management of that institution, at any time to alter the purpose for which it was founded." He then quotes Lord Eldon in Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 400: “If it turns out that the institution was established for the express purpose of such form of religious worship as the founder has thought most conformable to the principles of the Christian religion, I do not apprehend that it is in the power of individuals having the management of that institution, at any time to alter the purpose for which it was founded, or to say to the remaining members: 'We have changed our opinions, and you who assemble in this case for the purpose of hearing the doctrines, and joining in the worship prescribed by the founder, shall no longer enjoy the benefit he intended for you, unless you conform to the alteration which has taken place in our opinions.' In such a case therefore, I apprehend, considering it as settled by the authority I have referred to, that where a congregation become dissentient among themselves, the nature of the original institution must alone be looked to as the guide for the decision of the Court; and that to refer to any other criterion, as to the sense of the existing majority, would be to make a new institution, which is altogether beyond the reach and inconsistent with the duties and character of this Court."

These words, so often cited, were used in a case in which the property given to a Trinitarian Congregation, was reclaimed in after years from Unitarian hands. It turned very much on the then state of the law in England and the disabilities of Unitarians, but the general doctrine remains of undoubted authority. We have to consider whether the respondents have made out their case. First, have the plaintiffs departed from any of the fundamental principles or tenets of the society as it existed in 1821, or have they departed from its practice and discipline so as in effect to be no longer the same society or members thereof? and in connection with this, we have to consider the right of the society in the exercise of its acknowledged constitutional powers, viz., by the action of the Yearly Meeting, the admitted highest tribunal which it possesses, to change either doctrine or discipline.

It may not ultimately be necessary to discuss its power as to doctrine, but to confine the inquiry to disciplinary alterations.

It may be convenient in the first place, to glance at some of the leading authorities on the subject. The Lady Hawley's Charity Case, is well known, and the various discussions and judgments are most instructive; AttorneyGeneral v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592; Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clk. & Fin. 350.

In Attorney-General v. Gould, 28 Beav. 485, property was purchased and conveyed to trustees "in trust, to and for the use and benefit of the congregation of Particular Baptists within the city of Norwich, and so as the messuage and premises might be always held, used, and enjoyed as a place of public worship of Almighty God, for the congregation for the time being."

The question was, whether as the information charged, persons not baptized by total immersion, were unlawfully admitted to communion of the Lord's Supper contrary to the principles of Particular Baptists, and also that persons not Baptists were so admitted. The defence was, that "The question between open and strict communion in congregations of Particular Baptists, had always been an open question." The Master of the Rolls said he had simply to determine a legal question, whether having regard to the terms of the deed founding the chapel, free communion is to be henceforth interdicted in the practice. of its members, and he was bound to inquire whether the doctrine of faith of Particular Baptists excluded the practice of free communion. "In other words, I have to determine whether the employment of the building for this purpose, is such a perversion of the objects and trusts for which it was established, that is, whether it is a violation of those trusts which the court will interfere to prevent." He then considers whether the fundamental principles of the faith of Particular Baptists are so declared.

After an examination of the authorities, and the very heated controversies for nearly two centuries on this point,

he appears to consider it an open question. That it also appeared that in all matters not fundamental, " it was part of the constitution and essence of such church or congregation of Particular Baptists, that they might regulate their practice as they thought fit. This particular congregation had from its first institution adopted the practice of strict communion until very recently. He held that this did not help the plaintiffs, "because the words of the deed say nothing about maintaining the existing practice." He adds that it is a misapprehension of the doctrine of a court of equity, with reference to usage and custom, that any one can be brought to the opinion that previous custom will in such case bind the congregation, and he expresses surprise that it could be maintained "that a practice not involving fundamental points of faith, and not prescribed by the deed of endowment, can have become so fixed by custom as to be incapable of alteration, if the majority of the congregation shall be of opinion that such alteration will be more in accordance with the faith they profess, and more acceptable to the Great Being whose ordinance they assemble to observe." The judgment of Chief Justice Shaw in Earle v. Wood, 8 Cush. 430, is very instructive on two points of the case before us first as to variance in practice or discipline.

