INSURANCE.

A policy of life insurance was issued, insuring the life of a husband for
the benefit of his wife, for $5000, for life, a premium named to be
paid annually, and, if not paid, the policy to cease. It was made at
the instance of the husband, he paid with his own money all the pre-
miums which were paid, being nine, the policy remained always in his
possession, and the wife had nothing to do with it. Before the tenth
premium became due, the husband advised the company that he could
not pay that premium, and wished to take out a paid-up policy, under
a provision therefor. The company advised him not to do so but to
have so much of the $5000 released as would enable him, with the sum
allowed for such release, to pay what would be due as a premium on
the remainder. He agreed to do so, and presented to the company
what purported to be a receipt signed by his wife for $82.39, as a con-
sideration for the release of $700 of the $5000, the $82.39 being applied
towards the premium on the $4300 policy. Thereupon the husband
received a policy for $4300 insurance on his life, for his wife's benefit,
bearing the same number as the $5000 policy, with a less annual pre-
mium. A year later he advised the company that he could not pay
the premium on the $4300 policy, and took a paid-up policy for $1195
on his life for the benefit of his wife, having first given the company
what purported to be a receipt signed by his wife for $583.24 as a
consideration for all claims on account of "policy No." so and so,
released, the $583.24 being applied in payment of a premium on a
participating paid-up policy for $1195. The wife's name on both
receipts was written by the husband without her assent. In a suit on
the $5000 policy brought by the wife, the company set up the non-pay-
ment of any premium on it after the date of the $4300 policy. Held,
that that was a good defence, and that there was nothing to justify
the failure to pay the premiums. Miles v. Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 177.

1. The true line, in a navigable river between States of the Union which
separates the jurisdiction of one from the other, is the middle of the
main channel of the river. Iowa v. Illinois, 1.

2. In such case the jurisdiction of each State extends to the thread of the
stream, that is, to the "mid-channel," and, if there be several chan-
nels, to the middle of the principal one, or rather, the one usually fol-
lowed. lb.

3. The boundary line between the State of Iowa and the State of Illinois

is the middle of the main navigable channel of the Mississippi River.
Ib.

4. As the two States both desire that this boundary line be established at
the places where the several bridges mentioned in the pleadings cross
the Mississippi River, it is ordered that a commission be appointed to
ascertain and designate at said places the boundary line between the
two States, and that such commission be required to make the proper
examination, and to delineate on maps prepared for that purpose, the
true line as determined by this court, and report the same to the
court for its further action.

Ib.

IOWA.

See INTERSTATE BOUNDARY.

JUDGMENT.

The extent to which a judgment record should go in its recital of the pro-
ceedings depends largely upon the purpose for which it is to be used;
but generally anything not necessary to support the validity of the
judgment is presumptively no part of the record, however material it
may have been in the progress of the case. United States v. Taylor,
695.

See JUDICIAL SALE;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 8.

RES JUDICATA.

JUDICIAL SALE.

A sale of real estate under judicial proceedings concludes no one who is
not a party to those proceedings. United Lines Telegraph Co. v. Boston
Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 431.

JURISDICTION.

A. OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. A writ of error does not lie to a judgment of the Supreme Court of t
District of Columbia, denying a writ of mandamus to the Postmas...
General to compel him to readjust the salary of a postmaster when the
additional amount to become due him would be less than $5000; and
this is not affected by the fact that many similar claims for relief
exist, in which the aggregate amount involved is over $100,000.
Trask v. Wanamaker, 149.

2. An order of the Circuit Court of the United States, appointing commis-
sioners to assess damages for land in New Jersey taken by the North
River Bridge Company for the approaches to a bridge across the North
or Hudson River between New York and New Jersey, under the act of
July 11, 1890, c. 669, § 4, is not a final judgment, upon whici a writ of
error will lie. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 337.

VOL. CXLVII-46

3. The mere construction by the highest court of a State of a statute of
another State, without questioning its validity, does not deny to it the
full faith and credit which the Constitution and laws of the United
States demand, in order to give this court jurisdiction on writ of error.
Glenn v. Garth, 360.

4. This is especially true when there are no decisions of the highest court
of the latter State in conflict with the construction made by the court
of the former State.

Ib.

5. This court cannot, by mandamus, review the judicial action of a Circuit
Court of Appeals in refusing to receive further proofs offered by an
appellant, in an admiralty cause pending in that court on appeal.
In re Hawkins, 486.

6. A statute of the State of Nebraska authorizes a creditor in certain cases
to bring an action on a claim before it is due and to have an attach-
ment against the property of the debtor. A citizen of Ohio brought
an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of
Nebraska against a citizen of Nebraska, to recover $530.09 which was
overdue, and $1664.04 which was to become payable in the following
month, and an attachment was issued under the statute against the
defendant's property. The Circuit Court sustained its jurisdiction
and gave judgment in plaintiff's favor for both sums. Held, (1) That
the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that a
part of the sum sued for was not due and payable when the action was
commenced, and the amount actually due and payable was less than
$2000; (2) That if there were any error in the decision, on which
this court expresses no opinion, the defendant, if desiring to have it
reviewed should have taken the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co., 500.

7. There must be at least color of ground for the averment of a Federal
question in a case brought here by writ of error to the highest court
of a State, in order to give this court jurisdiction. Hamblin v. Western
Land Co., 531.

8. In executory process, according to the Civil Code of Louisiana, in the
Circuit Court of the United States, an order, made without previous
notice, for the seizure and sale of mortgaged land to pay the mortgage
debt, under which the sale cannot take place until the debtor has had
notice and opportunity to interpose objections, is not, at least when he
does interpose within the time allowed, a final decree, from which an
appeal lies to this court. Fleitas v. Richardson, No. 1, 538.

See COMMON CARRIER, 4;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;

MANDAMUS;

UNITED STATES, 1, 6.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.

See MANDAMUS.

C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNited StateS.

1. The maker of a promissory note signed it entirely for the benefit of the
payee, who was really the party for whose use it was made. The
maker and the payee were citizens of the same State. A citizen of
another State discounted the note, and paid full consideration for it
to the payee, who endorsed it to him. The note not being paid at
maturity, the endorsee, who had not parted with it, brought suit upon
it against the maker in the Circuit Court of the United States. Held,
that the court had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provision in the
act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, 434, c. 866, that such court shall
not have cognizance of a suit to recover the contents of a promissory
note in favor of an assignee or subsequent holder, unless such suit
might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been
made. Holmes v. Goldsmith, 150.

2. The general rule is that the judicial power will not interpose, by man-
damus or injunction, to limit or direct the action of departmental
officers in respect of matters pending, within their jurisdiction and
control. New Orleans v. Paine, 261.

3. A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over a bill in
equity to enjoin the collection of taxes from a railroad company, when
distinct assessments, in separate counties, no one of which amounts to
$2000, and for which, in case of payment under protest, separate suits
must be brought to recover back the amounts paid, are joined in the
bill and make an aggregate of over $2000. Walter v. Northeastern
Railroad Co., 370.

4. When it appears that some title, right, privilege or immunity, on which
the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the Con-
stitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite
construction, the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Cooke v. Avery, 375.

5. When a party, on the first trial of a,cause in a Circuit Court sets up
such a right as the ground of Federal jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction
is sustained, he cannot be permitted, on the second trial to oust the
jurisdiction by contending that no such right is in controversy. Ib.
6. Where a plaintiff's title rests upon the validity of a lien claimed to
have been acquired under a judgment of a Circuit Court of the United
States, the disposition of the issue depends upon the laws of the
United States and the rules of its courts, and a Federal court has
jurisdiction. Ib.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3;

D.

PUBLIC LAND, 4;

UNITED STATES, 1, 6.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

Although the United States did not appeal, this court considered the ques-
tion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and held, that as the

right of action of the plaintiffs accrued in 1886, and the Court of
Claims from that time had full jurisdiction over it, under its general
jurisdiction, and as the general jurisdictional act of that court was
not repealed by the act of 1888, to the extent of this case, the plain-
tiffs could waive the benefit of the additional method of adjustment
provided by the act of 1888, and the general jurisdiction of that court
and such additional method could both of them well stand together.
Smithmeyer v. United States, 342.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. An agreement between a railroad company and an individual that the
latter shall occupy a section-house of the company, and shall board
there the section-hands and other employés of the company at an
agreed rate, the company to aid in collecting the payment out of the
wages of the employés, does not create the relation of master and
servant between the company and the individual, but does create a
tenancy terminable at the will of the company. Doyle v. Union
Pacific Railway Co., 413.

2. In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, a landlord is not
responsible for injuries happening to his tenant by reason of a snow.
slide or avalanche. 1b.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

LICENSE TAX.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.

LIEN.

1. The courts of the United States enforce grantor's and vendor's liens, if
in harmony with the jurisprudence of the State in which the action is
brought. Fisher v. Shropshire, 133.

2. The doctrine of a vendor's lien, arising by implication, seems to have
been generally recognized in the State of Iowa. Ib.

3. If a suit to enforce a vendor's lien upon land in Iowa is pending at the
time when the vendee conveys the land to a third party, no presump-
tion can arise that that lien has been waived, as against the grantee
of the vendee, whatever may be the general rule in that State as to
the presumption of the waiver of a vendor's lien, in case of a convey-
ance of the tract by the vendee. Ib.

4. The filing of the petition in this case to assert and enforce a vendor's
lien was notice of its assertion and prevented third parties from