365 Opinion of the Court. The Secretary has the power to inspect the leased premises and the books and records of the lessee. 25 CFR § 172.25 (1967). The Secretary also has the power to impose such restrictions as to the time for the drilling of wells or the production from any well “as in his judgment may be necessary or proper for the protection of the natural resources of the leased land and in the interests of the Indian lessor." 25 CFR § 172.24 (1967). The lessee must furnish the Secretary with a monthly report disclosing all operations conducted on the lease, 30 CFR §§ 221.60-221.65 (1967), and must pay the royalties to the Secretary who deposits them to the credit of the Indian lessor. 25 CFR §§ 172.14, 172.16 (1967). The lessee agrees to drill wells which the Secretary determines are necessary to protect the leased land from drainage by another well on adjoining property. 30 CFR § 221.21 (1967). Finally, the lessee is obligated to prevent the waste of oil and gas and agrees to pay the Indian lessor the full value of all gas wasted, unless the Secretary determines at the request of the lessee that the waste was sanctioned by state and federal law. 30 CFR §§ 221.18, 221.35 (1967). While the United States has exercised its supervisory authority over oil and gas leases in considerable detail, we find nothing in this regulatory scheme which would preclude petitioners from seeking judicial relief for an alleged violation of the lease. If the Government does determine that there has been waste in violation of a lease, it will of course satisfy its trust obligations by filing the necessary court action. However, there is nothing in the lease or regulations requiring the Indians to seek administrative action from the Government instead of instituting legal proceedings on their own. The existence of the power of the United States to sue upon a violation of the lease no more diminishes the right of the Indian to maintain an action to protect that lease than Opinion of the Court. 390 U.S. the general power of the United States to safeguard an allotment affected the capacity of the Indian to protect that allotment. Furthermore, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is the agency of the Department of the Interior charged with fulfilling the trust obligations of the United States, is faced "with an almost staggering problem in attempting to discharge its trust obligations with respect to thousands upon thousands of scattered Indian allotments. In some cases, the adequate fulfillment of trust responsibilities on these allotments would undoubtedly involve administrative costs running many times the income value of the property." H. R. Rep. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1952). Recognizing these administrative burdens and realizing that the Indian's right to sue should not depend on the good judgment or zeal of a government attorney, the United States has indicated its support of petitioners' position that Indians have a capacity to sue under the oil and gas lease.1 11 The regulations do empower the Secretary to cancel a lease "for good cause upon application of the lessor or lessee, or if at any time the Secretary is satisfied that the provisions of the lease or of any regulations heretofore or hereafter prescribed have been violated." 25 CFR § 172.23 (1967). However, there is no justification for concluding that the severe sanction of cancellation of the lease is the only relief for all breaches of the lease terms or for any failure to pay royalties. Both the lessor and the lessee may wish to resolve their disagreement by the payment of damages and not by the cancellation of a basically satisfactory lease. 11 The Memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae states, at 7: "In sum, respondent's contention that, until the trusteeship is ended, the Indian landowners are disabled from maintaining suit for breach of a lease they have granted of their own property is unsupported in the governing statutes, the implementing regulations, or the terms of the lease." 365 Opinion of the Court. Nor is the capacity of the Indian defeated by § 6 of the lease, which provides that the Secretary may cancel the lease "before restrictions are removed," and concludes, "Provided, That after restrictions are removed the lessor shall have and be entitled to any available remedy in law or equity for breach of this contract by the lessee." 12 There is no warrant for implying by negative inference from this proviso a denial of all remedies otherwise available to the Indian prior to the removal of the federal restrictions on his power to alienate the land. Section 6 merely provides that when the federal restrictions on alienation are terminated, the federal supervision over the lease will likewise come to an end, without impairing the continuing rights of the Indian. Compare 25 CFR § 172.28 (1967).13 Respondent's argument that the judgment in its favor should be sustained on available adequate state pro 12 Section 6 of the lease provides: "6. Cancellation and forfeiture.-When, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, there has been a violation of any of the terms and conditions of this lease before restrictions are removed, the Secretary of the Interior shall have the right at any time after 30 days notice to the lessee, specifying the terms and conditions violated, and after a hearing, if the lessee shall so request within 30 days of receipt of notice, to declare this lease null and void, and the lessor shall then be entitled and authorized to take immediate possession of the land: Provided, That after restrictions are removed the lessor shall have and be entitled to any available remedy in law or equity for breach of this contract by the lessee." 13 The regulation dealing with the removal of restrictions avoids the danger of a negative inference by stating: "Oil and gas leases. . . on land from all of which restrictions against alienation have been or shall be removed, even if such leases contain provisions authorizing supervision by the Department, shall, after such removal of restrictions against alienation, be operated entirely free from such supervision, and the authority and power delegated to the Secretary of the Interior in said leases shall cease. . . ." 25 CFR § 172.28 (1967). Opinion of the Court. 390 U.S. cedural grounds is untenable. Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision rested solely on federal grounds, that court must have either rejected or failed to reach the asserted state grounds. Furthermore, we intimate no view on the merits of the case. If the lessee has conformed to all of the requirements of the federal regulations and has not breached any of the terms of the lease, the suit may fail. We merely hold that the Indian lessors have the capacity to maintain an action seeking damages for the alleged breach of the oil and gas lease. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Syllabus. SIMMONS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 55. Argued January 15, 1968. Decided March 18, 1968. A federally insured savings and loan association (hereafter "the bank") was robbed by two unmasked men. Five bank employees witnessed the robbery, and on the day it occurred gave the FBI written statements. Petitioners, Simmons and Garrett, and another (Andrews) were subsequently indicted for the crime. In the afternoon of the day of the robbery, FBI agents made a warrantless search of Andrews' mother's house and found two suitcases in the basement, one of which contained incriminating items. The next morning FBI agents obtained and (without indicating the progress of the investigation or suggesting who the suspects were) showed separately to each of the five bank employee witnesses some snapshots consisting mostly of group pictures of Andrews, Simmons, and others. Each witness identified pictures of Simmons as one of the robbers. None identified Andrews. Later some of these witnesses viewed indeterminate numbers of pictures and all identified Simmons. Three of the employees identified Garrett as the second robber from other photographs. Before trial Garrett moved to suppress the Government's exhibit of the suitcase containing the incriminating items as having been seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. To establish his standing so to move, Garrett testified that the suitcase was similar to one he had owned and that he owned the clothing found therein. The District Court denied the motion to suppress. Garrett's testimony at the "suppression" hearing was, over his objection, admitted against him at trial. All five bank employee witnesses positively identified Simmons in court as one of the robbers and three identified Garrett, the two others testifying that they did not get a good look at him. The District Court denied a defense request under 18 U. S. C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act) for the production of the photographs shown to the witnesses before trial, the defense apparently claiming that they were incorporated in the written statements, which the Government had made available to the defense. That Act provides that after a witness has testified for the Government in a federal criminal prosecution the Government must, on a defense request, produce |