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law, judgments, whatever the cause of action, did not bear interest. Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328. This was so in Maryland at the time of the cession of the District, with perhaps some exceptions, not embracing judgments in actions of tort. Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 306, 370; Railway Co. v. Sewell, 37 Maryland, 443. To change the common law in the District after the cession, of course required an act of Congress.

By the act of June 24, 1812, (2 Stat. 756, c. 106, § 6; Rev. Stat. Dist. Col., § 829,) it was provided as follows: "Upon all judgments rendered on the common law side of the Circuit. Court of said District in actions founded on contracts, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum shall be awarded on the principal sum due until the judgment shall be satisfied, and the amount which is to bear interest and the time from which it is to be paid shall be ascertained by the verdict of the jury sworn in the cause."

By its terms this provision was confined exclusively to actions founded on contracts. As appears from Newson v. Douglass, 7 Harr. & Johns. 417; Karthaus v. Qwings, 2 G. & J. 430; City Railway Co. v. Sewell, 37 Maryland, 443, and many other cases, only some causes of action carried interest at common law, in Maryland, as matter of right, its allowance otherwise being left to the jury to be decided according to the equities of the transaction, and, with few exceptions in cases of contract, no judgment in any form carried interest.. This law applied the remedy, but it declared that, while interest was to be allowed on the principal sum due, the amount which was to bear interest and time from which the interest was to run should be ascertained by the verdict of the jury. Interest was not to be awarded upon a judgment for the aggregate of principal and interest, but interest was recoverable upon the principal sum due from the date ascertained as directed.

The 8th section of the act of August 23, 1842, (5 Stat. 516, 518, c. 188,) provided "That on all judgments in civil cases, hereafter recovered in the Circuit or District Courts of the United States, interest shall be allowed, and may be levied by

Opinion of the Court.

the marshal, under process of execution issued thereon, in all cases where, by the law of the State in which such Circuit or District Courts shall be held, interest may be levied under process of execution on judgments recovered in the courts of such State, to be calculated from the date of the judgment, and at such rate per annum, as is allowed by law, on judgments recovered in the courts of such State." This was carried forward into section 966 of the Revised Statutes. The purpose of this act was to bring about uniformity between. the tribunals of the United States and of the States upon the subject of interest, and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is neither within its terms nor its object. It is wholly inapplicable. Whatever the law of the District of Columbia is, upon the subject of interest, controls of course.

On the 22d of April, 1870, an act was approved, entitled "An act to amend the usury laws of the District of Columbia," the first section of which read: "That the rate of interest upon judgments or decrees, and upon the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action, shall continue to be six dollars upon one hundred dollars, for one year, and after that rate for a greater or less sum, or for a longer or shorter time, except as hereinafter provided." The second section made it lawful, in all contracts thereafter to be made, for the parties to agree in writing for ten per centum per annum, or any less sum, of interest on money loaned or in any manner due and owing. The other sections related to the penalty for contracting to receive a greater rate; the recovery back of unlawful interest so received; and to the effect of the law upon the national banking act. 16 Stat. 91, c. 59. These sections constitute §§ 713, 714, 715, 716, and 717 of the Revised Statutes of the District.

This act related, as its title correctly stated, to the usury laws of the District, and the rate of interest at six per cent was to continue except as provided by the subsequent section, penalty being denounced for contracting in writing for a greater rate than ten or verbally for a greater rate than six per cent. Judgments and decrees, as well as the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action, are referred to,

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but the act does not say that they shall bear interest in the future if they did not in the past. On the contrary, that which had been was to continue, and the changes wrought by the statute were only in the rate and the consequences of transgression. There is nothing to indicate a legislative intention to declare that all judgments and decrees should thereafterwards bear interest by virtue of the statute, or to make any change in that respect. Such a view disregards the language of the act, which confines the exception to existing law to the enumeration of the succeeding sections. Judgments bore interest in actions founded on contracts as provided by the act of 1812, the award of interest being based upon the verdict and to be collected on the principal sum. Judgments in tort did not bear interest. The rule could, indeed, be altered or repealed by Congress, but the statute to that effect should be plain and unambiguous, or the repugnancy between the old law and the new, incapable of being reasonably overcome. We are unable to conclude that this act of 1870 comes within the settled rules of construction in this regard.

