In addition to freight rate bulletins, another aid in comp delivered prices was the use of delivery charge tables, which were de signed to simplify the procedure of figuring the delivered prices, an each petitioner refrained from publishing price quotations f. c point of production or shipment, but used the practice and met of quoting price sheets, which it termed "Price Cards," in whi designated base prices f. o. b. Pittsburgh, Pa. and f. o. b. Chr. Ill. About 1912 one manufacturer began announcing quotatio prices, based on Pittsburgh as a basing point, through the use of p cards which listed "Pittsburgh Basing Discounts" under whic discount was decreased-and the net price thereby increased-in p portion to the freight rate from Pittsburgh to the point of deliver The practice thus established was followed by other manufactur then in existence, and since then, up to 1930, by other manufacture as they have entered the conduit business.

In 1930, petitioner National Electric shifted from the list and count form of delivered price quotation to a quotation which spec the net base prices, with freight to be added, and during the next or so other manufacturers likewise changed to the quotation of base prices plus freight. In 1924, conduit began to be sold at pris based on Gary, Indiana, as a basing point. During that year p tioner Youngstown began to manufacture conduit at Evanston, I nois, and inaugurated the practice of quoting and selling conduit delivered prices based on Evanston, as well as Pittsburgh, as a basta point, the base price at Evanston being $4 above the current publise price at Pittsburgh. Clayton Mark, during the period (1924–1999 had quoted conduit prices upon a Chicago base. Since freight rea from Chicago and Evanston were the same, Evanston ceased to be basing point shortly after 1934. Other manufacturers followed practices inaugurated by Youngstown and Clayton Mark.

It also appears that instead of petitioner conduit sellers using? absolute Pittsburgh plus system for all designations in their * quotations, they collectively discussed and considered the matter maintaining and utilizing Chicago as a basing point, with its di ential over Pittsburgh, and that until 1930 they followed a m of calculating delivered price quotations which provided for disor ing from the Pittsburgh or Chicago base price, depending upon t base price and accompanying discount produced the lower figure customer's destination, and that during 1930 representatives of p tioners at a meeting of the Rigid Steel Conduit section of the Nations Electrical Manufacturers Association determined upon a change fr that method to the one they now use. Accordingly, at the time of hearings each of the petitioner conduit sellers quoted delivered pr for conduit based on Chicago as well as on Pittsburgh as basing and sold at that base price.

here was testimony that the system thus used was an effective means atching bids and price quotations, and that the quotations made by conduit seller, irrespective of whether it had a manufacturing t located at or near Pittsburgh or Chicago, enabled them to match · price quotations. It also appears that at times it was difficult to ly determine the railroad tariff rate and that mistakes by some uit sellers in the selection of a particular tariff rate to be used in rticular instance were a fruitful source of differences in the ered prices quoted, thereby preventing a matching of such [178] ations. To prevent such errors, petitioners, acting through Rigid 1 Conduit Association, employed one Donley, who prepared a pilation of freight rate applicators containing the freight factor icable from Pittsburgh to various destinations in the United es and, on a differential of $4 per ton above the Pittsburgh base e, the freight applicable from Chicago. These compilations bee important adjuncts to petitioners' plans and methods in matching vered price quotations. They were intended by petitioners to be as their common price factors.

he findings upon which the order of the Commission is based are thy and of a comprehensive nature. In these findings the petitionare identified by name in connection with the particular activities aged in by them as part of their general plan of suppressing price petition through the combination charged. Essentially the find; are, that there was collective consideration of pricing policies on part of representatives of petitioners in 1930 and collective conrations by such representatives of those matters through November, ); that by petitioners' adherence to their formula or system of ing, their matching of bids under seal and the matching of their vered price quotations was made effective, and a combination and spiracy was maintained by petitioners to deprive purchasers of duit of the benefits of competition in price, to maintain artificial monopolistic methods and prices in the sale and distribution of duit, to prepare and maintain common rate factors or freight ers used and useful in determining and establishing price quotais and prices for conduit, to classify customers of conduit and detere the treatment to be accorded them, to establish and maintain form discounts, terms and conditions of sale, to determine and trol the use of warehouses in the distribution of conduit, to prepare, pt, and use for the purpose of aiding in price maintenance and trol, uniform contracts for distributors and for contractors buying specific projects, and to enforce the terms of such contracts through estigations and reports thereon, to support and maintain their price ucture through the conduct of investigations of sales and offers to 1, and the circulation of reports thereon; and that the acts and prac

tices performed thereunder and in connection therewith, hire lessened and suppressed competition among sellers in the sale 27 distribution of conduit in interstate commerce.

These ultimate findings of fact are based upon subsidiary find It will not be necessary in this opinion to set forth these finding they appear in 38 Federal Trade Commission Decisions, 550. Upon these findings of fact the Commission concluded that these at and practices constituted unfair methods of competition in merce within the meaning of § 5 of the Act, and directed petitio1 other than General Electric Supply Corporation and Spang Cha to cease and desist from entering into, continuing in, or carrying any planned common course of action, understanding, agree combination, or conspiracy between any two or more of petitions or between any one or more of petitioners and others not parties her to do or perform any of the things specifically set forth in the enz. For the injunctive paragraphs covering the specific activities. 38 F. T. C. decisions, 593.

Petitioners assert that no finding was made as to when the c spiracy was instituted, how long it continued, and which responder (petitioners) were members thereof. They insist that the Com sion has failed to make a finding as to the conspiracy charged, toget with findings which would disclose how and in what manner eac the petitioners became a member thereof.

