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tion of Parliament; and I trust the year may not pass by without your having disposed of this question by the enactment of a just and effective law.

"The condition of Ireland with reference to agrarian crime has, in general, afforded a gratifying contrast with the state of that island in the preceding winter; but there have been painful though very partial exceptions.

"To secure the best results for the great measures of the two last Sessions which have so recently passed into operation, and which involve such direct and pressing claims upon the attention of all classes of the community, a period of calm is to be desired; and I have thought it wise to refrain from suggesting to you at the present juncture the discussion of any political question likely to become the subject of new and serious controversy in that country.

"The burdens devolving upon you as the great Council of the nation, and of this ancient and extended Empire, are, and must long continue to be, weighty. But you labour for a country whose laws and institutions have stood the test of time, and whose people, earnestly attached to them, and desiring their continuance, will unite with their Sovereign in invoking upon all your designs the favour and aid of the Most High."

The Address in answer to the Speech was moved in the House of Lords by Lord Westminster, and in the Commons by Major Hamilton, and seconded by Lord Rosebery in the Upper and Mr. Samuel Morley in the Lower House. There was little to call for notice in the debates on the Address. The Duke of Richmond reserved his opinion upon the course taken by the Government with respect to the state of affairs upon the Continent; but criticized, although without acerbity, some of the passages of the Speech, especially with reference to the Circular of Prince Gortschakoff and the absence of France from the Black Sea Conference.

Lord Granville referred with much feeling to his friendly personal relations with both France and Germany. As Foreign Secretary, however, he said that it had been his paramount duty to lay aside all personal feelings, and to maintain a fair and impartial neutrality, although, unluckily, his cordiality for both the belligerents had been deeply resented by each.

In the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli plunged at once into a discussion on the state of foreign affairs. His speech was laboured, but picturesque. He returned again to his favourite notion, that we ought to have used the guarantee to Prussia of her Saxon provinces, given by us in the Treaty of Vienna, as a means of frightening France out of the war before it began. He insisted that we ought to have made much more of the concession obtained from Prussia as to the Hohenzollern candidature, and have told Louis Napoleon that if in the face of that concession secured by us, he did not withdraw his demand for a formal veto on the Hohenzollern candidature, he would be guilty of an "outrage" on England, and must "take the consequences, which consequences were not, however, to be war. He rallied the

Government for its attenuated armaments, which rendered an "armed neutrality" on our part so difficult. He complimented Mr. Childers and Mr. Cardwell on having quite justified the confidence reposed in them on their appointment to office that they would reduce the naval and military strength of England to the utmost of their ability; and Mr. Lowe on his "harum-scarum budgets." He ridiculed our action in the case of the Russian Note, and said he believed there was a secret treaty between Germany and Russia on the subject, which made our appeal to Count Bismarck as undignified as it was simple. He depicted the "cynical cordiality" with which the Count offered to assist us by proposing a Conference, in which, as a matter of course, Russia's high-handed proceeding was first of all condoned. He laughed at the Government for being represented on the Roman question by "the honourable Member for Perth" (Mr. Kinnaird); reproved the Americans for the "rough simplicity of their Republican manners" and their unmannerly conduct to England, though ironically intimating that they had no doubt "improved upon our language;" and he finished his clever disquisition on Foreign Affairs by depicting the position of England as one of enormous peril.

Mr. Gladstone's reply was, of course, nearly limited to the points touched by Mr. Disraeli. He declared the Ministry had no knowledge of the coming storm before it broke; pointed out that the armaments had really been greatly increased in efficiency since the Conservatives went out in 1868; twitted Mr. Disraeli on the close resemblance between his conception of a "bloated armament" in 1861, and his conception of an "attenuated armament" now; confuted him as to the binding character of the guarantee of Prussia's Saxon provinces given in 1815, out of his own Government's exposition of the character of a joint guarantee as exemplified in the Luxemburg guarantee of 1868; declared, with relation to the Russian Note, that neither Lord Clarendon nor Lord Palmerston had ever believed that the neutralization of the Black Sea could be more than temporary; told the House that we should not have had a single ally among the neutral Powers if we had proposed simply to insist on this neutralization when the Russian Note appeared, as Austria was entirely opposed to that course; denied that we had made any sort of special appeal for help to Germany, having merely notified our course to Germany as to other Powers; and after declaring that he did not see any special or near peril to England, avowed his wish to make England strong, and admitted the possibility that the neutrals might be compelled to express an opinion as to the terms of peace, which his Cabinet had already advised the German Government to declare at once.

