Patriot. Our hope is that this work will be done before Condor-like missiles are deployed in the future so that we have defenses that might work. What produced our successes, as I described them, in slowing the Condor and other similar problem programs? Clearly, the focus of this committee is appropriate since it was key to the success.

Enforcement. Enforcement consisting of several key elements. The first of these elements is intelligence. I am speaking not just of intelligence collecting here-the amassing of raw reports, but of analysis-assessing and organizing this information. In addition to intelligence, however, a second element is needed-action.

Domestically, in the case of the Condor, we had to review our own exports, matching intelligence about the Condor program with technical assessments of the significance and alternative uses of exports. And we had to have a diplomatic understanding of the measures needed to support our own export restraint with complementary from other suppliers.

Of course, no domestic enforcement program can stop technology transfers unless there is a corresponding international enforcement effort. This brings me to the third element-the need for international and diplomatic support. The establishment of multilateral arrangements such as COCOM, the MTCR, the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group set the general framework for international restraint. But when it comes to specifics, much more needs to be done. Our diplomats, Customs officials, and intelligence specialists, in the Condor case, for example, work with their counterparts in the MTCR partner governments to ensure that U.S. denials of exports were supported elsewhere, that is, not undercut, and to identify Condor procurement overseas that needed to be stopped.

As you can see, from what I've said, enforcement and administration of export controls is highly manpower intensive. In the Condor case, we needed the involvement literally of hundreds of Government officials around the world, and a high enough priority to focus these officials on the effort. Again, I would like to think this effort was warranted and I believe it was.

In my written testimony, I tried to address your questions on COCOM liberalization, but for the sake of short time, I will pass over that and allow that to be treated in questions and answers. I would, however, like to do one thing in closing. And that is to recognize three people in Defense-if there were other agencies here, I would perhaps add to the list much more-whom I think had the most to do, not only with the Condor, but with the enforcement of export controls in general. You will be hearing from one of them today, Mr. Steve Bryen, and in addition, Mr. Mike Maloof of

DTSA who is here and Dr. Richard Speier who works in my office. Mr. Maloof works in DTSA. This is my counterpart, Peter Sullivan, and Dr. Speier have been on this case for a good, long period of time. Without their efforts and the efforts of people like them I would not have been able to give the testimony I gave today.

Thank you. That concludes my testimony and both of us will be able to, I hope, answer your questions.

[The prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI

DEPUTY FOR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman:

I wish to thank the Committee for this opportunity to testify on what we all agree is a very important topic.

Before addressing the specific issues posed in your letter of invitation, I would first like to present a brief statement on the Department of Defense's role in the export control process. My office, the Office of Non-Proliferation Policy, is concerned with threats posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. In addition to supporting research in non-proliferation issues we articulate policy options to deal with these issues. Additionally, we work closely with all concerned DoD components in formulating DoD positions on the cases that are referred to us for review by either the Departments of State or Commerce. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) reviews all other license applications referred to DoD for technology security review. DTSA also provides support to my office.

I would like to emphasize, however, that DoD is not a licensing agency. That responsibility lies with the Department of State for munitions items and with the Department of Commerce for "dual-use" items. We do believe, however, that DoD is uniquely qualified to gauge the military or proliferation significance of a proposed sale or transfer, and we are ready and eager to advise either State or Commerce when they seek our advice.

DoD's role in the export control process varies considerably given the nature of the export in question, as defined by the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Nuclear NonProliferation Act, and various practices and procedures established by interagency agreement or executive directive.

Under the Arms Export Control Act, Defense reviews applications for the export of defense articles and services. The Department of State sends these munitions applications to DTSA for DoD review. DTSA, in turn, automatically sends to my office all of their missile and space technology related cases. My staff is responsible for analyzing at least 1,500 of these cases per year, not only for DoD, but also for the interagency proliferation review groups.

DoD's role in the area of reviewing dual-use technologies under the Export Administration Act is somewhat different from its handling of munitions cases.

DoD reviews most dual-use export applications for exports to the Soviet Union and other so-called controlled countries. DOD also reviews certain categories of dual-use exports to other nations to determine the risk of diversion to the Soviet Union or other proscribed countries.

Defense, as part of its responsibilities under U.S. export controls, provides assistance to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This ranges from providing expert analyses on identifying suspect government and technology to bringing to their attention possible illegal acquisition of controlled items. Effective administration and enforcement of export controls is not very flashy: It is not passing laws or creating new multilateral regimes, but without it, none of these other efforts can bear fruit.