By section 997 of the Revised Statutes of the District, justices of the peace have jurisdiction where the amount claimed for debt or damages arising out of contracts or damages for injuries to persons or property does not exceed one. hundred dollars, and by section 1007, justices' judgments bear interest from their date until paid or satisfied; but it does not follow that, because Congress intended to allow interest upon judgments in tort not exceeding one hundred dollars, therefore all judgments in tort bear interest.

Reference was made at the bar to certain rules of the Supreme Court of the District which are and have been, since 1869, as follows:

"51. A general verdict for the plaintiff shall be recorded thus: The jury, on their oath, say they find the issue aforesaid in favor of the plaintiff, and that the money payable to him by the defendant by reason of the premises, is the sum of $, besides costs.' If the action be founded on contract, the record of the verdict shall proceed: With lawful interest from the day of, 18-, besides costs.'

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"If the verdict be for the defendant, then: The jury, on their oath, say they find for the defendant,' unless, upon setoff pleaded, a balance is found due the defendant; and then the record of the verdict shall proceed: And that the money payable to him by the plaintiff, by reason

of the premises, is day of ——, 18—,

"If there be several counts in the declaration, and the jury find for the plaintiff on some and for the defendant on the rest, the verdict shall be entered thus: The jury, on their oath say, they find for the plaintiff on the (-) issues, and that the money payable to him by the defendant, by reason thereof, is the sum of $, [with interest from the day of 18-,] besides costs; and for the defendant on the issues.'

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67. Whatever the cause of action may be, if the judgment be for the recovery of money, it shall be awarded generally without any distinction of debt from damages - thus: 'It is considered that the plaintiff recover against the defendant $, [with interest as aforesaid,] being the money payable by him to the plaintiff by reason of the premises, and $for his costs of suit, and that he have execution thereof.""

These rules are in conformity with the act of 1812. The jury find the principal sum and the time from which interest on the contract shall be given. In an action of tort the jury include interest, if given at all, in the damages assessed. The form of the judgment prescribed follows the verdict, discriminates between contract and tort, and recognizes that the judgments that carry interest do so by reason of the verdict to that effect. We think no support to the view that judgments in tort bear interest by force of law can be derived from these rules.

Nor is the contention sustained by reference to the rules of this court. By the 23d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, now section 1010 of the Revised Statutes, it was declared: "Where, upon such writ of error the Supreme or a Circuit Court shall affirm a judgment or decree, they shall adjudge or decree to the respondent in error just damages for his delay,

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and single or double costs at their discretion." And by various rules of this court, promulgated from time to time, this jurisdiction has been regulated. Thus, in cases of affirmance, where the writ is for mere delay, ten per cent damages may be awarded in addition to interest, and interest is given at the same rate that similar judgments bear interest in the courts of the State where the judgment was rendered; and the same rule is applied to decrees for the payment of money, unless otherwise ordered by this court. (Rule 23.) But the question of interest is solely for the court to determine, as the act of 1842 did not repeal the 23d section of the Judiciary Act. Boyce v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 149; Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 331; In re Washington & Georgetown Railroad, 140 U. S. 91.

We are of opinion that error was committed in the judg ment of affirmance in respect of the allowance of interest.

In Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, which was a case of contract, the matter in dispute in the District Supreme Court in general term was, with interest accrued before the affirmance, largely in excess of the amount necessary to give jurisdiction to this court. A motion was made to dismiss, which was overruled, and Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, pointed out that the promissory note sued on, by its express terms, bore interest at the rate of eight per cent. yearly from its date until paid, and that, computing interest accordingly, the sum in dispute was much more than the jurisdictional amount, and as to Railroad Co. v. Trook, 100 U. S. 112, and District of Columbia v. Gannon, 130 U. S. 227, (which involved judgments rendered in cases in tort,) cited in support of the motion, he remarked that the judgment in special term for damages for an action sounding in tort "bore no interest, either by the general law, or by the judgment of affirmance in general term." In each of the cases referred to, the judgment of affirmance was only for the amount which the sum or value of the matter in dispute had to exceed in order to give us jurisdiction. Had the original judgments carried interest by force of law, jurisdiction would have attached. Mass. Benefit Association v. Miles, 137 U. S. 689.