Senator SPARKMAN. Our first witness will be Mr. Joseph Sisco, who is accompanied by Mr. Dean Brown, Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

Mr. Sisco, we will start with your statement.

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STATEMENT OF JOSEPH SISCO, UNDER SECRETARY OF ST POLITICAL AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY DEAN BROWN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT AND SEYMOU DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO AND MILITARY A DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Sisco. Thank you.

With your permission I would like to ask that the state included in the record. To save time I think I will read only portions to allow the committee further time for questioning Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.

Mr. SISCO. You can see since I have been Under Secret Political Affairs for an entire 2 weeks, that you are getting expert across the board here this morning.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will take our chances on that. It 2 weeks on this, but it has been a good many years in the bro of foreign relations.

Mr. SISCO. I have sought to make myself an instant expert of the areas in the last 2 weeks and I will do my best.

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

Mr. Chairman, as I prepared this testimony from the po view of a broad overview, there were three fundamental que that came to my mind:

First, what kind of world structure can we realistically s create, and what are the major obstacles to its creation?

Second, what is the potential and what are the limits of Am contribution to a new global structure?

Third, what is the central foreign policy challenge facin American people?

We cannot determine the future unilaterally. It is beyon power of any one country to create a new international order.

CHALLENGE BEFORE UNITED STATES

But two major crises of 1973-in the Middle East and in ener demonstrated that the United States has a unique contributi make to a peaceful world order. We have brought Arabs and Is from the battlefield to the negotiating table. We have launche search for a global solution to the global problem of energy. 1 are facts of international life.

Our interests, our strengths, and our resources compel an a and responsible American role in the world. This does not n there is or should be a Washington blueprint for every internati conflict-military or economic. It does mean a policy of sele engagement on the critical problems of our time.

Through most of my quarter century in the State Department have faced a relatively frozen international landscape. The challe was to ease the cold war with the Soviet Union and China and to hot wars in Korea and Vietnam.

While we are no longer directly engaged in war and the landsc has begun to thaw, it would be a mistake for any of us to take granted a future of peace. Each of the achievements of recent ye

is only partial-foreign policy is a process, not a final product. The danger of nuclear weapons is still self-evident. While our relations with Moscow and Peking are improved, they are still competitive. Peace in the Middle East and Indochina is not yet secure.

Therefore the central challenge before Americans today is not any particular issue but our willingness to persevere, to pursue a consistent framework of policies over a sustained period of time. We falter or tire only at the risk of great peril to all of us.

AREAS OF GREATEST FUTURE IMPACT

Let me devote the remainder of my remarks to the four areas in which our willingness to pursue steady purposes can have the greatest impact on our future.

ALLIES.

I. Allies we are convinced that at the very heart of a stable world must be the community of nations sharing common goals, common ideals, and a common perspective of how to deal with the problems and threats confronting us. New relationships with countries with different systems and outlooks are only possible if old relationships with allies remain strong.

Our alliances with Japan and Western Europe were attained as a result of a World War and have served successfully to deter major threats to global peace for more than a quarter century. Today we must not permit an improved climate in international relations to weaken our strong ties with our allies.

The problem before us is whether the nations of the Atlantic area and Japan, faced with self-evident problems that affect them all, can develop a common approach or whether this relationship is dominated by nationalistic rivalries.

The United States has made clear its choice. In speeches last April and December, Secretary Kissinger made a number of specific proposals to revitalize our alliances. He said:

"We have intensified all levels of consultations with our allies, but consultation must be a two-way street.

"We wish to make steady progress toward the issuance of joint declarations to define the future of our relationships.

"We encourage the development of Western European unity, but not at the expense of the Atlantic unity that is essential to European security and to the resolution of a growing list of global issues."

There can be no higher priority than to encourage Japan and Western Europe to join us in giving fresh creativity to our alliances based on our common objectives.

NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

II. New relationships-our debate about the future has centered principally on the kind of relationship we should seek with the Soviet Union and China. Today, I believe, we are free of certain of the illusions of the past, and there is hope for the future. Relations once characterized simply by degrees of hostility are now defined by a complex mixture of competition and cooperation.