The first nights of the session were, as was to be expected, devoted chiefly to the great Continental War, the peace which had now been virtually concluded by the surrender of Paris, and the grave diplomatic transactions in which the English Government was directly concerned. These subjects, however, caused no serious parliamentary

discussion. It was undoubtedly judicious to abstain from comments which could have exercised no influence on the policy of Germany or on the fortunes of France; and the results of the Black Sea Conference, and of the Joint High Commission at Washington, were practically beyond the control of Parliament. But the surprising admission attributed to Lord Palmerston by the Premier with respect to the neutralization of the Black Sea led to a passage at arms between him and Mr. Disraeli about a fortnight later. Mr. Disraeli began by explaining that his object was not to enter into the general policy of the Treaty. He wished to discover what was the object of the Conference, which was covered with so much ambiguity and mystery, and also to vindicate the accuracy of his statement on the first night that the neutralization of the Black Sea was the vital part of the Treaty of 1856. To prove this he recounted the history of the negotiations at Vienna, and the famous "Four Points," maintaining that the Cabinet of Lord Palmerston, including Lord Clarendon and Lord Russell, continued the war for a whole year solely for the purpose of obtaining this condition, and that it was the gist of the Peace of Paris: and the policy of the British Government had never changed-at least until the end of last November. Mr. Disraeli then passed on to consider how his observations on the opening night had been met by the Prime Minister, particularly his declaration that in the view of the British Government the neutralization of the Black Sea had never been a vital object of the Treaty of 1856, and that Lord Clarendon and Lord Palmerston set no particular value on it. He pointed out that by the connexion of his sentences Mr. Gladstone had seemed to imply that when he opposed the idea of neutralization in 1856 he spoke as a Minister, whereas he was one of a minute and powerless section of distinguished men with no following in Parliament or the country, and he himself the most unpopular of all, because of the lukewarm manner in which he had provided for the war. Without presuming to defend Lord Clarendon or Lord Palmerston, he dilated on the extreme gravity of holding up two eminent statesmen as acting with insincerity at a great crisis, and laughing in their sleeves at their fellow-countrymen. As to Lord Palmerston, the story must have arisen out of some bit of banter with which he had foiled an importunate diplomatist, but it was his solemn conviction that Lord Palmerston had never wavered for a moment on this question. He strongly condemned the assembly of a Conference merely to register the humiliation of Great Britain; for at the very moment when it was declared that it met without a foregone conclusion there was evidently a foregone conclusion in Mr. Gladstone's mind fatal to the honour of the country.

Mr. Gladstone, after a scornful regret that Mr. Disraeli should have stooped to repeat some paltry accusations about falsifying a date and the like, went on to complain with some warmth that Mr. Disraeli had twisted and misrepresented both his speech and the despatches. He had never denied that the neutralization of the

Black Sea was a vital part of the Paris Treaty, but only that it was exclusively vital. Further inquiry, Mr. Gladstone acknowledged, had shown him that he was wrong as to Lord Clarendon's view of the value of the neutralization condition, but he still believed that Lord Palmerston, while attaching great importance to it, did not think it was one which could be permanently enforced. Proceeding to defend the policy of agreeing to the Conference, he made a sharp attack on the alternative policy recommended by Mr. Disraeli of leaving Russia to take the consequences, which meant that we were to open a new source of controversy at a time when it was important that the utmost harmony should prevail among the neutrals.

It was not intended, nor was it expedient, that the discussion should be further prosecuted, but the Minister's tone, rather than his language, left in the House and the country a painful impression of distrust. The Ministerial diplomacy was but briefly criticized in the House of Lords by Lord Cairns and Lord Salisbury, the former eliciting from Lord Granville the statement that he had reason to believe that Lord Palmerston had in fact regarded the neutralization of the Black Sea as an article of the Treaty of 1856 which could not be permanently maintained.