"It would seem to be inconsistent with the nature and principles of the Quaker system, as far as it is disclosed in the case before us, to be bound down as a body, as a Christian denomination, to a precise and unbending rule in matters of speculative opinion. They profess to believe in the continued influence and presence of the Holy Spirit in the mind of each individual humbly waiting for its manifestations, to aid in the discovery of Divine truth. It would seem therefore, that they must suppose it possible that new truths may be discovered, and so manifested as to require the assent of the true disciple, and thus add something to its existing faith; * should the testimony of the Scriptures, and the influence of the Holy Spirit concur in bringing to the conviction of humble, sincere and inquiring minds, the knowledge of further Christian truths, manifest with a brilliancy and clearness not to be mistaken; it seems perfectly consistent with the avowed principles of the Society of Friends to adopt and sanction them, although they were not known to Pennington, Barclay, or

Fox, and the respected founders of their society, and under a full belief that if the same light had been thrown on the same truths in their day, those sincere and seeking men would have humbly and devoutly embraced them If after solid and weighty consideration, humbly and conscientiously awaiting the guidance of best wisdom, the Yearly Meeting should fully unite, in the proper as well the Quaker sense of the term, in adopting some modification of their creed or of their speculative opinions, adhering to their great principles of love and fraternal duty, it would upon their professed principles seem too much to say that they would thereby cease to be Quakers and cease to be the Society of Friends. Especially we think, this could not be asserted by meetings and individuals subordinate to them, who owe ecclesiastically allegiance to them and to whom, so long as they remain subordinate, the decisions are final and infallible as well in matters of faith as of conduct."

This judgment is most full and instructive. It also fully discusses the question as to the legality of the meetings, quarterly and yearly. Some of the New York cases seem to turn very much on the effect of their statute incorporating religious societies. White Lick Meeting, &c. v. White Lick Meeting, 89 Indiana 136 (1883), is a very important case, involving questions on a schism in the Society of Friends strongly resembling, if not identical with some of those raised before us. It reviews most if not all of the previous decisions. It quotes largely from Chief Justice Shaw's judgment in Earle v. Wood, and declares that he has not too strongly stated the power of the Yearly Meetings in ecclesiastical affairs. The Court adds, "Every church and every principal ecclesiastical denomination, claiming to be founded on Christian principles, or composed of persons calling themselves Christians, has within itself some quasi legislative and supreme powers having control over matters of doctrine as well as discipline, and having some jurisdiction at least over what pertains to the faith as well as the practices of its members."

The judgment also deals with the question of the disputed regularity of the Yearly Meeting.

Watkins v. Wilcox, 66 N. Y. 654, seems to adopt the principle of the decision in Gable v. Miller, 2 Denio 492,

where Gardiner, President, says, "It must be a plain and palpable abuse of trust, which will induce a Court of Equity to interfere respecting a controversy growing out of a difference in religion and sectarian trusts.'

Harrison v. Hoyle, 24 Ohio Sup. Ct, 254, is very full as to the proceedings of the Yearly Meeting, and the action of the clerk in ascertaining the "solid sense" of the members. The judgment of the Sup. Ct. of U. S. (1871), in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wallace 679, very fully reviews the general law. The head notes epitomise the views of the court. After stating that the court will inquire into the religious faith or practice of the persons claiming the use or control of property devoted, by the express terms of the gift, grant, or sale, to the support of any specific religious doctrine or belief.

Or "If the property was acquired in the ordinary way of purchase or gift for the use of a religious society, the court will inquire who constitute that society or its legitimate successors, and award to them the use of the property

And "In the class of cases in which property has been acquired in the same way, by a society which constitutes a subordinate part of the general religious organization, with established tribunals for ecclesiastical government, these tribunals must decide all questions of faith, discipline, rule, custom, or ecclesiastical government and the civil

courts will accept their decision as conclusive."

Reference may be made to the celebrated "Essays and Reviews" cases, Williams v. Bishop of Salisbury, and Wilson v. Fendall, 2 Moo. P. C. N. S. 375, and the judgment of the Chancellor as to the certainty and precision required, before convicting anyone of departure from the Articles and Formularies of the Church. The head notes summarize thus: "Matters of doctrine in which the Church has prescribed no rule, may be discussed without penal consequences, and no rule is to be ascribed to the Church which is not found expressly and distinctly stated, or which is not plainly involved in or to be collected from the written law of the Church."

The spirit in which alleged variations from articles and rubrics is discussed, is exemplified in the judgment of the Privy Council in Gorham v. The Bishop of Exeter, 14 Jur.