MINTON, J., dissenting.

346 U.S.

Leaving open the question of whether respondent has advanced sufficient reasons for relief pursuant to Rule 60 (b) if the proceedings had been timely commenced, he has not established that these proceedings were instituted within a reasonable time after entry of the judgment of conviction, even if the one-year period of limitation is not applicable. Respondent has not sought to explain his long delay in seeking to set aside the federal judgment, and twelve years' delay would appear to be unreasonable on its face, absent unusual circumstances which are not shown to be present here. United States v. Moore, 166 F. 2d 102, 105; Farnsworth v. United States, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 198 F. 2d 600; United States v. Bice, 84 F. Supp. 290, aff'd, 177 F. 2d 843.

Apparently, having once abolished the common-law writ of coram nobis, the Court now undertakes to reestablish it under the name of "a motion in the nature of coram nobis" in order to escape the limitations laid down in Rule 60 (b). Rule 60 (b) is said to be inapplicable because coram nobis may be sought by a motion in the criminal case rather than in a separate, independent proceeding. There is no indication that this "application" was intended as a motion in the case rather than an independent proceeding to set aside the prior judgment, and several courts have stated that coram nobis proceedings retain their civil character under the modern practice.

10

But assuming the Civil Rules to be inapposite, I believe that Congress superseded the common-law writ of coram nobis in enacting 28 U. S. C. § 2255.11 As

10 See cases cited in note 7, supra.

11

11 "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to

502

MINTON, J., dissenting.

the Reviser's Note makes clear, that section "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis." 12 H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-180. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 214-219. In enacting this comprehensive procedure for collateral attacks on federal criminal judgments, Congress has supplied the remedy to which resort must be had. Since Congress did not see fit in § 2255 to extend the remedy there provided to persons not in federal custody under the judgment attacked, I do not feel free to do so.

It may be said that the federal conviction is still being used against respondent and, therefore, some relief ought to be available. Of course the record of a conviction for a serious crime is often a lifelong handicap. There are a dozen ways in which even a person who has reformed, never offended again, and constantly endeavored to lead an upright life may be prejudiced thereby. The stain on his reputation may at any time threaten his social standing or affect his job opportunities, for example. Is coram nobis also to be available in such cases? The relief being devised here is either wide open to every ex-convict as long as he lives or else it is limited to those who have returned to crime and want the record expunged to lessen a subsequent sentence. Either alternative seems unwarranted to me.

The important principle that means for redressing deprivations of constitutional rights should be available often clashes with the also important principle that at some point a judgment should become final-that litiga

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."

12 Emphasis added.

275520 O-54-38

MINTON, J., dissenting.

346 U.S.

tion must eventually come to an end. These conflicting principles have traditionally been accommodated in federal criminal cases by permitting collateral attack on a judgment only during the time that punishment under the judgment is being imposed, and Congress has so limited the use of proceedings by motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. If that is to be changed, Congress should do it.

Syllabus.

GENERAL PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF OPTION WARRANTS OF THE UNITED CORPORATION v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ET al.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 184. Argued December 2, 1953. Decided January 4, 1954. A voluntary plan of reorganization submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which would enable a registered holding company to comply with § 11 (b) of the Act by converting itself into an investment company, was approved by the Commission. The Commission expressly provided in its order of approval that certain provisions of the plan would not be operative "until an appropriate United States District Court shall, upon application thereto, enter an order enforcing said provisions"; but the Commission had not yet applied to the District Court for enforcement under § 11 (e). Held: On a petition for review under § 24 (a) of the Act, the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction over those provisions of the plan which the Commission had made operative on enforcement by the District Court, but had jurisdiction of the controversy so far as it related to other provisions of the plan. Pp. 522-536.

92 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 203 F. 2d 611, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Securities and Exchange Commission approved a reorganization plan under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 10614, 10643. On review in the Court of Appeals, the petitioner here was allowed to intervene, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's order. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 203 F. 2d 611. This Court granted certiorari limited to the question of jurisdiction. 346 U. S. 810. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, p. 536.

Opinion of the Court.

346 U.S.

John Mulford argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Henry S. Drinker, Thomas Reath and M. Quinn Shaughnessy.

William H. Timbers argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission, respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern and Alexander Cohen.

Richard Joyce Smith argued the cause and filed a brief for the United Corporation, respondent.

Randolph Phillips, respondent, argued the cause pro se. Joseph B. Hyman was with him on the brief for Downing et al., respondents.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United Corporation is a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. § 79 et seq. Section 11 (b) of that Act requires each holding company, with exceptions not material here, to limit the operations of the holding-company system of which it is a part to a single integrated public-utility system and to businesses reasonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate to that system. Section 11 (e) allows a registered holding company to submit a plan to the Commission which will enable it to comply with § 11 (b).

United controlled, directly or indirectly, various gas and electric utility companies in the East. It submitted a plan to the Commission which, it claimed, would complete its compliance with § 11 (b). The Commission rejected United's plan. 13 S. E. C. 854, 898-899. The Commission, however, withheld issuance of a dissolution order so as to afford United an opportunity to comply with the Act by divesting itself of control over its subsidiaries and by transforming itself into an investment