Opinion of the Court. 390 U.S. whether respondent's service area should be characterized as a "peninsula" attached to its main region of service or as a mere "island" surrounded by TVA territory and therefore more properly subject to TVA intrusion. But we can attribute no controlling significance to such characterizations. The most isolated area of private service will necessarily be connected to the private company's main area by at least one power line such as the one present here, and the company may even, as here, serve scattered customers along the line-if indeed the region contains any customers to serve. At the same time a broad area served almost entirely by a private company and contiguous with its main service area may be crisscrossed by the lines of TVA distributors and TVA may even have scattered customers along these lines; the fact that the private company was thus surrounded by TVA might not under this statute justify TVA expansion into the "peninsula" or "island," whatever it may be, served by private power. In the present cases respondent did serve a substantial number of customers in the corridor between the Tazewells and its main service area in Kentucky, but if a "peninsula," it was at best a very narrow and tiny one in relation to the possible patterns of power distribution. TVA, on the other hand, served most of the rural areas in Claiborne County and had a substantial minority of the customers in the Tazewells themselves. Under these circumstances, the TVA Board could properly have concluded that the pattern of electric power distribution would be more sensible and efficient if TVA competed in the entire Tazewell municipal area as well as serving the relatively unprofitable rural customers, many of whom were rather close to respondent's transmission line into the Tazewells. In addition, the Board could have considered the existence of its significant, though not primary, service in the Tazewells themselves as a compelling reason for including these villages in its 1 HARLAN, J., dissenting. "area," since the factors supporting inclusion were in any event significant and since the great disparity of rates in the villages had resulted in significant economic dislocations. Under all these circumstances we cannot say that the conclusion of the TVA Board in the present cases is incompatible with the "area" concept formulated in the Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm that of the District Court. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. These cases present a narrow question of statutory construction, upon which differing views might reasonably be entertained. I cannot, however, agree that the position now adopted by the Court will satisfactorily achieve the purposes evidently sought by Congress in 1959. I therefore respectfully dissent. The scope of judicial review of administrative action is, of course, governed principally by the terms and purposes of the underlying statutory system. Compare generally 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 30.03 (1958); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239; Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 546 et seq. (1965). The purposes of these statutory provisions are uncommonly plain. The Court acknowledges, as it must, that "it is clear and undisputed that protection of private utilities from TVA competition was almost universally regarded as the primary objective of the [service area] limitation." Ante, at 7. The provisions in question were expected to protect private utilities by "defin [ing]" and "limit[ing]" the HARLAN, J., dissenting. 390 U.S. "working arrangement that now exists with respect to" the Authority's service area. S. Rep. No. 470, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8. They were thus intended to constrict the Authority's discretion as to the expansion of its area of service. It is no disparagement of the Authority to recognize that an orderly system of law does not place the enforcement of a restraint upon discretion into the unfettered hands of the party sought to be restrained; surely, therefore, the scope of judicial review of proceedings involving such limitations should be measured generously. The role of the courts should, in particular, be viewed hospitably where, as here, the question sought to be reviewed does not significantly engage the agency's expertise. This is an instance "where the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning of the statutory term," NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F. 2d 583, 591; it may, as Judge Friendly has noted, therefore appropriately be denominated a "question of law." Ibid. It presents issues on which courts, and not the Authority, are relatively more expert. See 4 Davis, supra, at § 30.04. No doubt "economic and engineering aspects," ante, at 9, including topography, may influence the Authority's wish to expand its area of service, but such factors can hardly prescribe the terms or stringency of Congress' prohibitions against expansion. In light of these considerations, I am unable to accept this decision, the effect of which is to restrict severely the scope of judicial review of the Authority's determinations under § 15d (a). The Court forbids reviewing courts to set aside such determinations unless they lack "reasonable support," and then discovers such support here in the most minimal evidence.' At bottom, the support 1 It should be noted that the agency determination upon which the Court places so much weight was reached at a "special meeting" of the Board of Directors on August 26, 1964, more than eight 1 HARLAN, J., dissenting. 2 adduced for this determination by the Court consists of two facts: first, the Authority's distributor served on July 1, 1957, eight customers in New Tazewell and 20 customers in Tazewell; and second, at least some of the other residents of the two municipalities quite understandably would prefer to pay the lower rates for electrical power charged by the Authority. If these facts illustrate the "reasonable support" demanded by the Court, Congress' stringent limitation upon the Authority has proved extraordinarily fragile.* months after respondent filed its complaint, and only three weeks before trial. One of the staff memoranda upon which the determination was based refers specifically to this litigation. One might have supposed that a determination which was made post litem motam warranted at least cautious treatment. 2 The Court's choice of descriptive phrase is noteworthy. The Court suggests that the Authority's distributor served "a substantial minority" of the customers in the two Tazewells. The District Court found, in fact, that on July 1, 1957, respondent served 95.3% of those customers. 237 F. Supp. 502, 513. The Court intimates darkly that "economic dislocations" have occurred. The pertinent evidence appears to consist at bottom of allegations that housing and other forms of economic development tend to locate in areas in which the Authority's less expensive electrical power is available. Surely the Court does not suppose that Congress in 1959 was unaware that the Authority's electrical power is relatively inexpensive, or that it did not recognize that those who reside outside the Authority's service area would find it economically desirable to have that area extended so as to include themselves. It is pertinent to note that neither of the two staff memoranda upon which the Authority's belated determination was explicitly based included among the "facts which appear to be relevant" (Memorandum from the Manager of Power to the General Manager, Tennessee Valley Authority, August 25, 1964, 2 Transcript of Record 801) any references to "economic and engineering aspects" (ante, at 9), or even to any "economic dislocations" (ante, at 13). Whatever the relevance of these factors in the eyes of the Court, the Authority's staff appears to have thought them immaterial. The determination itself does not, of course, refer to these factors. HARLAN, J., dissenting. 390 U.S. Neither the statute nor the pertinent legislative history provides any formula for the precise measurement of the Authority's service area. However, given Congress' clear purpose to restrict stringently the expansion of the area served by the Authority on July 1, 1957, I think that the emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the number of customers served on that date by respondent and the Authority offers the basis of a sensible and practical standard. Certainly Congress did not wish or expect that, as this Court now holds, the question should be left largely, if not entirely, in the hands of the Authority. I would therefore affirm the judgment below for the reasons given in Judge O'Sullivan's opinion for the Court of Appeals, 375 F. 2d 403, supplemented by the considerations discussed in this opinion. |