PARITY OF NATIONS AT CONCLUSION OF TREATY

Mr. FRENCH. Mr. Secretary, before we take up the question of increase of the Navy, there are a few matters that I believe we should consider further with you. Turning for a moment to the 5-5-3 program, may we understand this: First, that it is accepted as a principle that the establishments of the several countries, as finally left at the conclusion of the treaty, with the arrangements for the scrapping of certain ships, the attainment of replacements, the attainment of certain defined tonnage of a defined character in aircraft carriers, and with the carrying out of the agreement touching the size or tonnage of cruisers, and the different stipulations touching the size of guns, the nations at that time would be the parity of 5-5-3?

Secretary WILBUR. AS I understand it, the treaty was based upon the theory that the tonnage of battleships remaining, coupled with those to be completed and with the scrapping program, would place the nations substantially on a 5-5-3 basis in capital ships; and that the construction of aircraft carriers, as provided for in the treaty, would also put the nations on a 5-5-3 basis with reference to aircraft carriers; that no provision was made in the treaty for the limitation of construction of submarines. destroyers, or destroyer leaders, or light cruisers; and that the nations, however much their plenipotentiaries considered the matter, could not or did not agree upon that question, or, rather, upon the question of what the limitation on those arms of the service should be.

Mr. TABER. Or upon the ratio?

Secretary WILBUR. Yes, sir; or upon the ratio with reference thereto; the only limitation being as to the size of the light cruisers and the character of their armament, the guns not to exceed 8 inches.

FIGHTING STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. BYRNES. As to the limitation of armament agreement, do you believe that that agreement, as finally ratified, left the United States with a navy equal in fighting strength to that of Great Britain, without our putting into effect the modernization program which the department has urged? In other words, without that modernization program, have we a navy equal in fighting strength, in so far as capital ships are concerned, with that of Great Britain? Secretary WILBUR. I can not give a direct answer to that question for this reason: In the first place, in determining the relative strength of the two fleets, you must either adopt the practical method, which, of course, would be impossible of actual conflict, or adopt some scale for measuring the relative values of the two fleets. Now, the scale adopted by the plenipotentiaries for the conference was the tonnage scale having some regard to the age of the ships, with change in tonnage ratio to follow the addition of certain new construction which was provided for. I think I can answer your question more definitely by two statements:

First, as I understand it, the question of modernization was not considered as an element in determining the treaty ratio, but, as I pointed out in my statement to-day, the treaty clearly contemplates

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the modernization of capital ships by all of the signatory powers by the addition of underwater protection and deck protection, which was expressly provided for in the treaty. It is obvious that if we do not do that work, and the others do, or if they had it done before hand, and we should refrain from doing it, our ships would be inferior. How far that inferiority would affect us in actual combat it would be very difficult to determine. The other point is quite a different one, and that is, the question of the light cruisers. We accepted inferiority in light cruisers at the time the treaty was put into effect. We knew, of course, that England had more of that type than we had. The only way that we can get the number she has, or the equivalent of them, would be by new construction. Therefore, for the time being, we have accepted inferiority in that branch of the service. Of course, we knew, although the ratio does not indicate it, that we also had great superiority in submarines and in destroyers. Whether anybody else ever figured out the relative weights of those factors, I do not know, but, as I pointed out in my stateiment to-day, I think it would depend altogether on where the corflict or combat took place, and the circumstances of it. Our destroyers would be available along our coast and our submarines would be helpful here as against attacks, and in that way give us an advantage, but, so far as the treaty is concerned, it did not deal with that subject.

Mr. BYRNES. I know that the treaty dealt only with tonnage: but what I was asking for was an expression of opinion by yourself. based upon such information as you have, as to whether, or not, under the provisions of the treaty, the 18 battleships that we retained were equal in fighting strength, or as fighting units of the Navy, to the battleships retained by Great Britain under the treaty. Secretary WILBUR. You mean, for instance, the day after the treaty was signed? Mr. BYRNES. Yes.

Secretary WILBUR. I have not given that any consideration. Mr. BYRNES. I want an expression of opinion by yourself, as the Secretary of the Navy, as to whether, or not, we were left with capital ships equal in strength to those of Great Britain; and, if we were, whether there is any change now, or whether we still have capital ships equal in fighting strength to those of Great Britain.

Secretary WILBUR. I have not given consideration to the question of whether, or not, if we had had a combat immediately after the treaty was signed, between the units of our fleet that we had left and those that the other powers had left, we would have had superiority as to Japan and parity as to Great Britain.

Mr. BYRNES. Having charge of the naval defense, what will you say to-day as to whether or not our capital ships are equal in strength, as fighting units, with the capital ships of Great Britain?

