Mr. O'HARA. You have taken as a moral viewpoint that we should wash away all sin or not at all?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I say until the Federal Government finds that it can aid in the whole situation, then it should be left to the States, who can do it, because your own colleagues have testified to their ability to do it.

Mr. O'HARA. Of course, I was one of those who made some comments. I appreciate that to a prosecuting attorney in a rural county it might be an entirely different problem as compared to a prosecuting attorney in a large city. In the first place, you have to have some fine honorable law enforcement officers-and I think every city has those. I certainly still believe that. I agree with you that a great deal of this problem is a local problem, that it is a matter of local enforcement. If you have people who are law enforcement officers, and who take their oath literally, they enforce the laws, is that not true, Mr. Schultz, in your experience?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I believe that politics enters in so tremendously to the thinking of the average man on every election that who are the enforcement officers does not depend, as far as I know, at all, on any one given thing.

As I see law-enforcement officers elected, I see them elected first because of a political party, second because there had been too many people, perhaps, arrested for traffic violations, and third, the people think taxes are too high. We get a composite of all the thinking of the American people. Finally, if we do not do things that are harmful, the American people will take care of themselves, and they will get a composite of what they want.

You gentlemen have said, "Let the States all pass and enforce gambling laws," and then your law would be ineffective. That is the process of democracy.

Mr. O'HARA. In considering this matter, do the States themselves, so far you you know, prohibit the transportation of gambling devices of the nature of slotmachines or games of chance, or is it confined. largely to the operation of them?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. O'Hara, I am sorry I cannot answer it. I am just without the knowledge.

Mr. O'HARA. In my own State-and my recollection is not too good-I believe that it merely prevents the operation of them.

Now, do you think, as far as the effectiveness is concerned—and I am asking only for your opinion, as you appreciate that the compelling of these manufacturers to report and to be regulated by license would make for easier law enforcement?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I do not believe I got the import of your entire question-I am sorry.

Mr. O'HARA. As I understand this bill-and I do not have a copy of it before me-as I recall, it provided, among other things, that there was a licensing device in the bill with respect to the manufacturer, and then a report to be made. I may not be correct. It may have been an invoice of where the shipments are made, and so forth. But, as I understand it, the manufacture of such gambling device is not prohibited, is that true?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I think that is true.

Mr. O'HARA. Now, let us take the manufacture of certain drugs, which are prohibited from being sold, except under certain conditions, and by prescription of the doctor, and so forth.

The only thing that is made illegal about that drug, which has some good benefits as well as bad, is that it must be used only under a prescription. Is that not the situation?

Mr. SCHULTZ. That is right.

Mr. O'HARA. Let me ask you this question, as to the constitutionality of this bill:

Without declaring the instrument-slot machine-itself as being unlawful, what would be the situation-as one of my colleagues suggested with respect to the manufacture and distribution of oleomargarine, which is perfectly lawful in one State, to be manufactured and sold uncolored-to prohibit the transportation of that article in a State like my own which prohibits the sale of oleomargarine colored? Mr. SCHULTZ. May I restate your question just a moment to see if I understand it correctly?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes, of course.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I think you have asked me my view of the constitutionality of S. 3357 as drawn?

Mr. O'HARA. That is right.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I must be perfectly honest with you. I have had two men in my office trying to work that out, not from the standpoint of trying to find a defense, but simply to find out if it is unconstitutional.

When I called my office yesterday, they had not yet been able to say it was not constitutional. We are now down to the examination of the common law to determine it.

Mr. O'HARA. It presents to me, as a lawyer, a very interesting question.

Mr. SCHULTZ. It does. It presents most intriguing questions.

Mr. O'HARA. What I am getting at, Mr. Schultz, is this: If we develop the analogy with respect to something that is not evil in itself until it is put in operation, as compared to the drug acts, and various other acts which we have, and its impact, and its question of constitutionality, I am frank to say to you I do not know what the next step legislatively we will be asked to do.

Mr. SCHULTZ. That is my thesis, too.

