64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

442 (1945).

Further, one expansion in the definition

included in the income tax regulations clearly was

authorized by the sponsoring House committee's report.
See the body supra, and the note, at note 8.

See 1 SIMES & SMITHI, op. cit. supra, note 9, pp 2 and 3.

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, $8.12, p.237 (1952).

BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, $74, p.257 2d ed. (1955).

Id.,
$88, p. 375. Further, the statutes of California,
e.g., in dealing generally with future interests,
provide: "In respect to the time of enjoyment, an
interest in property is either: (1) Present or future,
and (2) Perpetual or limited." CALIF. ANN. CIVIL CODE,
$688. Underlining added.

Also relevant is the fact that the regulations under
I.R.C. $170 (a) (3) even reach so-called "lóan-back"
arrangements, oral or written, though the donor purported
to give complete title to the donee. See body op.cit.
supra, note 8. And that interpretation clearly was
authorized by the sponsoring House committee's report..
R. Rep. No. 749, op. cit. supra, note 7.

Comm'r v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393,397 (1941). Also
relevant to this for tax purposes is the addition made
for purposes of $170 (a) (3), to the regulatory definition
of "future interests," so as to cover, e.g., inform:1
"loan"back" arrangements wh re the donor purportedly had

H.

passed full title.
note, at note 8.

See the body supra,

and the

69.

70.

71.

72.

The statement in the body is a slight exaggeration,
The Hutchings case has been referred to in all cases
but Comm'r. v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945).

See U.S.

v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941); Ryerson v. U.S., 312 U.S. 405 (1941); Fondren v. Comm'r., 324 U.S. 18 (1945).

Underlining

Fondren v. Comm'r., 324 U.S. 18,20 (1945).
added. Equally relevant for purposes of I.R.C. $170 (a) (3)
is the expanded definition of "future interest" reflected
in the regulations, as quoted in the body supra at
note 8. That the regulatory expansion was fully

justified, see supra note 8.

Op. cit. supra, note 57.

Estate of Sanford v. Comin'r, 308 U.S.39 (1939).

73. 44 U.S.C. $2105.

74.

2 SCOTT, TRUSTS, SS175,176, and 172 (1967).

75.

76.

U.S. v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941); Ryerson v.
U.S., 312 U.S. 405 (1941); Fondren v. Comm'r.,

324 U.S. 18 (1945); Comm'r. v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442
(1945).

44 U.S.C. $2105.

78.

79.

H. R. Rep. No. 2747, 81st Cong., 1st sess. 15

(1950); S. Rep. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 18

(1950).

44 U.S.C. $2113.

80.

H. R. Rep. No. 2747, 81st Cong. 1st sess.17 (1950).

81.

82.

83.

See Note, Personal Letters in Need of a Law of Their
Own, 44 IA. L. REV. 705, 711 (1959).

See 1 NIMMER, COPRIGHT, $52 (1963).

Parker, Chancery Jurisdiction, 1 AM. L. REG. 449, 458
(1853), quoted with almost complete approval in
Grigsby v.Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 489 (1867).
Also see SHAW, LITERARY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

107 (1950); Note, op. cit. supra, note 81 at 706.

84.

1 NIMMER, COPYRIGHT, $64, p. 248 (1963).

85.

86.

Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 279 N.Y.S. 2d
51 (1967).

So characterized by writers in Noto, Personal
Letters: In Need of a Law of Their Own, 44 IN. LAW REV.
705; 707 n. 24 (1959); SHAW, LITERARY PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 16 (1950). The idea that the
author has such a right most certainly is difficult
to square with the notion t. at the recipient has full
title and possession to the tangible iter and could, ii
he vishes, simply destroy it. Of course, the

author of the writing

should be able through the

courts, say, in a law suit for infringement of

his copyright, to gain access to the original, just
as he could obtain access through procedural rules
to any essential document. E.g., see Simmons v.

89.

90.

91.

44 U.S.C. §2113.

44 U.S.C. $2108 (c).

See S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d secs. 64 (1964).
However, this is not to imply that the Senate's
revision had any adverse impact on the expanded version
of "future interests" reflected in the regulations under
$170 (a) (3) (see the body supra at note 8), for that
addition was fully warranted by a part of the House
committee's report with which the Senate committee
did not quibble. See supra, note 8.

H. R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st sess. 55, A50 (1963) (C.B. 1964-1, 179 and 298 (1964)).

S. Rep. No. 830, op. cit. supra, note 89 at 65.

03.

See discussion in the boy upza, pp. 24-33.

the (i) "retained-affirmative-rights proviso,"

(ii) the "negative-restrictions proviso,"

(iii) the nature of the tangible property,

clearly retained in the case of

and

tangible items in which he had no common law

copyright, what was the equivalent of a "loan-
arrangement which now is deemed to

back"

96.

See the paragraph in the body supra, embracing
notes 56 and 57.

98.

99.

100.

See body supra, commencing with the last
paragraph on p. 8 through the middle of p.10.

H. R. Rep.No. 749, op. cit. supra, note 7.

III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, $12.90, p. 382 (1952).

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Reference here, it should be remembered, is to that tangible "Material" as to which the donor never owned ar.' intangible property interest.