issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film." (2) The absence of any provision for a prompt judicial decision by the trial court violates the standard that "... the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision . . .

Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court of Illinois and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, agreeing that Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58-59, requires reversal of this case, base their reversal also on Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART bases his concurrence in thi judgment upon Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

390 U.S.

January 29, 1968.

SMITH v. NOBLE DRILLING CORP.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.

No. 648. Decided January 29, 1968.

Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded.

Samuel C. Gainsburgh for petitioner.
W. Ford Reese for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana is granted. The judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for further consideration in light of Billiot v. Sewart Seacraft, Inc., 382 F. 2d 662 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967), and Loffland Brothers Co. v. Huckabee, 373 F. 2d 528 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967).

390 U.S.

January 29, 1968.

GARAFOLO v. UNITED STATES.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 866. Decided January 29, 1968.

Certiorari granted; 385 F. 2d 200, vacated and remanded.

Francis Heisler for petitioner.

Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is vacated. The case is remanded to that court for further consideration in light of Smith v. Illinois, ante, p. 129.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.

Syllabus.

ALBRECHT v. HERALD CO., DBA GLOBE-
DEMOCRAT PUBLISHING CO.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 43. Argued November 9, 1967.-Decided March 4, 1968. Petitioner, an independent newspaper carrier, bought from respondent at wholesale and sold at retail copies of respondent's morning newspaper under an exclusive territory arrangement which was terminable if a carrier exceeded the maximum retail price advertised by respondent. When petitioner exceeded that price, respondent protested to petitioner, and then informed petitioner's subscribers that it would itself deliver the paper at the lower price. Respondent engaged an agency (Milne) to solicit petitioner's customers. About 300 of petitioner's 1200 subscribers switched to direct delivery by respondent. Respondent later turned these customers over, without cost, to another carrier (Kroner), who was aware of respondent's purpose and who knew that he might have to return the route if petitioner discontinued his pricing practice. Respondent told petitioner that he could have his customers back if he adhered to the suggested price. Petitioner filed a treble-damage complaint which, as later amended, charged a combination in restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, between respondent, petitioner's customers, Milne, and Kroner. Petitioner's appointment as carrier was terminated and petitioner sold his route. The jury found for respondent and the trial court denied petitioner's motion for judgment n. o. v., which asserted that the undisputed facts showed as a matter of law a combination to fix a resale price which was per se illegal under United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960), and like cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondent's conduct was wholly unilateral and not in restraint of trade. Held:

1. The uncontroverted facts showed a combination within § 1 of the Sherman Act between respondent, Milne, and Kroner, to force petitioner to conform to respondent's advertised retail price. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra, followed. Pp. 149-150.

2. Since fixing maximum as well as minimum resale prices by agreement or combination is a per se violation of § 1 of the

Act, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was no restraint of trade. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), followed. Pp. 151-153.

3. The Court of Appeals also erred in assuming on the record here that it was necessary to permit respondent to impose a price ceiling to prevent the price gouging made possible by exclusive territories, for neither the existence of exclusive territories nor the dealers' resultant economic power was in issue; and the court was not entitled to assume that the exclusive rights granted by respondent were valid under § 1 of the Act, either alone or in conjunction with a price-fixing scheme. Pp. 153–154.

367 F. 2d 517, reversed and remanded.

Gray L. Dorsey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Donald S. Siegel.

Lon Hocker argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Thomas Newman.

Arthur B. Hanson filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. A jury returned a verdict for respondent in petitioner's suit for treble damages for violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.1 Judgment was entered on the verdict and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 367 F. 2d 517 (1966). The question is whether the denial of petitioner's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Because this case presents important issues under the antitrust laws, we granted certiorari. 386 U. S. 941 (1967).

1 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, in part provides that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal..."