Secretary WILBUR. In answering that, we must assume that the British ships are up to the standard, and we have no information that they are not, and our program for modernization is based upon the fact that that is essential to maintain our position, or our relative position, with reference to Great Britain. I can answer you by giving you my opinion, but I am not sure that it would be fair to give just a broad general off-hand statement, because I could

not back it up with figures. It is a more or less technical question. But I never have had any doubt that the ships retained by us under the treaty were substantially equal in fighting ability to those of Great Britain, and that the issue of battle would depend upon the skill of the personnel. You ask for my personal opinion, and that is my opinion.

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FLEET EFFECTIVENESS INCREASED BY MODERNIZATION

Mr. BYRNES. In your opinion, Mr. Secretary, what is the argument there in favor of the modernization program?

Secretary WILBUR. The argument in favor of the modernization program is a very simple one, I think. In the first place, the treaty recognized that the older ships of the various navies were not prepared to resist the torpedoes as they had been developed; were not prepared to resist the effect of a high-explosive bomb dropped from an airplane; and that the changes in range-that is to say, the fighting of battles at greater range-have made the deck of a ship a target as well as the side, due to the plunging fire at long ranges, of 40 degrees; and therefore the treaty, recognizing that these older ships were not efficient units, provided for that type of modernization. You have an old ship that can be sunk, we will say, by a 400pound T. N. T. charge of a modern torpedo. You know that by certain under-water construction you c can keep her afloat after she is struck. Now, as a fighting unit, the ship, if she stays up, is just as good without the protection as with it; but the chance of hits in

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battle by torpedoes from destroyers, from submarines, and from other battleships, is so great that it involves a hazard which ought not to be taken without all possible protection, and unquestionably the ship which has that protection is a better ship than one that has not.

Mr. BYRNES. Then, Mr. Secretary, if our ships are equal in strength to-day, after we complete this modernization program, unless Great Britain should make some improvement that would offset it, our capital ships will then be superior as fighting units to the capital ships of Great Britain?

Secretary WILBUR. I would not want to say that; and I do not know exactly what you have in your mind.

Mr. BYRNES. I mean to say, if the modernization program is going to increase the effectiveness of the fleet as a fighting fleet, then if to-day the fleet is equal in effectiveness to that of Great Britain, and if we improve the effectiveness of the American fleet, the American fleet will then be superior.

Secretary WILBUR. Well, I am willing to accept that as a mathematical statement.

Mr. BYRNES. Do you say that that is a fact, or do you say that to-day our fleet is not as effective as that of Great Britain and it is necessary to complete this modernization program in order to make it as effective? Which is the fact?

Secretary WILBUR. I think a fair and straightforward answer to your question is that we do think in the department that it is essential that we have this modernization in order that our fleet shall be equal to that of Great Britain.

Mr. BYRNES. I have always understood that that was the attitude of the department; and I have understood that you contended that to-day, in the absence of this modernization program, the fleet is not equal in effectiveness to the fleet of Great Britain. That is the reason I was asking you the question. If, as I understood you to say a while ago, it is equal in effectiveness as a fighting unit, then when we complete the modernization program we will have a superior fleet, will we not?

Secretary WILBUR. Of course I know we are all lawyers, and I know how those things can be turned. I think I was answering you first as to the ships at the conclusion of the treaty.

Mr. BYRNES. Yes; but the question of blisters entered into it. Secretary WILBUR. I could not tell you offhand whether all the English ships have blisters on them or not. That was an improvement that was begun during the war. I suppose we have that data and can probably furnish it to you.

Mr. FRENCH. Rather must we not assume that the battleships were of approximately balanced capacity at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, and that to continue to be in such shape our ships must be kept in first-class condition, assuming that the other nations will be doing the same thing?

Secretary WILBUR. Exactly.

Mr. FRENCH. Then that leads up to the recommendations that you have made touching the battleships that have to do with the modernization program. One is that you would have certain of the ships strengthened as to their deck protection; second, you would have certain of them strengthened by affording blister protection: third, you would have six of them made more efficient by substituting either new coal burners or new oil burners. Does that represent the situation?

Secretary WILBUR. I think so.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SHIPS RETAINED BY TREATY AGREEMENT

Mr. FRENCH. And, assuming that Great Britain is keeping her battleships in first-class condition, we would need to follow this program to keep ours in first-class condition?

Secretary WILBUR. Exactly.

I want to say this in answer to Mr. Byrnes's question. Perhaps it would be more nearly an answer to what he asked me than I have heretofore said. Personally, and after a discussion with a good many officers in the department and other officials of the Government, I have absolutely no sympathy with the claim that we were outgeneraled in that limitation of armaments treaty. The fact is that we got exactly what we proposed, and I am perfectly willing to accept the judgment of those who participated in that treaty that the battleship strength at the conclusion of the treaty and of the scrapping was substantially in the ratio stated in the treaty.

Mr. BYRNES. And when you say that do you take into consideration all elements-range of guns, speed, and other things besides tonnage or do you base it solely on tonnage?

Secretary WILBUR. Well, I have not analyzed the statement. My own belief is that the question of the range of the guns was not con