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have now treated shortly, is that principle which the schoolmen of the science of Political Economy have especially excluded from their view and from their writings. Hence it has happened that no incentive to social action, or motive of a high or true moral and spiritual character, has been introduced by them into that confused mass of idealistic invention, of confused opinion, and of statistical compilation, which, having put together, they have asked the world to receive and hold in the name and character of Science. Moreover I am called upon to declare that whenever this great element of social sacrifice arising out of moral law divine moral lawhas been incidentally brought forward by some men who have not assumed to be of the class of schoolmen, the men of the school have exerted themselves to repress and to suppress it, using every means likely to answer their purpose, and so have succeeded hitherto in extruding from the field of the science those sources of light, and that power, by which alone the bad character of their principles, together with their erroneous reasoning, could have been thoroughly detected and exposed.

A highly interesting and most instructive commentary on the great principle of sacrifice involved by the law in nature or the law of God, in all social action and dealing, is presented for our contemplation and study, in connexion with the course intellectual and philosophical, moral and practical that was adopted and pursued by a man who has acquired high renown in the province of philosophical effort and research, whose method of investigation and reasoning is held in high estimation. The man to whom I allude is Lord Bacon. In a work lately composed by a German writer, Dr. Kuno Fischer, for the purpose of introducing and explaining to his countrymen the character of the philosophy that was educed by Lord Bacon, and also the method of philosophising or discovering truth that was resorted to and

commended by him, the author of the work had to explain that analytical process of experiment which Lord Bacon adopted for the accomplishment of his course of reasoning on the material department of nature, this consisting of the adducement of facts facts past and present facts hispresent-facts torically recorded, and as well as those present and patent— the bringing these facts together into one large heap, and then drawing out from them something to which the name of Truth was to be assigned. This process being denominated the course of experiment the results are denominated experience the axiomatic matter accruing, to be received as the guiding or constructive light, — the light to show the way of progress.

Having explained the philosopher's material philosophy, as well as the course of reasoning, or induction, by which he arrived at results, the writer undertook another important inquiry and examination. These had reference to the manner in which the philosophy and course of material experiment had operated on the spirit and mind of the philosopher by whom they had been elaborated. By this course the results that were exhibited in the personal instance of the philosopher himself, after his philosophical process and system had assumed a completed form, were to be ascertained. The inquiry and examination led necessarily to the subject of sacrifice — social sacrifice. In a very able review of Dr. Fischer's work given in the Times journal*, the writer of the article, having first made a very clever and interesting critique on the character of the Baconian method and philosophy, proceeded to introduce that important feature of moral philosophy to which I desire to refer. The following extract from this article will sufficiently establish the point of which I am treating:

* Times journal, April 3, 1858.

"It would be inconvenient to follow the Doctor (Dr. Kuno Fischer) into his exhibition of the prerogative instances,'into the relation of Bacon's method to the preceding philosophy, to poetry, to religion, to history, or to mark its status as an encyclopædia of the sciences and its relation to progress. In all these respects Dr. Fischer has performed his task clearly, though excursively, to the vindication of his great exemplar, though recognising his defects. A more interesting inquiry to the majority of English readers is contained in a preliminary essay, in which Dr. Fischer maintains, in opposition to Mr. Macaulay, that there was a close correspondence between Bacon's moral and scientific character, according to the universal analogy; and that a great mistake has been made, when the character of Bacon has been excepted from the law of such an analogy. Bacon's moral nature was as elastic as facile, as completely directed towards practical ends, and as compliant with circumstances, as his intellect. His character was as practical as cool, as supple as the science which he desired and prescribed for the age. His moral disposition was by no means that of a creeping snake.' It was in the highest degree facile, and therefore frail; through all the windings of his life it became no worse than it was by nature: that is to say, it was easily corruptible. Indeed, when we see the general corruption by which such a character was surrounded, we can scarcely wonder that it fell into sad perplexities and aberrations. No violent passions, no strong affections, counterbalanced its calm pursuit of self-interest; and the dictates of the feelings never outweighed its simple practical ends." Here follows a passage from a translation of Dr. Fischer's work. It is this: "When both of them were in harmony we might be certain to find in Bacon one of the most amiable of men; but the least collision would at once destroy the equilibrium of his natural benevolence. If he were compelled

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to make a choice between the practical objects of his life and the promptings of his heart-between his interest and his friend we may be perfectly sure that Bacon would always have given the preference to the former. He attempted indeed to effect a reconciliation between them, and would have been much pleased if his experiment had succeeded; but as soon as it had failed, and Bacon saw the impossibility of success, he made up his mind to sacrifice his friend, and this sacrifice was made with small compunction."

The social character and operation of that peculiar inductive philosophy the philosophy derived by means of experiment and experience-which was so ingeniously elaborated by Bacon, is here described. The commentator on this philosophy, and upon its operation on the personal character of its elaborator, is here shown to be under the necessity of declaring that the principle of this philosophy, however applicable it may be to the appropriation and management of all inert matter, is nevertheless so very weak and defective as not to afford to its inventor and devotee a foundation upon which he might, at one and the same time, insure his own interest and welfare, and also the interest and welfare of his friend. writer has declared that Bacon wished to effect a reconciliation

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between the two persons and the two interests, that is, between himself and his friend, between the matter of his own interest and the matter of his friend's interest; but this reconciling principle and philosophy had not been opened to him by that inductive process which he had elected and which he had pursued. His inductive philosophy - the philosophy of experiment and experience was singular, not plural or even dual. He had not learnt by it how to make that due and honourable sacrifice by means of which sufficient would have been insured for himself, and a like sufficiency insured for his friend. Failing in a discovery of this great point, his

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election was to throw over his friend; to make his friend a sacrifice to himself.

Yet, notwithstanding the failure of all social principle here declared, it is not to be assumed that Bacon disregarded religion. This he did not. But the fact and the fault were, that, as in the case of his friend whose welfare he sacrificed under the pressure of a difficulty, or when he could not see the way to secure his own interest, that he did not regard religion as the supreme principle and power. His love and his faith were directed and devoted to himself. He adopted the common course pursued by men in general, that is, in his right hand he took his own invented course,-his factual philosophyhis philosophy of experiment and experience—his philosophy of statics-his philosophy of circumstance-his inductive course and process-his weak, error-begotten, and errorbreeding philosophy, which, having no true philosophy in it, conducted him, or impelled him, on one main course of selfish action; no element of reconciliation, or that element of a spiritual, moral, and social character, which could promote and accomplish a reconciliation of the interests of two or more human and fellow creatures, being present in that inductive course and process, or that philosophy which he had found to be so admirably applicable to earth and to air, to metals and to minerals, and to all material affinities, and to all simple material construction. In his left hand he took strong, truthimparting, and reconciling religion. But here, love being secondary, and hence lukewarm, so faith was either deficient or absent. As the commentator just referred to has remarked, the philosopher yielded to the law of analogy: that which was of himself attracted him, governed him, and made him its slave. He was not inclined to sacrifice the promptings of cold and calculating intellect for the great principle of sympathy, social sympathy, brought to him by religion. He had

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