These relationships have been described as détente. We do not say that détente is based on the compatibility of domestic systems. We

recognize, and we must remain fully aware, that some of and the ideology of both the Soviet Union and the People's of China are opposed and sometimes hostile to ours.

In our relations with the Soviet Union, détente is root recognition that potential adversaries can bring damage other-mutual destruction in the case of the United St U.S.S.R.-and have a common interest and responsibility in ing their relationships so as to prevent this risk. Put anot that the threat of nuclear war is not a rational policy.

In this context, we have made a concerted effort to agree u of conduct that will encourage mutual restraint. We have a basic principles designed to minimize the use of conflict an vent nuclear war. We have established communications bet top leaders that make it possible in time of crisis to avoid th of accident or miscalculation. We have sought through an network of agreements to develop a framework for mutual that will give durability to an improvement in Soviet-Ameri tions. It is within this context that we place such emphasis on zation of the Soviet-American economic relationship which shortly be considering.

SALT, MBFR AND CSCE NEGOTIATIONS

The realism of Soviet-American relations in 1974 is demo by the fact that we are engaged with one another in an unprec range of negotiations which address the hard political and s issues confronting us and seek to build greater stability. include:

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]—our objecti paraphrase the President, are to control military technology an erate the process of strategic arms growth so that our politica tionship with the U.S.S.R., indeed the basic issues of war and will not be dominated by the competition in this area. We s agreement that will enhance strategic stability and preserve es equilibrium of the strategic forces of the two sides.

Mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR]—here we a allies hope by patient negotiating effort to probe Soviet willing address the real issues of military security in Europe and neg an agreement that will maintain the security of both East and at lower levels of confrontation and cost.

Conference on European Security and Cooperation [CS broadly stated, the Western objectives in this conference are to agreement on principles to guide interstate relations, enhance fidence in military intentions through such measures as ad notification of maneuvers, improve economic and other cooper and open the way to broader contacts among the people of t participating states.

Obviously, all of these negotiating initiatives touch on very portant political and military interests of the United States an allies. It is for this reason that we work in concert with the MBFR and CSCE, and consult closely on SALT.

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NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is also contributing to a more hopeful environment for peace, particularly in Asia. In 1973 we strengthened our dialog by establishing liaison offices in each other's capitals, by Secretary Kissinger's two visits to Peking, and by a substantial expansion of economic and other exchanges. In 1974 we will strive to deepen our dialog, to give durable form and content to our relationship. We have indeed come a long way since our first efforts in 1969 and since the President's trip to Peking in 1972. But we have a long way still to go.

MAINTAINING APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF MILITARY STRENGTH

To build a more peaceful world, America requires the confidence of our allies and the respect of those with different social systems. A strong defense is an essential element as a means of accomplishing both. We will not allow the United States to be second to any nation in its conventional and nuclear forces. It is a fact that the Soviet Union is making a major military effort-improving its capability in Europe, expanding its seapower, and pursuing major new strategic nuclear programs still permitted under the interim agreements.

The task of maintaining an appropriate level of military strength is a complex one, affected by the dynamics of technological progress, political power, and pressing domestic priorities. For a quarter century, the Congress and five separate administrations have met this task together and provided America with an adequate defense. It is essential that cooperation continue to this end.

MIDDLE EAST

III. Middle East-the recent Middle East and energy crisis have clearly demonstrated that our efforts to achieve common international objectives are more than intellectual exercises. Our labor in this critical area demonstrates our willingness to persevere, to take bold diplomatic moves in the knowledge that the seeds of war remain, and that there can be no lasting structure of global peace without a durable peace in the Middle East.

The fourth war in a quarter century between Arabs and Israelis has changed the objective conditions in the area. It has also changed the perception of each side toward the other. From four recent trips to the area, I have the impression that people there are weary and desirous of raising their sights.

In these circumstances, there is hope in the step-by-step approach we have adopted. Both sides want the United States to play a constructive role. Both Egypt and Israel have gained from the disengagement of forces agreement achieved this past January. This first step toward a final settlement has been implemented with impeccable good faith by both sides. The separation of forces has reduced the likelihood of renewal of hostilities on this front. And above all, the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement could become in time the 'kind of practical test of peace on the ground which can build con