Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

Opinion of the Court.

Southern markets, all of which vessels were licensed and registered under the act of Congress, filed a bill alleging that, prior to the construction of the dams, the complainants were able to navigate the river without interruption, except such as was incident to the ordinary use of the channel in its natural state; that said dams were an impediment to the free navigation of the river; that for the construction of the locks they were charged and paid duties upon the tonnage measurement of their steamboats and other vessels, amounting to about five thousand dollars; and that similar charges would be made upon subsequent shipments. And the bill alleged that the imposition of the tolls and tonnage duties was in violation of article four of the ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River, passed July 13, 1787, which provides "that the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence and the carrying places between the same shall be a common highway and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the territory as to citizens of the United States, and those of any other State that may be admitted into the confederacy without any tax, impost or duty therefor," and of the article of the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of a tonnage duty by any State without the consent of Congress. The bill therefore prayed that the canal commissioners and persons acting under them might be restrained from exacting any tonnage duties or other charges for the passage of their steamboats or barges and other vessels used by them in navigating the Illinois River, and from interfering in any manner with the free navigation of the river in the course of their business. The Circuit Court of the United States sustained the validity of the statute and this court affirmed its judgment. In its opinion this court said:

"The exaction of tolls for passage through the locks is as compensation for the use of artificial facilities constructed, not as an impost upon the navigation of the stream. The provision of the clause that the navigable streams should be highways without any tax, impost or duty, has reference to their navigation in their natural state. It did not contemplate that such navigation might not be improved by artificial means, by

Opinion of the Court.

the removal of obstructions, or by the making of dams for deepening the waters, or by turning into the rivers waters from other streams to increase their depth. For outlays caused by such works the State may exact reasonable tolls. They are like charges for the use of wharves and docks constructed to facilitate the landing of persons and freight, and the taking them on board, or for the repair of vessels..

"The State is interested in the domestic as well as in the interstate and foreign commerce conducted on the Illinois River; and to increase its facilities, and thus augment its growth, it has full power. It is only when, in the judgment of Congress, its action is deemed to encroach upon the navigation of the river as a means of interstate and foreign commerce, that that body may interfere and control or supersede it. If, in the opinion of the State, greater benefit would result to her commerce by the improvements made than by leaving the river in its natural state- and on that point the State must necessarily determine for itself—it may authorize them, although increased inconvenience and expense may thereby result to the business of individuals. The private inconvenience must yield to the public good.

[ocr errors]

We adhere to the doctrine thus declared. It was not new when stated in the case mentioned. It had been often announced, though, perhaps, not with as much fulness. That case differs essentially from the one before us. It pointed out distinctly the nature of the improvement; the benefit which it extended to vessels was readily perceptible, and no principle was violated, and no control of Congress over commerce, interstate or foreign, was impaired thereby. Congress, by its contribution to the work, had assented to it. The navigation of the river was improved and facilitated, and those thus benefited were required to pay a reasonable toll for the increased facilities afforded. Nothing of this kind is mentioned for considération in the ordinance of Chicago. The license fee is a tax for the use of navigable waters, not a charge by way of compensation for any specific improvement. The grant to the city under which the ordinance was passed is a general one to all municipalities of the State. Waters navigable in

Opinion of the Court.

themselves in a State, and connecting with other navigable waters so as to form a waterway to other States or foreign nations, cannot be obstructed or impeded so as to impair, defeat or place any burden upon a right to their navigation granted by Congress. Such right the defendants had from the fact that their steam barges and towboats were enrolled and licensed, as stated, under the laws of the United States.

The case of Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S. 288, does not have any bearing upon the case under consideration. The Manistee River is wholly within the State of Michigan, and its improvement consisted in the removal of obstacles to the floating of logs and lumber down the stream, principally by the cutting of new channels at different points and confining the waters at other points by embankments. The statute under which the improvement company was organized contained various provisions to secure a careful consideration of the improvements proposed and of their alleged benefit to the public, and, if adopted, their proper construction, and also for the establishment of tolls to be charged for their use. When the case came before this court it was held that the internal commerce of a State, that is, the commerce which is wholly confined within its limits, is as much under its control as foreign or interstate commerce is under the control of the general government, and, to encourage the growth of that commerce and render it safe, States might provide for the removal of obstructions from their rivers and harbors and deepen their channels and improve them in other ways, and levy a general tax or toll upon those who use the improvements to meet their cost, provided the free navigation of the waters, as permitted by the laws of the United States, was not impaired, and provided any system for the improvement of their navigation instituted by the general government was not defeated. No legislation of Congress was, by the statute of Michigan, in that case interfered with, nor any right conferred, under the legislation of Congress, in the navigation of the river by licensed or enrolled vessels, impaired, defeated or burdened in any respect. It was the improvement of a river wholly within the State, and, therefore,

Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.

until Congress took action on the subject, wholly under the control of the authorities of the State. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 699; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678.

It follows from the views expressed that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois should have been for the plaintiff below, the plaintiff in error here. Its judgment will, therefore, be

Reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

DOYLE v. UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. SAME.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

Nos. 100, 101. Argued January 3, 1893. — Decided January 23, 1893.

An agreement between a railroad company and an individual that the latter shall occupy a section-house of the company, and shall board there the section hands and other employés of the company at an agreed rate, the company to aid in collecting the payment out of the wages of the employés, does not create the relation of master and servant between the company and the individual, but does create a tenancy terminable at the will of the company.

In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, a landlord is not responsible for injuries happening to his tenant by reason of a snow-slide or avalanche.

It is not reversible error in a judge of a Federal Court to express his own opinion of the facts, if the rules of law are correctly laid down, and if the jurors are given to understand that they are not bound by such expressions of opinion.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. T. M. Patterson for plaintiff in error.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. John F. Dillon, (with whom was Mr. Harry Hubbard on the brief,) for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court.

In the early part of November, A. D. 1883, Marcella Doyle, a widow, with a family of six children, agreed with the Union Pacific Railway Company to occupy the company's sectionhouse, situated on the line of the railroad at or near Woodstock, in the county of Chaffee and State of Colorado, and to board at said section-house such section hands and other employés of the company as it should desire, at the rate of four and one half dollars per week, to be paid by the persons so to be boarded, and the company agreed to aid her in collecting her pay for such board by retaining the same for her out of the wages of the employés so to be boarded.

Mrs. Doyle moved with her children into the section-house, and continued in the discharge of her duties as boarding-house keeper until the 10th day of March, A. D. 1884, when a snowslide overwhelmed the section-house, injured Mrs. Doyle, and crushed to death the six children residing with her.

Subsequently, Marcella Doyle brought, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, two actions. against the Union Pacific Railway Company, one for her personal injuries, the other for damages suffered by her in the loss of her children, and which latter action was based on a statute of the State of Colorado.

The actions resulted in verdicts and judgments in favor of the defendant company, and the cases have been brought to this court by writs of error. As the cases turn upon the same facts and principles of law, they can be disposed of together.

The record discloses that the facts of the case, as claimed by the respective parties, and certain admissions by the defendant company, were stated in a bill of exceptions, and upon which instructions by the court were given which are made the subject of the assignments of error.

The bill of exceptions was as follows:

"Be it remembered that on the trial of this cause, at the

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »