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been very great; and, in that of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

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A MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF ASSYE.

(Subsequently transmitted.) 1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out Natives in the 2 Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are4 as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans ; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body 6 of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that? we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted ; and Colonel Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to 10 Assye, where was its left: it was all 11 in the

i et particulièrement regrettables 4 'because, being ... &c., they en ce qui concerne le lieutenant- are'; see page 254, note 1, colonel M— et autres officiers dont before we have been able to'; les noms y sont mentionnés.

see page 7, note 7.
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gros. 3 See page 29, note ?. In all ? 1 résulte de (or, Il en . cases where the construction can- sulte) que. not be altered, and qui would be 8 which we had agreed to at. awkward, follow the course recom- tack, Col. Stevenson and I.' mended in the note referred to, 9 See page 79, note 2. even when no ambiguity is to be 10 à une distance de plus de six feared ; and when the construction milles jusqu’d.-'to that village'; can be altered, follow the rule 'to' here, du côté de. given at page 14, note 5.

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district of Bokerdun, which was the cause1 of the mistake.

3. My march of the 23rd was so directed as that 2 I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I there received intelligence 4 that they were going off ; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnoitred. I could not have reconnoitred? without taking the whole of my small force; and, when I gots near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front 9 of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.10

4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front,11 and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, 12 and a vast quantity of cannon,13 I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according to the plan.

5. The consequence of my withdrawing 14 would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult

i See page 28, note 10, and page 6 il m'aurait fallu reconnaître 117, note 14. We also use causer (or, faire une reconnaissance). (to cause, to occasion) : être la 1 See page 44, note 2, and page cause de, &c., may, however, be 38, note 3: Observe that could' used, and the rule 10 of page 28 is here conditional (for should be is not absolute in this case; but, able'), not imperfect indicative before que, the article must be left (for 'was able ') as at page 38, out, as, vous êtes cause que je me note 3. suis brálé les doigts ("I have burnt 8 Use the compound of the conmy fingers through you'). – ditional.—' to get,' here, arriver. which ;' see page 7, note 17.

en face. 2 .so as that,' de telle façon que. 10 Simply, sur la foi des ren3 See page 14, note 5, and page seignements que j avais reçus à N—. 22, note -'within,' d'environ. en face de moi.

4 • There I received (page 254, une infanterie seule (or, note 1) intelligence.' intelli- d elle seule) trois ou quatre fois plus gence, avis, in this sense, preceded forte que la mienne. by no article.

13 Use the plural. 5 de toute manière.

14 See page 21, note 3.

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to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost? a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was : and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it. 2

6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed 3 a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make 4 the attack.

7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c.

8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right up to 9 Assye.

9. For a length of timelo they did not see my infantry, or 11 discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye,

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'myself,' moi. 'in ;' leave 7 d, followed by no article.out this word.—'it was ten,' &c., Notice this use of d, instead of il y avait dix à parier contre un avec : in the same way we say, un que j'aurais perdu.

homme à cheveux blancs, l'Homme 2 Simply, auprès.

au masque de fer, la Poule aux 3 je dirai même.-Construct, 'it cufs d'or, &c.-If, however, the was likely, indeed certain.' Kaitna has high as well as steep

banks, the French epithet for it 5 remarquez-le bien. 'to fail,' will be rivière encaissée. here, échouer.-' from ;' see page 8 See page 126, note 17. 137, note 6.

goto throw up to,' porter jus6' such as it is (se trouve,-to qu’d. avoid the awkward repetition of

10 Pendant assez longtemps. être) indicated on.'

11 See page 42, note 8.

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and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye;1 but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaum: if they had, I must have gone lower down;and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road 4 across the river, which 5 would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan ; and determined to maneuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must 6 fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly.

11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regiment, which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support 9 the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line 10 between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible 12 cannonade from 13 Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos ; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regiment, we 14 sustained the greatest part of our loss. 15 One company of the piquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file,16 lost the officer and forty-four rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah,

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l'on the ground which sepa- note 9). rates the K—from A

9 soutenir, or appuyer, here, ? Supply the ellipsis, which, as not supporter we have repeatedly seen above, is 10 floresta un grand espace not allowed in French.

(or, intervalle) dans notre ligne 3 il m'aurait fallu (or, j'aurais rompue. été obligé dej'aurais eu a) des- 11f those which were.' cendre plus bas. See page 44, 13 See page 96, note 10. note ?, and page 38, note 3.

13 from, partie de (lit., 'prochemin.

ceeded-come--from '). 5 See page 7, note 17.

14 “it is in ... &c., that we have.' 6 Use the imperfect tense. -'to sustain,' here, éprouver, cr 7 who commanded.'

essuyer. 8 and which ;' see page 56, 15" le plus de pertes. note 3. —' was ordered ;' turn, 'had 16 rank and file,' hommes (or order-or, the order' (page 21, soldats).

12. Another bad 1 consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period.? I had ordered it to watch the motions : of the enemy's cavalry4 banging upon our right; and, luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into 6 the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated ; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended? when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus makes the victory still more complete than it

was. 9

13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon 10 by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses. 1 fâcheuse (fem.).

6 au milieu de. 2 of introducing too soon,' &c. 7 See page 5, note 8. Turn 3 mouvements.

here, as I had had the intention 4 We rather say cavaleriemor of it.' in funterie ennemie (adjective) 8 See page 35, note 1. than de l'ennemi (substan- 9 See page 29, note 22, and page tive, as in English). — banging 15, note 9. upon,' qui ne cessait de rôder aux ío to work upon,' here, attaalentours de.

quer ; see page 29, note 9. 5 à temps pour.

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