-5

applicable after June 30, 1973. Section 4 of this bill

includes a provision which is virtually identical to section 4 of Public Law 92-46, thereby insuring that the Board's authority in this regard would continue after June 30, 1973. This provision does not affect the cost of the benefit increases

proposed.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I hope that the bill will be enacted as soon as possible. As I have stated, I favor an amendment to the bill which would provide the benefit increase on a permanent basis. However, if the adoption of such an amendment would delay enactment of the bill,

I would prefer that the bill be acted upon without amendment

that

so that the increases to railroad retirement beneficiaries

will not be delayed.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Schweiker, do you have any questions? Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Mittelman, our minority counsel, would like to ask a question.

Mr. MITTELMAN. I would like to clarify one thing for the record. As I understand it, if we were to adopt a pass-through increase, the net effect on the fund would be zero; it would not either increase or decrease the actuarial deficit of the fund.

Perhaps Mr. Cowen would answer that question.

Mr. CowEN. It would be very close to zero. It might not be exactly

zero.

I have figures here some place, but I know it would be less than $10 million a year either way.

Mr. MITTELMAN. That is because of the financial interchange provisions in the law now?

Mr. CowEN. Correct.

Mr. MITTELMAN. Also, this is what the Commission recommends in its report, is it not?

Mr. COWEN. I believe there was a divided view on that particular point. I believe the Commission members will be testifying, and I would rather let them speak for themselves.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I have no other questions.
Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.
Senator Taft, we welcome you to the hearing.

Our next witness is Theodore O. Yntema, Chairman, Commission on Railroad Retirement.

STATEMENT OF THEODORE 0. YNTEMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON RAILROAD RETIREMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL S. MARCH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Mr. YNTEMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. I understand you are accompanied by Dr. Michael March.

Mr. YNTEMA. Yes, and may I say that I am glad Mr. Cowen is in the audience. If there are highly technical questions, with your permission I will call on him to answer them.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. We are going to have to recess for a rollcall. (Recess.)

Senator CRANSTON. The hearing will please come to order. I apologize for the delay. I will appreciate your indulgence while Senator Schweiker presides briefly. I must make one urgent telephone call.

Mr. YNTEMA. Thank you. I am most grateful for this opportunity to appear before you, the more so since I was denied such an opportunity on the hearings on corresponding legislation in the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

I am pleased therefore to present to you the findings of the Commission on railroad retirement that have a bearing on S. 3852. This bill, as you know, will provide an across-the-board 20-percent increase in benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act.

My statement is divided into two parts: First, a summary of the Commission's findings as they relate to the present bill. Second, an analysis of S. 3852 in the light of the Commission's findings and recommendations.

The Commission's Findings: The Coming Crisis of the Railroad Retirement System: The 5-member Commission on Railroad Retirement was created by Congress by Public Law 91-377, which your committee helped draft. The Commission was ordered to make a study of the railroad retirement system and report to the President and the Congress on how to provide adequate benefits on an actuarially sound basis.

The Commission first met on January 20, 1971, and it held its 19th and last meeting on June 28, 1972. During this period of about 17 months we investigated the topics stipulated in Public Law 91-377 and developed our recommendations. Our report is now at the printers. We have, however, forwarded to your committee advance copies of part I, which is now mostly set in type.

For this study we developed a computerized actuarial model of the railroad retirement system, which for the first time gives capability to project the cash flows for the system year-by-year for many years ahead. We also made an economic study of the future of the railroad industry and of railroad employment with the assistance of the National Planning Association. Then we ran more than 20 tests with our model on alternate sets of assumptions.

The Commission's findings that are directly relevant to S. 3852, which you now have under consideration, are the following:

1. The railroad retirement account will be bankrupt in 16 or 17 years if it continues on its present course. This assumed (a) that the temporary 1970 and 1971 increases of 26.5 percent will be continued, (b) that no further liberalizations except cost-of-living increases will be made, (c) that present tax rates for funds retained by the railroad retirement account will be continued, and (d) it takes into account the higher wage base enacted by Public Law 92-336 as it became law July 1, 1972.

Our projections show that, unless remedial measures are taken, the present reserve of about $5 billion in the railroad retirement account will be gone by 1989. The total projected deficits from 1973 to the year 2000 add up to $16 billion. The railroad retirement account would thus have a debt of at least $11 billion in the year 2000-if the program is still in existence. This projection, it should be noted, does not allow for the 20-percent increase in benefits provided in S. 3852.

2. The 15-percent benefits increase in 1970 and the 10-percent increase in 1971, which multiply out to an increase of 26.5 percent, have not been covered by tax increases. They cause the bulk of the deficiency in the system as it now is. Our Commission has recommended that any extension of these temporary increases be accompanied by a tax increase sufficient to finance them.

3. Dual OASDI benefits are a major and needless cost to the railroad retirement system. Because railroad workers are excluded from full and direct social security coverage, they are able to qualify for disproportionate OASDI benefits by contributing for a relatively short time to social security. The vast majority of workers in the United States who are under OASDI cannot qualify for dual benefits in this

manner.

