Opinion of the Court.

paid before notice of a prior lien, in order that a subsequent purchaser may be protected, as so far qualified that protection may be accorded for the amount actually paid before notice, (Kitteridge v. Chapman, 36 Iowa, 348,) it is quite apparent that George Lyle was not deprived against his will of that protection by the relief awarded.

The motion to dismiss the suit for defect of parties was properly overruled. By equity rule 47 it is provided that in all cases where it shall appear to the court that persons who might otherwise be deemed necessary or proper parties to the suit, cannot be made parties by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of being made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction as to the parties before it, the court may in its discretion proceed in the cause without making such persons parties, and in such case the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of the absent parties. When this bill was filed the conveyance to George Lyle had not been made. What rights may have accrued to him prior to that date are not affected by the decree. The suit was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States by the defendant John Lyle, and having done that, he then contended that the court had no jurisdiction. because George Lyle was an indispensable party defendant, and he was a citizen of the same State as complainants. We do not think this will do. If George Lyle, who was fully aware of the pendency of the suit and gave his testimony therein, desired to set up equities which he claimed arose from the payment of part of the purchase price of the prop erty before the suit was brought, he might, as pointed out by the Circuit Court, have intervened in the cause, for the protection of his rights, without ousting the jurisdiction. This he did not do, and we are not prepared to hold the Circuit Court should be deprived of jurisdiction at the suggestion of the party who voluntarily invoked it.

Undoubtedly, George Lyle would have been a proper party to the proceeding, but we do not regard the case as one in which his interest in the subject-matter and in the relief sought was so bound up with John Lyle that his legal presence as a

VOL. CXLV-10

Opinion of the Court.

party was an absolute necessity without which the court could not proceed. Traders' Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall. 87, 95.

This brings us to the examination of the matters complained of in regard to the master's report. The rule in relation to the findings and conclusions of a master, concurred in by the Circuit Court, is that they are to be taken as presumptively correct, and unless some obvious error has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious or important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, the decree should be permitted to stond. Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 596; Furrer v. Ferris 145 U. S. 132.

We have carefully examined the evidence, and are satisfied that the findings of the master (including that rejecting the alleged settlement in January, 1880) ought not to be disturbed under a proper application of the rule just stated, except in one particular, in respect of which we hold a serious and important error has been committed. The report of the master states certain items, amounting to $5778.80, as the "individual indebtedness" of A. C. Shropshire to John Lyle on January 1, 1881, including interest. In the summary of the account stated between the parties, the report puts the balance due in the alternative. If the $5778.80 were rejected as a credit in Lyle's favor, the balance found was $7807.31 and if it were allowed, the balance was $2028.51. The Circuit Court entered a decree for the larger amount, with interest thereon. We cannot concur in this conclusion. Lyle's advances were made for the benefit of both the Shropshires. The husband had charge of the farm, and the stock that was procured from time to time and placed upon it through the business transacted with Lyle was for the benefit of both. Lyle gave credit to the farm and its operations, and not to A. C. Shropshire, as contradistinguished from his wife. Some of the credits allowed to the Shropshires in the $4894.44 appear to have been realized out of items thrown into the alleged individual indebtedness of A. C. Shropshire. The course of dealing between the parties, their correspondence, the whole evidence taken together, seem to us wholly inconsistent with the idea that Lyle was trusting A. C. Shropshire to the extent indicated, and looked to

Statement of the Case.

him for repayment, or that Shropshire and his wife so understood. The indebtedness was joint and not several. There is, however, included in this amount of $5778.80 a note of $1000 of Augustus and Alexander C. Shropshire, with interest from December 1, 1877, to January 1, 1881, amounting to $327.83, which should be excluded as individual indebtedness of A. C. Shropshire and not properly chargeable in this account. All equitable considerations are open in such a suit, and we think that the equities require that John Lyle should receive an additional credit of $4450.97. The balance due upon the account stated, corrected in this particular, would be $3356.34.

The decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with a direction to enter a decree for the amount of $3356.34 with interest from January 1, 1881.

JENNINGS v. COAL RIDGE IMPROVEMENT AND COAL COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.

No. 98. Argued December 21, 1892. Decided January 3, 1893.

Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, affirmed to the point that a provision in a state law for the assessment of a state tax upon the face value of bonds instead of upon their nominal value violates no provision of the Constitution of the United States.

THE brief of the plaintiff in error stated his case as follows:

"W. W. Jennings is the owner of $20,000 of the registered mortgage bonds of the Coal Ridge Improvement and Coal Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, upon which bonds by the terms thereof, there was due him on the first day of December, 1887, six months' interest amounting to $600. The total issue of bonds secured by the mortgage is $200,000. The company being financially embarrassed was not in funds.

Opinion of the Court.

to pay the interest maturing December 1, 1887. It made an arrangement with most of its bondholders for an extension of two years. Jennings was asked to agree to this arrangement, but refused, threatening foreclosure unless the interest due him were fully and promptly paid. The company thereupon tendered him $570, being the interest due, less $30, which the treasurer of the company proposed to deduct for state tax alleged to be due, at the rate of three mills per annum upon the nominal or par value of the bond. Jennings agreed to submit to the deduction of a tax based upon the actual value of the bonds, which did not exceed 75 per centum of par, but the treasurer of the company insisting that he was compelled by law to assess them at par, regardless of actual value, refused to make any concession."

"The decision of the trial court being in favor of Jennings, the Coal Ridge Company carried the case to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, assigning as error the affirmance of the above and other points by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the ruling of the trial court and, allowing the tax, reduced the judgment to $570, to correct which action this writ of error was taken."

A brief was also

Mr. M. E. Olmsted for plaintiff in error. filed in his behalf in Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, decided at October Term, 1889.

Mr. S. P. Wolverton for defendant in error.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The judgment is affirmed on the authority of Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.

Opinion of the Court.

UNITED STATES ex rel. TRASK v. WANAMAKER.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 1232. Argued and submitted December 20, 21, 1892. — Decided January 3, 1893.

A writ of error does not lie to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, denying a writ of mandamus to the Postmaster General to compel him to readjust the salary of a postmaster when the additional amount to become due him would be less than $5000; and this is not affected by the fact that many similar claims for relief exist, in which the aggregate amount involved is over $100,000.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Harvey Spalding for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury filed a brief for defendant in error, but the court declined to hear him.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the

court.

The relator applied for the writ of error herein to one of the justices of this court by a petition, setting up the alleged errors relied on, and stating that the questions of law involved "concern the interest of more than one thousand persons, expostmasters, who reside in many different States and Terri'tories, and are in like case with herself and who have presented claims for like relief before the Postmaster-General, and that all of such claims amount to more than one hundred thousand dollars;" and praying that the writ be allowed "under section 706 of the Revised Statutes." The order

was thereupon granted.

Upon an almost identical petition, a writ of error was allowed in United States v. Vilas, 124 U. S. 86, but no question as to the pecuniary amount involved in its relation to jurisdiction, or as to the repeal of section 706, was suggested by counsel or considered by the court.