Opinion of the Court.

and character of the parcels of land to be taken, with the names of their owners.

The fifteenth and sixteenth assignments, which complain of the course of the court in adopting and acting upon the decision of the President of the United States approving the appraised values of part only of the land selected for the Rock Creek Park, present the same contention in another form, viz., that the court and commissioners were concluded by the enumeration of tracts contained in the map when first prepared, and call for no further remarks.

The fourteenth assignment charges the court with error in

not thereafter have vested in any one the title to any part of the property. We do not find anything, however, in the circumstances referred to which affects this case. A point was made in argument which had not been made before and not founded upon any new facts in reference to the character of these proceedings before the chancellor upon the application for a repatent. Robert Peter had a resurvey patent in 1803 signed by the chancellor and founded upon a warrant of resurvey issued in 1800, about six or eight months before Congress had passed its law assuming jurisdiction over the District, and we held that that could not pass title to land in the District; but it is claimed that the proceedings before the chancellor as a judge of the land court was in its nature a judicial proceeding, and that all such proceedings and the result of them are saved by the act of Congress which assumed jurisdiction over this District. That is entirely a misconception, we think, of the act of Congress. All that it says is this: "That in all cases where judgments or decrees have been obtained or hereafter shall be obtained on suits now pending in any of the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia or of the State of Maryland, where the defendant resides, or has property within the District of Columbia, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in such cases, upon filing an exemplification of the record and proceedings in such suit with the clerk of the court of the county where the defendant resides or his property may be found, to sue out writs of execution thereon returnable to the said court, which shall be proceeded on in the same manner as if the judgment or decree had originally been obtained in said court." Now, this applies only to contests between private parties in which execution may issue and does not provide for a proceeding in which the State may be a party. The language is exclusively applicable to private parties.

We think, therefore, upon the whole, that none of the new considerations which have been presented to us shake our former conclusion and the motion to rescind the order is overruled. What I have said applies to the Shoemaker tract with more force than to the Truesdell tract, because that is admitted to be a new grant or, at least, taken under the patent in 1772 and not derived from a patent in 1760 at all.

Opinion of the Court.

refusing to allow interest on the amounts assessed as the values for lands selected for the Rock Creek Park. The argument shows that the interest claimed was for the time that elapsed between the initiation of the proceedings and the payment of the money into court. The vice of this contention is in the assumption that the lands were actually condemned and withdrawn from the possession of their owners by the mere filing of the map. Interest accrues either by agreement of the debtor to allow it for the use of money, or, in the nature of damages, by reason of the failure of the debtor to pay the principal when due. Of course, neither ground for such a demand can be found in the present case. No agreement to pay the interest demanded is pointed to, and no failure to pay the amount assessed took place. That amount was not fixed and ascertained till the confirmation of the report. Then some of those entitled to the assessments accepted their money, the plaintiffs in error declined to accept, and the amounts assessed in their favor were paid into court, which must be deemed equivalent to payment.

It is true that, by the institution of proceedings to condemn, the possession and enjoyment by the owner are to some extent interfered with. He can put no permanent improvements on the land, nor sell it, except subject to the condemnation proceedings. But the owner was in receipt of the rents, issues, and profits during the time occupied in fixing the amount to which he was entitled, and the inconveniences to which he was subjected by the delay are presumed to be considered and allowed for in fixing the amount of the compensation. Such is the rule laid down in cases of the highest authority. Reid v. Hanover Branch Railroad, 105 Mass. 303; Kidder v. Oxford, 116 Mass. 165; Hamersley v. New York City, 56 N. Y. 533; Norris v. Philadelphia, 70 Penn. St. 332; Chicago v. Palmer, 93 Illinois, 125; Phillips v. South Park Commission, 119 Illinois, 626.

These various contentions and objections did not escape the attention of the court below, but were disposed of, as they arose in the proceedings, in opinions of great research and ability, which appear in the record. We have briefly reviewed

VOL. CXLVII-21

Opinion of the Court.

them here, not to add to what was so well expressed in those opinions, but to show that the questions so zealously and ably pressed upon us have not been disregarded.

Our conclusion is that we find, in the legislation creating the park and in the proceedings under it, no infringement of the constitutional or legal rights of the plaintiffs in error, and the judgment of the court below is accordingly

Affirmed.

WEATHERHEAD v. COUPE.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND.

No. 104. Argued January 4, 5, 1893.

- Decided January 16, 1893.

