discretion, to set the verdict aside. Washington & Georgetown Railroad
Co. v. Harmon, 571.
2. A railway company being bound to deliver a passenger, its failure to
stop long enough to enable him to alight with safety is a neglect of
duty which involves liability for injuries resulting therefrom. 1b.
3. When the evidence justifies a finding that future damages will result
from an accident to a passenger caused by the negligence of a common
carrier, the jury may estimate and include such damages in their
verdict. Ib.
4. Two suits at law against a railroad company, incorporated by New York,
were brought in the Circuit Court of Saline County, Missouri, by two
different plaintiffs, to recover damages for injury by the company, as a
common carrier, through negligence, to live cattle transported by it.
The damages occurred from a collision which took place in Qhio. The
cattle were being transported from Massachusetts to Missouri. The pro-
cess of the court was served in St. Louis, Missouri, on a city passenger-
agent of the defendant, in its business office there, who had charge of
it at the time, no chief officer of the defendant being found in St. Louis
at the time. By a petition in each suit by the defendant, which stated
that it appeared only for the purpose of making the application, the suit
was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States, because of
diverse citizenship. The defendant then moved in the latter court, in
each suit, to quash the process on the ground that it conferred no juris-
diction on the state court over the defendant. The motion was over-
ruled. Both cases were then tried before the same jury. In one case the
verdict was for $8750 damages, and $2362.50 interest thereon at 6 per
cent per annum from the time the suit was brought, and in the other
case for $14,000 damages, and $11,880 interest thereon. In the first
case judgment was entered for $11,112.50, with interest from the date
of the verdict, and in the second case for $50,000, and like interest,
the plaintiffs having voluntarily remitted $5880, because the petition
claimed only $50,000 damages. There was only one bill of exceptions,
covering all matters in the two suits, and one writ of error, and one
citation, and one supersedeas bond, and one transcript of record.
This court took cognizance of the two cases, and Held,
(1) The state court acquired jurisdiction of the cases, under subdi-
vision 4 of § 3189 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879,
and § 3481 of the same Revised Statutes: The cases on that
subject in the courts of Missouri reviewed;
(2) Whether the defendant waived any objection to the service of the
process in the state court by appearing therein and filing a
petition for the removal of the cause into the Federal court,
quære;
(3) A large number of the cattle being cows with unborn calves,
which were lost through their premature births, caused by the
collision, the defendant was liable for deterioration in the value
of such cows, caused by such abortions, although it was not
shown that the defendant knew that the cows were with calf;
(4) The cases having been tried in the court below on the theory that
the value of the cattle at their place of destination in Missouri
was the proper basis for fixing the damages, the point that their
value at the terminus in Ohio of the defendant's road was the
proper basis cannot be taken for the first time in this court;
(5) It was proper to show that some of the cattle died, or lost their
calves, after their final arrival in Missouri, from the effects of
the collision;
(6) The proper rule of damages was the difference between the mar-
ket value of the cattle, in the condition in which they would
have arrived but for the negligence of the defendant, and their
market value in the condition in which, by reason of such negli-
gence, they did arrive;
(7) It was not material whether the plaintiffs intended to keep the
cattle upon their farms, for breeding purposes, or to sell them
upon the market, the depreciation in value of the cattle being
the same in either case;
(8) The court having instructed the jury that the burden was upon
the plaintiffs to show that the abortions were the direct result
of the collision, and the jury having found in favor of the plain-
tiffs on that question, and the bill of exceptions containing all
the evidence in the case on either side, and there being sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict, this court cannot review it on
the weight of the evidence;
(9) There is no ground for holding that the plaintiffs ought to have
traced each animal and to have shown the amount received for
it when sold;
(10) It was improper, under the statutes of, and decisions in Missouri,
for the jury to allow interest on the damages from the time suit
was brought; and as the jury stated, in each verdict, the amount
of interest allowed, this court reduced the judgments by strik-
ing out the interest, and ordering judgments to be entered for
the amounts of the damages, with interest from the entry, and
costs; the costs of this court to be paid, one-half by the plain-
tiffs in error and the other half by the defendant in error.
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co. v. Estill, 591.
See ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS;
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, affirmed to the
point that a provision in a state law for the assessment of a state tax
upon the face value of bonds instead of upon their nominal value vio-
lates no provision of the Constitution of the United States. Jennings
v. Coal Ridge Improvement & Coal Co. 147.
2. It is within the constitutional power of Congress, in legislating for the
creation of a commission charged with public duties, to provide that
some members of it shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and that other members of it
shall consist of officers in the service of the United States, who had
been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, when
the duties of the new office are germane to those of the offices already
held by the latter. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.
8. Congress may increase the duties of an existing office without rendering
it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated, confirmed
and appointed. Ib.
4. The ordinance of the city of Chicago, imposing a license tax for the
privilege of navigating the Chicago River and its branches upon steam
tugs licensed by the United States authorities under the provisions of
Rev. Stat. § 4321, is an unconstitutional exercise of municipal authority,
and is invalid. Harmon v. Chicago, 396.
5. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution operates exclusively in
restriction of Federal power and has no application to the States.
Thorington v. Montgomery, 490.
