with circumstances against these unhappy members, aggravated to the extreme degree of human endurance; for in their case, the use of all the animal and vegetable materials which are adapted for sustaining life, and which are placed within reach of appropriation by man in his uncivilised state, is wholly interdicted. If we suppose the case of agricultural production, here recourse to unappropriated land is not permitted; it is reserved for those who may hereafter be rich enough to demand its productions. Likewise of all animal nourishment that is found in the fields, the woods, and the waters. Also of every other kind of matter which can conduce to the subsistence or comfort of man. These are all decreed, by the usages and laws of civilised life, to be for the sport or the luxurious indulgence of those who already possess abundance. In such a state of conventional regulation, those of mankind who occupy the lowest grade in their respective communities can only procure subsistence by offering their labour for hire. To this offer the reply is, the labour market is overstocked, capital is deficient; and as to deficient capital, I submit that I have shown that it cannot be assigned to any other cause than defective appropriation. How unjust and how horrid, then, is the attempt which this writer has made to take off from man and to cast upon the Creator the responsibility of those derangements that abound in the human condition, and which occurs so often in his general argument, and which is strongly set forth in the following passage: "After the public notice which I have proposed had been given, and the system of poor laws had ceased with regard to the rising generation, if any man chose to marry without a prospect of being able to support a family, he should have the most perfect liberty to do so. Though to marry, in this case, is, in my opinion, clearly an immoral act, yet it is not one which society can justly take upon itself to prevent or punish; because the punishment provided for it by the laws of Nature falls directly and most severely upon the individual who commits the act, and through him, only more remotely and feebly, on the society. When Nature will govern and punish for us, it is a very miserable ambition to wish to snatch the rod from her hands, and draw upon ourselves the odium of executioner. To the punishment, therefore, of Nature he should be left, the punishment of want. He has erred in the face of a most clear and precise warning, and can have no just reason to complain of any person but himself when he feels the consequences of his error. All parish assistance should be denied him; and he should be left to the uncertain support of private charity. He should be taught to know that the laws of Nature, which are the laws of God, had doomed him and his family to suffer for disobeying their repeated admonitions; that he had no claim of right on society for the smallest portion of food beyond that which his labour would fairly purchase; and that if he and his family were saved from feeling the natural consequences of his imprudence, he would owe it to the pity of some kind benefactor, to whom, therefore, he ought to be bound by the strongest ties of gratitude." The declaration,-"He should be taught to know that the laws of Nature are the laws of God," opens up matter of the most extensive and awful import. It might be supposed that the writer's observation had never been attracted by the fact of the fallen, ignorant, and depraved nature of man. The general subject-matter of which he has undertaken to treat is that of the laws made by man in his capacity of legislator, and of the still wider range of those actions of * An Essay on the Principle of Population, by T. R. Malthus, A.M., book 4, ch. viii. p. 180. man which occur out of or beyond the sphere of legislative control or coercion. Before setting down his conclusion, or connecting his facts with the agency of God, he was bound to show that the laws of man have been framed, in every instance, in accordance with justice, or the perfect law of God; and, moreover, that all social action, or the general dealing of mankind, has been of a similar character of justice, purity, and truth. Had he succeeded in showing this, then his great declarative proposition, "the laws of Nature are the laws of God,” · applied, as he has applied it to the prevailing condition of man-would have been apposite. Now it has been my duty to show how signally the author has failed in all his attempts to elucidate the subject-matter alluded to; and, moreover, that, in repeated instances, we find upon record his own admissions of failure. In addition to this evidence of a negative character, we have, on the face of the same record, admissions of a positive character likewise, such as, that labour is frequently thrown out of employment by changes in fashion, by the substitution for it of mechanical power, by the productions of foreign labour being brought into competition with those of domestic labour, and also by home competition. Now, over all these extensive causes of rejection and degradation the labourer himself possesses no control, neither has he the power of foreseeing their advent. They are set in motion entirely by the taste, the caprice, and the ill-regulated or selfish desires of those members of the community who occupy more elevated positions than he, and it is on these agents, therefore, that the responsibility of the derangements alone rests. And yet, notwithstanding the powerful and conclusive evidence thus educed and advanced by the author himself, for the arrest of all judgment, or, I am warranted in adding, for deciding in favour of the weaker party, he has incautiously and presumptuously proceeded to occupy the judgment-seat of the most exalted One, and under the usurped sanction of the most sacred of names, has promulgated an edict, which, if carried into effect, would consign a great portion of mankind to miserable and rapid destruction. I maintain, then, that the great judgment by which the right of the destitute to subsistence has been denied, being wholly unsupported by evidence, must necessarily fall. - It must excite surprise and great regret that Malthus should have delivered a judgment so unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive, and there is only one way of accounting for it that occurs to me. It is this: His mind was occupied on investigating the great and important subject, at a period when the horrid power generated by a state of anarchy, was devastating the public institutions of France, and invading there the security of domestic life. A state of social confusion in that country had called forth many men endowed with energetic and powerful spirits, who, by their writings, excited, in the first place, hatred against all known state abuses, and taking advantage of the passion thus aroused, they endeavoured, in the next place, to undermine the foundations of existing institutions and governments. Now, Malthus entered the arena as an antagonist of these writers, but was wholly incapable of grappling with and destroying the main arguments of his adversaries. The powers of his mind were inadequate to the task of separating good from bad, consequently, he was not able to uphold the one and to cast down the other. Failing, therefore, to place on its right foundation the governmental principle of man, he was induced to seek safety by attempting to implicate the providence of God. In confirmation of the line of argument that I have advanced against the validity of his great judgment, I will refer to two passages in his "Principles of Political Economy." At the close of this work, and under the head of the "Progress of Wealth," he attempts to take a general or comprehensive survey of the subject, both in its theoretical and practical development. It will be apparent that if he had been able, in the course of his preceding investigations, to discover and to establish a great general principle, it would here, more especially, have been brought into action, and have served him as a guide in forming a correct judgment on the arguments and practical results, the collective evidence of which his mind was occupied on considering. The passage is as follows: "With regard to these causes (alluding to the causes of distress), such as the cultivation of our poor soils, our restrictions upon commerce, and our weight of taxation, I find it very difficult to admit a theory of our distresses so inconsistent with the theory of our comparative prosperity. While the greatest quantity of our poor lands were in cultivation; while there were more than usual restrictions upon commerce, and very little corn was imported; and while taxation was at its height, the country confessedly increased in wealth. with a rapidity never known before. Since some of our poorest lands have been thrown out of cultivation; since the peace has removed many of our restrictions upon commerce, and, notwithstanding our corn laws, we have imported a great quantity of corn; and since seventeen millions of taxes have been taken off from the people, we have experienced the greatest degree of distress, both among capitalists and labourers." Thus, upon remarking on the acknowledged rapid increase of capital, or prosperity, at one period, and then upon the declining rate of increase of capital, or adversity, at another, he Principles of Political Economy, by T. R. Malthus, A.M., sect. 10, ch. i. p. 418. |