The projected gross cost of all dual OASDI benefit payments to railroad beneficiaries is about 10 percent of covered payroll for the next 30 years. About two-thirds of these costs are excess or windfall bene

fits. They would not have to be paid if railroad retirement and social security were fully coordinated, as staff pensions and social security are for most other workers in the country.

The railroad retirement account has to bear the full cost of these excess benefits. The dual benefits are received largely by shorter-service railroad workers. To finance them, all railroad workers must pay higher taxes, including the full career workers who are much less likely to qualify for dual benefits. The excess cost of dual benefits in 1971 was $265 million and this amount will increase sharply to about $700 million by the year 2000.

4. The railroad retirement system is probably the most complicated pension system in the United States. It is two systems within one. The initial staff benefit provisions have been retained, but the entire structure of social security benefits was also incorporated by cross reference in 1951.

Our Commission has recommended that the railroad retirement system be restructured into two tiers: (1) a basic tier consisting of OASDI and (2) a separate, second tier of staff benefits, related primarily to service and financed by the RR community. This second tier would be completely separate from OASDI and would float on top of it. Such restructuring, in our opinion, is absolutely essential to eliminate the existing confusion and to preserve the financial integrity of the railroad retirement system.

Because confusion now prevails in regard to the objectives of the railroad retirement system, confusion also prevails in regard to benefits, costs, and the financing of the system. The bill presently before your committee reflects this confusion: it fails to distinguish between the part of the railroad retirement benefits that are social security and the part that are staff benefits. There is not reason why a percentage rise in social security benefits should automatically be extended to the staff portion of railroad retirement benefits.

Instead of continuing with a further discussion of the report, I would like to offer you a series of fact sheets for inclusion in the record. I think copies have been supplied to the committee, and I would like to offer this one for the record if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. This will go in the record. We will also print your report and recommendation summary, along with dissenting and individual views, as an appendix to this record.

Mr. YNTEMA. The fact sheets outline our major findings and also present factual information bearing on S. 3852.

You might also want to take a moment to glance at the charts that are appended to the statement I have read.

The first chart shows the size of the annual deficit year by year, and the second chart shows the expenditures, and you can see how very rapidly the fund begins to drop beginning about 1975, and disappears by approximately 1985.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF A 20-PERCENT INCREASE AS PROPOSED BY S. 3852

S. 3852 would provide a percentage increase of 20 percent in benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act across the board. It has no offsets for dual benefits, already increased 20 percent by the amendments in Public Law 92-336 (H.R. 15390) to the Social Security Act. The increases would expire June 30, 1973.

My analysis of the consequences of S. 3852 is as follows:

1. Temporary benefits once paid are very likely-I will say practically certainly to become permanent. When our Commission considered the temporary 1970 and 1971 increases there was great resistance to any suggestion that they be rolled back. The same will be true of the new 20-percent increase, which will be on top of the early unfinanced increases. This will mean compounded increases amounting to 51.8 percent in 3 years-all without financing.

2. In particular, the increases for dual beneficiaries who already receive excess benefits would be costly and inequitable. It would be much better to include offsets, as was done in 1966, 1968, and 1970, to eliminate double increases for dual beneficiaries. This would save a needless expenditure of $60 million the first full year.

3. The proposed increase of 20 percent would raise both the basic OASDI tier of railroad retirement benefits and the additional layer which constitutes the staff pension tier of benefits. For a career worker with a wife who together now receive $325 monthly under social security, the 20-percent increase would be $65 a month. For a married career railroad worker with a $570 railroad benefit, including $500 from the railroad retirement account and the rest in supplemental benefits, the 20-percent increase would be $100 a month. The extra increase on his second tier would be $35 a month.

4. The railroad retirement account must bear the entire cost of the staff tier increase and of the doubled up increase for dual beneficiaries. OASDI pays for the basic tier through the financial interchange. In calendar year 1973 this net extra cost to the railroad retirement account will be $134 million, according to our projections.

From 1973 to the year 2000 the additional expenditures will add up to $12 billion. S. 3852 does not provide any additional taxes to cover these costs.

As a result-assuming these benefits will be extended-as I think everyone concerned knows they will be the railroad retirement account will go broke in the year 1985 and by the year 2000 will run up a debt of $23 billion. The size of the annual deficits is shown on the two charts which are attached. Indeed, by the year 2000 the annual deficit will be at the rate of $1.9 billion if the bill is enacted.

Senator CRANSTON. I am sorry to interrupt. I was hoping we might be able to complete your testimony, but we must leave at this point. for another rollcall.

(Recess.)

Senator CRANSTON. The hearing will reconvene.

Please proceed, Mr. Yntema.

Mr. YNTEMA. S. 3852 would create a very unfavorable tax situation for railroad workers and employers. In the second half of 1972 the railroad retirement taxes collected and retained by the railroad retirement account are 9.5 percent of covered payroll shared equally by workers and employers, plus an additional 1.8 percent of covered payroll by employers for the supplemental benefits enacted in 1966. Thus the total for staff tier benefits is 11.3 percent. In addition, in 1972 9.2 percent of covered payroll goes to OASDI plus 1.2 percent