6. A controversy as to the good faith of a transaction by which the title to
the property which forms the subject of this litigation was transferred
to the plaintiff in error is held to involve no Federal question. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3, 4; C, 4;
TAX AND TAXATION, 3, 4.
See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 3.
1. In a suit brought by a marshal against the United States, under the
act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, (24 Stat. 505,) to recover $1770.60 as fees
and disbursements of the marshal, from March, 1886, to October,
1888, the items having been disallowed by the First Comptroller:
Held, that the Circuit Court of the United States, had jurisdiction to
review items disallowed by the First Comptroller before March 3,
1887, although, by § 2 of the act, jurisdiction was withheld of claims
which had theretofore "been rejected, or reported on adversely, by
any court, department or commission authorized to hear and determine
the same." United States v. Harmon, 268.
2. Items for marshal's fees for distributing venires; and for amounts paid
for blanks for United States attorney; and for amounts charged for
marshal's travel to attend court on days when the courts were held by
adjournment over an intervening day, and were not held on consecu-
tive days, and to attend special courts or special terms of court; and
for expenses in endeavoring to make an arrest; and for travel to
serve precepts, where he had in his hands for service, several precepts
against different persons for different causes, and made service of two
or more of such precepts in the course of one trip, making one travel
to the most remote point of service, but charging full travel on each
precept; and for amounts paid for hack hire in transporting prisoners
to and from court; allowed. Ib.
3. Whether the payment of the amount of the judgment in favor of the
marshal will exceed the maximum compensation of the plaintiff as
marshal, and the proper expenses of his office, is a matter still open
for adjustment at the Treasury Department. Ib.
4. A marshal is not entitled to charge "travel in going to serve" process
when taking a prisoner, under sentence, to the place of commitment.
United States v. Tanner, 661.
5. When, for convenience in making up accounts, an outgoing marshal
relinquishes to his successor his right to expenses incurred in endeav-
oring to arrest persons for offences against the United States, the
incoming marshal may charge these fees in his accounts, and they
should be allowed. United States v. Fletcher, 664.
6. A marshal of a district into which an offender, who has committed a
crime in another district, comes, may deputize the marshal of the
district in which the offence was committed, or his deputy, to execute
the warrant of removal, and relinquish to him the fees therefor. Ib.
7. A marshal may charge mileage upon as many writs as he may have in
his hands, where the writs are against different persons. Ib.
8. Marshals are entitled to per dien fees for attendance when attending
under §§ 583, 584, 671, 672 and 2013 Rev. Stat., the same as if the
judge were present and business were transacted. United States v.
Pitman, 669.
9. A clerk of a District Court is entitled to charge for entering orders
approving marshal's accounts. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S.
United States v. Jones, 672.
169, approved.
10. He is also entitled to charge for certifying copies of such orders to be
forwarded to the department with the accounts, but not for the seals
affixed to such copies unless such authentication is required by the
Treasury Department. Ib.
11. He is also entitled to charge for copies of orders for marshals to pay
supervisors of elections, without regard to the necessity for such
orders, or the power of the court to make them. Ib.
12. He is also entitled to a fee for filing a marshal's accounts with vouchers
attached, but not to a separate fee for filing each voucher. Ib.
13. He is also entitled to fees for recording, after the determination of a
prosecution, all the proceedings relating to it, including the order of
commitment.
14. United States v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, affirmed to the point of the
power of the Treasury to determine whether the several allowances
increase his salary beyond the maximum compensation. Ib.
15. A clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to a per diem pay for services
in selecting juries in connection with the jury commissioner. United
States v. King, 676.
16. When a statute increases the duties of an officer by the addition of
other duties germane to the office, he must perform them without
extra compensation; but if he is employed to render services in an
independent employment, not incidental to his official duties, he may
recover for such services. Ib.
17. When a clerk of a Circuit Court attends the court personally at one
place within the district, and appoints a deputy to attend to it at
another place or in a different division of the same judicial district,
he is entitled, under Rev. Stat. § 831, to make a per diem charge for
attendance at each. Ib.
18. A clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to charge for docketing and
endorsing an order for the removal of a prisoner for trial in another
district. lb.
19. Charges by a clerk for making separate reports of the amount of fees
due each juror and witness and filing separate orders for their pay-
ment are disallowed: also charges for making separate recognizances
for witnesses in a criminal case, it not appearing that the witnesses
could not have conveniently recognized together. Ib.
20. The clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to a fee for entering upon
the final record the proceedings before a committing magistrate, as,
although they may be properly filed, and a fee charged for the filing,
they form no part of the record. Ib.
21. A District Attorney is entitled to charge a per diem for services
before a United States commissioner upon the same day that he is
allowed a per diem for attendance upon the court. United States v.
Erwin, 685.
22. A clerk of a Circuit or District Court is entitled to fees for making
dockets and indexes, taxing costs, etc., in suits upon manufacturers'
bonds under the internal revenue law where issue was joined and tes-
timony given: also for entering orders of court for alias fi. fa. and for
venditioni exponas, one folio each: also for making record entries of
recognizances of defendants, or of entering and filing such recogni-
zances, but not for both: also for making docket entries and indexes
in cases of sci. fa. and other proceedings where issue was joined: also
for entering orders approving the accounts of officers of the court, and
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