He

Lord Salisbury, for his part, endeavoured to prove the decay of our national power and reputation. Such a disquisition would have been useless even if well founded, and the subject was not afterwards resumed. Mr. Auberon Herbert and Sir Robert Peel constituted themselves the spokesmen of the same cause in the Lower House, the former in a sober and statesmanlike, the latter in a bitter and vivacious fashion. Mr. Herbert called attention to the papers relating to the war, drawing from them a conclusion that the conduct of the Government all through deserved the strongest condemnation; and, chiefly, he blamed the "moral neutrality" which had been invented by our Foreign Office-the abnegation of every thing like a wish or an opinion at every stage of the war, and their determination not to act in concert with the other neutrals. accused the Government of playing towards France the part of a "detrimental”—that is, of having prevented the other neutrals from coming to her assistance; and if the neutrals had acted together, Mr. Herbert firmly believed that peace would have been restored before now. These opinions Mr. Herbert supported by numerous references to what he called "the colourless pages" of the Blue Book. As to the future, he did not wish this country to take up arms, but to express openly and straightforwardly our sense of the great evils which must result from immoderate terms of peace; and a violent annexation of territory was not only an immoderate condition, but would be a "fatal gift" to Germany herself. Mr. Herbert concluded by moving "That this House is of opinion that it is the duty of her Majesty's Government to act in concert with other neutral Powers to obtain moderate terms of peace, and to withhold all acquiescence in terms which might impair the independence of France, or threaten the future tranquillity of Europe."

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Sir R. Peel, who professed to treat the question from the English interest point of view, also assailed the policy of the Government as one of obliteration and "selfish isolation." It had brought about the humiliation of the character and credit of England, and made all the world ashamed of us. Sir Robert complained strongly of the flight of Lord Lyons from Paris, and in reading some extracts from the Blue Books he made the House exceedingly merry with the mock humility of their tone and of Mr. Gladstone's speeches, which he contrasted with the firm, straightforward language which Lord Palmerston would have used. The House will observe (he said) that in every one of them the word "ventured" occurs in some shape or other. "We ventured" to do this, or "we ventured" to do that: "We ventured" to disapprove the demand made by France upon the King of Prussia for a prospective engagement respecting the candidature of Prince Hohenzollern for Spain; but then it was our misfortune to fail. "We ventured" (laughter) to appeal to the Treaty of 1856 as to a reference to some competent tribunal for a settlement of the disputes between France and Prussia; but we did not obtain a hearing. This is the language of the right hon. gentleman at the head of the Government. (Hear, hear.) Now observe this:-"We expressed in language so respectful (much laughter and cheering) "that no objection could be taken to it, a hope that Prussia would not have recourse to the extreme measure of a bombardment of Paris." [Mr. Gladstone-" Hear, hear."] But we failed. (Renewed laughter.) Again - “We ventured to favour"-the calling together of an Assembly fully authorized to represent France-I assure the House that I am using the literal expressions of the Government. (Hear, hear.) Again"We ventured to point out that little good was likely to arise from the multiplication of abstract declarations with reference to the terms of peace." (Ministerial cheers.) I don't dispute the fact, I am only showing now how "venturesome" the Government have been. (General laughter and cheering.) In the next place we "ventured" to suggest to the Government of Germany that it would be conducive to the general welfare if they found themselves in a condition to make known what were the terms of peace which they deemed to be required. This expression "we ventured" occurs throughout the whole of the correspondence, as it is the manner of dealing with the question which is characteristic of the Government. I submit respectfully to the House that it is not the language which Lord Palmerston would have used. (Loud cheers.) Why, this language is unworthy of a great and powerful nation. (Cheers.) In common with many others upon both sides of the House, I am unable to listen to such language patiently. (Hear, hear.) When M. Thiers implored us to show our sense of the long alliance, Lord Granville replied that the Government must judge what was best for themselves, and objected even to an offer of mediation or good offices. Can you conceive such a niggardly policy? (Cheers.) The hon. gentleman concluded by arguing that the uni

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