Claims 1 and 3 of letters patent No. 213,323 granted to William Coupe, March 18, 1879, for an improvement in hide-stretching machines, construed.

The principal feature of the Coupe machine, covered by claim 1, and of his method of stretching hides, covered by claim 3, is, that the hide is stretched longitudinally and transversely at the same time; and a single passage of the hide through the machine is supposed to give it sufficient stretching transversely as well as longitudinally.

The defendant's machine has no stretcher bar, substantially such as that of the patent, giving a transverse stretch to the hide simultaneously with the giving of the longitudinal stretch; and, therefore, does not infringe the patent.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Causten Browne and Mr. Walter B. Vincent for appellants.

Mr. Wilmarth H. Thurston for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the

court.

This is a suit in equity, brought January 11, 1881, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, by William Coupe and Edwin A. Burgess against George

Opinion of the Court.

Weatherhead, John E. Thompson, and William G. Evans, copartners as Weatherhead, Thompson & Co., for the alleged infringement of letters-patent of the United States No. 213,323, granted March 18, 1879, on an application filed January 24, 1879, to the said William Coupe for an improvement in hide-stretching machines. The bill of complaint alleges that the defendants from July 17, 1879, have made, used and sold hide-stretching machines containing the invention described in the patent. The answer sets up in defence want of novelty and non-infringement. A replication was filed, proofs were taken, and the case was brought to a hearing before the court, held by Judge Lowell, then Circuit Judge, and Judge Colt, then District Judge; and on the 20th of April, 1883, the opinion of the court (16 Fed. Rep. 673) was delivered by Judge Lowell, sustaining the patent, and holding that the first and third claims of it had been infringed.

On the 1st of May, 1883, an interlocutory decree for an injunction and account was entered. The master filed his report on January 7, 1888, exceptions were filed to it by the defendants, and they made a motion to-dismiss the bill. The master found that the amount of gains and profits to be accounted for by the defendants was $15,412.82. The court, held by Judge Colt, filed its opinion on the motion and the exceptions November 15, 1888. 37 Fed. Rep. 16. It overruled the motion and the exceptions, and on May 6, 1889, entered a decree in favor of the plaintiffs for $15,412.82, with interest from February 1, 1888, and the costs of the suit. The defendants have appealed to this court. The only question contested here is that of infringement.

The specification of the patent is as follows: "The invention hereinafter described relates generally to an improved method of stretching and reducing to a uniform thickness the hides of animals previous to said hides being manufactured into dressed leather, or what is known as 'rawhide:' and it particularly relates to a combination of mechanism which, accompanied by certain hand manipulation, will accomplish the desired result of stretching and reducing the hides, as above mentioned.

Opinion of the Court.

"As is well known, all hides vary considerably in thickness at different points, and when taken from the liquor-vats in which they have been immersed to remove the hair, etc., they are found to be soft, flabby, wrinkled and fulled. Owing, therefore, to this condition of the hides, it is necessary, before they are dressed and finished for the market, that they be stretched throughout to remove the wrinkles and fulness, and also to reduce those parts which are thicker than other portions, so that, as far as possible, the hides shall be uniform in thickness.

"My invention consists in a combination of mechanical devices which are capable of producing, in connection with hand manipulation, the desirable results of thoroughly stretching the hides, and rendering them of even thickness in all parts, the said devices comprising, in the main, a friction-table or beam, over which the hides are dragged, a stretcher-bar of suitable form for stretching the hides transversely, and a slowly-revolving roller, to which the edge of each hide is secured, and around which it is wound after being drawn over the table or beam and the stretcher-bar.

"Referring to the drawings, Figure 1 represents a front elevation of my improved machine. Fig. 2 shows the same in central vertical transverse section, and Fig. 3 represents the stretcher-bar in perspective.

"As particularly shown in Fig. 1 of the drawing, my improved machine consists of the following devices: A pair of standards, as at A A', in which is mounted a shaft, as at B, to which power is applied. Upon one end of this shaft is a pinion, as at C, arranged to mesh with a gear, as at D, loosely mounted on one end of a roller, as at E. The inner side of this gear D is provided with a clutch face or pin, as at d, for engagement with a clutch, as at F, splined [spliced?] to the roller E, and furnished with a shipping handle, as at G, so arranged as to be convenient of access to the operating attendant. The remaining parts of the machine consist of a narrow table or breast-beam, as at H, which is mounted in mortises, as at a, in the standards, A A', and a stretcher-bar, as at K, likewise mounted in mortises, as at a', and having its two