In support of their contention, petitioners argue that the finding Paragraph Nineteen: (a) Pursuant to Count I of the complaint herein the C mission concludes from the evidence of record and therefore finds that the capacity, tendency and effect of the combination and conspiracy maintained r the respondents [petitioners] named therein in the manner aforesaid, and e acts and practices performed thereunder and in connection therewith has been, and is, to hinder, lessen, restrain, and suppress [179] competit. 24 the sale and distribution of conduit

is wholly insufficient in law, because, so they say, the finding is e a description of the "capacity tendency, and effect" of the conspire"

In considering this contention, it is well to remember that find are to be construed liberally in support of a judgment or order, E v. Kuhn, 20 N. W. (2d) 72. Whenever, from facts found, other f may be inferred which will support the judgment, such inferences : be deemed to have been drawn, Clyde Equipment Co. v. Fiorito, (2d) 106, 107, and any words which fairly import a concerted actr for a conniving together to restrain trade, are sufficient to ch conspiracy, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2)

117.

Pertinent and akin to the question we are now discussing are words of Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in the of United States v. Line Material Company, rendered March 8, 198

ich case, after stating that the Sherman Act outlaws price fixing inations, he said: "Price fixing in any form is perhaps the most rful of all inducements for abandonment of competition. *

therefore one of the most effective devices to regiment whole stries and exact a monopoly price from the public. The benefits mpetition disappear." And in the case of United States v. United s Gypsum Co., also decided by the United States Supreme Court arch 8, 1948, the court said that price fixing, without authorizing tes, is illegal, per se. See also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Co., 220 U. S. 373; Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States r Trade Association, 273 U. S. 52 [11 F. T. C. 636, 1 S. & D. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392. Any ination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an wful activity. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 150, 221. And the existence of a plan or method which equalizes delivered costs or prices of competitors having widely different ht costs to given destinations constitutes strong evidence in itself agreement to use such plan or system. Milk and Ice Cream Can tute v. Federal Trade Commission, 152 F. (2d) 478 [42 F. T. C. ; Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 2d) 899 [43 F. T. C. 1087]. And price uniformity especially if mpanied by an artificial price level not related to the supply and and of a given commodity may be evidence from which an agreecor understanding, or some concerted action of sellers operating strain commerce, may be inferred. Cement Manufacturers Prove Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 606; Eugene DietzCo. v. Federal Trade Commission, 142 F. (2d) 321 [38 F. T. C. . The fixing of prices by one member of a group, pursuant to ess delegation, acquiescence, or understanding, is just as illegal e fixing of prices by direct, joint action. United States v. MasonTorporation, 316 U. S. 265, 276. Moreover, the question we are discussing was considered and decided in the Federal Trade Comion v. The Cement Institute, announced by the Supreme Court April 26, 1948. In disposing of the identical question, the court ed our problem. It said:

seems impossible to conceive that anyone reading these findings in their ety could doubt that the Commission found that respondents, collectively tained a multiple basing point delivered price system for the purpose of ressing competition in cement sales. The findings are sufficient. The ention that they are not is without substance.

etitioners also stress the point that the use of the basing point hod of pricing does not have any adverse effect on competition is not oppressive. They contend that in the event we should 1 that the Commission made a finding that there was a price fixing spiracy, such a finding is not supported by the evidence.

The argument is that there is no direct evidence of any conspiny that if the Commission made such a finding, it is based upon a of inferences; and that the [180] general use of the basing pc method of pricing and the uniformity of prices does not justify a inference of conspiracy. We think there was direct proof of i conspiracy, but whether there was or was not, in determining fai a finding is supported, it is not necessary that there be dire pid of an agreement. Such an agreement may be shown by circaESYS tial evidence. Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal I Commission, supra, 480.

In this case there was evidence showing collective action to el nate the Evanston basing point, and collective activities in promer 2 the general use of the formula presently to be noted. The rea clearly establishes the fact that conduit manufacturers control 93% of the industry use a system under which they quote only de ered prices, which are determined in accordance with a formula : sisting of a base price at Pittsburgh or Chicago plus rail freisi depending upon which basing point price controls at any particis destination or in any particular section of the United States; that a result of using that formula the conduit producers were enak ». to match their delivered price quotations, and purchasers everywi were unable to find price advantages anywhere; and that purchas at or near a place of production could not buy more cheaply from ther{ nearby producer than from producers located at greater distanus, and producers located at great distances from any given purchas quoted as low a delivered price as that quoted by the nearest proda

An example of an instance where petitioners have matched their bids appears where the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Tritai States Navy Department, requested bids under seal for the furnisice of one million feet of conduit for delivery at the Navy Yards: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Norfolk and Sewell's Point, Virg Seven of the petitioners submitted bids and matched their price qua tions in terms of dollars per foot down to the fourth decimal pe Of course, there were other instances in the record showing identity bids. Not only did petitioners match their bids when submitted un seal to agencies of public bodies, but each, with the knowledge of others, did likewise-used the formula for the purpose of presenting prospective private purchasers conditions of matched price quotati

In this state of the record it will be enough to say that Congress i left to the Commission the determination of the facts, Federal In Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 [40 F. T. C. A6 and the weight to be attributed to the facts proved and the inferen to be drawn from them, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Imi Commission, 324 U. S. 726, 739 [40 F. T. C. 892]. See also Unit