Mr. O'HARA. Let me make myself plain. I do not believe in onearm bandits. I have played them, I have prosecuted people who have had them, and as a county attorney I have run them out of my county; but I do want to say, purely from the legal viewpoint, that is a very nice question in my own mind.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I feel I have a comrade in crime.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Suppose the bill before us at the present time provided a tax of sufficient size to practically eliminate the use of these gambling machines, would you be here speaking for such a bill or against it?

Mr. SCHULTZ. If they were to eliminate only the slot machine, I would not be for it until an investigation showed that by the elimination of the slot machine the moral problem and the State problem that we are now down to would be helped by doing that. If by doing that it would leave open the many, many instrumentalities for producing the same result, my answer would be "No."

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Mr. WOLVERTON. If I interpret your answer correctly, you would, under present conditions, be here opposing the enactment of any such law?

Mr. SCHULTZ. If such a law were before you today, my answers would be the same, whether I would be here or not, if that is what you mean. If that were a law being considered today, I would have to urge upon you the same things I am urging now.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Having in mind the different elements or qualifications that enter into the forming of your opinion with respect to the one-arm bandit machine, if there was a bill before us today that fixed a license fee recoverable by the Internal Revenue Office, in the sum of $2,000, $5,000, or any other amount, that would have the effect of diminishing the use of these machines, or maybe the elimination of them, you would oppose that legislation, would you not?

Mr. SCHULTZ. If that were the sole purpose of it, Mr. Wolverton, I would oppose it simply on the same basis that I am opposing this legislation; that is, because it is aimed at exactly the same thing, that is, the elimination of one item.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, do you mean to take the position that until our several States in their entirety, or our Federal Government in its sphere of jurisdiction, has eliminated all crime, or what would be considered crime, by the enactment of such a statute, that you are opposed to the enactment of any criminal statute?

Mr. SCHULTZ. No; I am not, Mr. Wolverton. I am making the same distinction that I made with Mr. Wilson; that is, when you approach one sin, if that is what you think it is, then I think you ought to be sure that you cure the whole sin.

Mr. WOLVERTON. What do you mean by the whole sin?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I do not see any comparison between the question of stealing automobiles or narcotics or the illegal transportation of women. Again, if you divide that down-if you can only cover Buick automobiles; if you only put morphine out of that one class, and if you only cover Chinese women, you would not accomplish your object. Mr. WOLVERTON. I am not speaking from the standpoint of whether we would or would not accomplish our object. I am trying to ascertain the basis of a code of morals that seems to actuate some citizens of this great country of ours in openly expressing the opinion that a statute of this kind, whereby a situation such as has been described as a crime in 43 of our States, should not be enacted, because we have not struck at all sources of crime. I cannot understand that, if I have correctly interpreted your remarks.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Well, if you have interpreted them on the basis that you would stop all 5-cent items for slot machines, but permit all items of a dollar, because the poor could not get a dollar, I would think you had not touched the moral aspect of it at all.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I probably would agree with you, but that is not what we are doing here. That is not the objective of this bill. We are directing our attention to a practice which has been declared illegal in 43 States of the Union, and the question is whether the Federal Government shall do anything to assist those 43 States in the objective that is set forth in their statutes-and you say "No." Is that because five States have not done it, or because we have not named every kind of a gambling device? What is the basis of your position? I have listened to you very intently. I listened to Mr.

Jennings, and I listened to one or two more, and I just cannot understand your viewpoint from the standpoint of what I term "good citizenship," and responsibility to recognize law, whether we like it or whether we do not like the particular law.

Mr. SCHULTZ. I think your last point, at least in my thinking, has been most prominent, Mr. Wolverton. "We should always obey a law, if it is there, no matter what it is, or how oppressive.

Let me tell you, that was the argument of King George, after the Boston Tea Party.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I still do not understand your point, I am sorry. Mr. SCHULTZ. I am sorry, too.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Do you consider gambling by means of slot machines, called by some one-arm bandits, morally wrong?

Mr. SCHULTZ. If I go in tomorrow to a place where there is a onearm bandit and I pick out that nickel and put it in and watch what comes up and walk away, I feel no disgrace.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I am asking this question, leading to another question, to determine, if I can, just what is your basic thought. I ask the question again, not whether you would consider the playing of a one-arm bandit a disgrace, I am asking you the question firstDo you consider it morally wrong?

Mr. SCHULTZ. No. I do not want to say a thing here that could be misinterpreted. If you ask me if I like sea food, I can say "Yes" or I could say "No," because there are lots of sea foods that I am very fond of and lots of them I do not like.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I never had heard of sea food coming within the description of one-arm bandits, so for that reason I do not follow

you.

I am talking about one-arm bandits, not sea food. Now, answer my next question, if you will.

You have given a very direct answer to my question. You have said "No," that you did not consider it morally wrong. I assumed that you would say it. I assume that a great many people would be of that opinion. I am not expressing my own opinions, I just want to get the basis of your thought.

Now, if the State, on the theory that it considers it morally wrong, or for other reasons, passes a statute that prohibits the use of one-arm bandits, would it then be wrong for you to play the machine in violation of the State law?

Mr. SCHULTZ. It must not be, because I go to carnivals, I go to baseball games, I go to many places that have things that are, in my opinion, exactly like a one-arm bandit. Yes, I play them; and I do not feel that I am morally wrong.

Now, therefore, if you ask me whether by simply putting a nickel in the one-arm bandit, I feel morally wrong, and by playing the paddlewheel I feel morally right, the answer is "No."

Mr. WOLVERTON. What is your position, then, with respect to recognizing law?

Mr. SCHULTZ. I say that we are human beings, all of us. There is a law in every State with respect to speed, and I want to see just one man in this country who has never violated a law.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Then until somebody has never violated a speeding law, you would not favor or believe that there was any obligation

on you to respect as a citizen of a particular State the speed laws of that State?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Exactly. I would say just what I said before. I think there ought to be a speed law as far as the protection of the individual State is concerned. But I do not think that if I went into Kentucky, which has a 60-mile speed law, that I would feel that I was doing wrong if I went 62 miles an hour, nor would I feel that way because I came from Illinois that has no such restriction.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I will not enter into a discussion with you along that line, because that is not the basis of what I have in mind. I am seeking to find out what the basis of your position is.

I ask you again the question: Do you, as a citizen of a State, recognize your obligation to observe a statute that the legislature of that State, as representatives of the people, has designated to be a crime? Mr. SCHULTZ. I will take one law, and tell you, so far as the speed law is concerned, I violate it many times, when I do, I do not think I have done anybody, including any State, any harm.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not suppose I would be justified in taking any further time in pressing the point, because I am talking about one-arm bandits and you are talking about speed laws. I do not see the relationship between the two. I am trying to get before your mind what I consider to be the duty of a citizen when a State legislature, because of the moral question involved, or because of the tendency to create graft in public officials at times, or because of the effect it has on families, as pointed out by Mr. Wilson, in its judgment, speaking for the people of the State, says, "You shall not operate a slot machine."

Do you take the position that because that State has not designated everything that is criminal or immoral, that, therefore, there is no obligation on your part to recognize the statute which they have passed?

Mr. SCHULTZ. No. I take the position that that law is no different than any other single law in that State, and if every violation of every law in that State were immediately prosecuted, you would even have the prosecutor in jail with you. There would be no free people left.

Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not understand what you mean by "having the prosecutor with you."

Mr. SCHULTZ. Because I do not believe, when all of our complicated laws

Mr. WOLVERTON. The prosecutor is in office to enforce the laws of the State and that obligation is upon him. Now, assuming that you were a prosecutor and charged with the responsibility of enforcing the laws of the State, and the State has passed a statute which prohibits the operation of slot machines, would you feel obligated to enforce that statute?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Equally as I would the speed laws.

Mr. WOLVERTON. Now, if you would have that feeling of obligation as a public officer, do you not recognize that there is an equal duty on the part of a private citizen to observe the law?

Mr. SCHULTZ. No; I do not in relationship, because I do not believe that people are so constituted that they can follow every law, and when you put another one on to make it more effective, you ought to be sure that that is what happens.