Probably I should observe that experience growing out of the shaping of a good many appropriation bills indicates that those who are charged with the expenditure of the appropriations see the subject in which they are interested from a magnified point of view, and the Committee on Appropriations must coordinate the recommendations made by the particular bureau or department with the recommendations that are made by other bureaus or departments, with a view to the total expenditures of the Government. In view of this fact, the committee is oftentimes compelled to take action that does not coincide with the ideas of the particular departments concerned. It would seem that this is a bill following very closely along the lines of the current appropriation act, and that we probably shall be able to expedite the hearings to some extent. Even so, it is thought that the hearings, while as brief as they may reasonably be, ought to, after all, be rather encyclopaedic touching the different matters that will be presented in the bill, and, especially, all matters that are different from the matters considered last year. This morning we have with us the Secretary of the Navy, and we shall ask the Secretary to make a general statement to the committee, either offhand or following a prepared statement, as may in his judgment seem desirable. We will be glad to hear from you now, Mr. Secretary. GENERAL STATEMENT OF SECRETARY WILBUR Secretary WILBUR. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee, we have with us this morning the new Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Theodore Douglas Robinson, who has already been introduced to you. It is my idea at this point to take a more direct personal charge of matters pertaining to legislation than heretofore, and to cooperate with the others handling naval problems to the utmost of my ability. I appreciate what the chairman has said with regard to the subject. I might add to that the fact, which you know, of course, that the various amounts asked for by the different bureaus were first considered in the department by our own budget officer and then presented by him to the Secretary's council, composed of the Secretary of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the chiefs of all bureaus. The determinations of the Secretary thus arrived at were then submitted to the Budget Bureau, and, after we received tentative figures from the Budget Bureau there was a reapportionment of the total amounts by the Secretary and his council and the result, with our suggestion for additional appropriations was again submitted to the Budget Bureau, at which time the chiefs of the Navy Department bureaus appeared before the Budget Bureau and explained the wants of their respective departments. Pursuant to that course of action, the amount in the proposed bill, $289,783,978, was fixed. In addition to that total, an item of $4,500,000 as an authorization without appropriation for the building of aircraft, was approved by the Budget Bureau to be presented to Congress. I have here my typewritten statement prepared in response to the request of your chairman, which I will read if you desire. Mr. FRENCH. I think that will be an admirable plan. STATE OF THE NAVY-PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL OFFICER PERSONNEL Officers are the framework upon which the Navy rests. War-time expansion beyond a proper physical expression of their experience and knowledge in the units of the naval organization would impair its efficiency or disorganize it The success of the Navy in the late war may be attributed in large measure to the fact that the physical expansion did not exceed too far the availables of trained officers; this without prejudice to the splendid material from the reserves and from the country. The existing authorized line officer total represents a minimum figure for adequate naval peace preparation, and the reductions which have occurred in enlisted strength could be faced, although with misgiving, because the framework of officer personnel that could undertake training was left intact. Distribution of officer personnel in any year is made with the view of training the commissioned and enlisted strengths of the Navy and reserve, and at the same time, of maintaining the material in operating readiness. The department is confronted with unusual reduction of officer personnel by resignation and retirement. A high percentage of officers is necessary in submarines and aviation. The need for training of naval reserves and for adequate war college and technical training for regular officers, together with the demands of the force operating plan, enlisted schools, the production, inspection and supply of material, and naval administration makes a demand on officer personnel which is insistent. The department at all times has difficulty in adequately meeting these needs for officer personnel. The extreme difficulty of this problem is more readily realized when it is understood that nearly two-thirds of the present line personnel have entered the Navy since 1917. With the material stabilized by treaty the line officer situation should improve yearly as the large number of young officers in the lower grades acquires operating experience. The department considers the need for staff officers has been well net, and few or any increases will be needed in view of the curtailment of building and general reduction of work in the shore establishment. ENLISTED PERSONNEL Last year the General Board recommended a total enlisted personnel of 120,000 men for the fiscal year 1925. The General Board considers that for 1926 this number should be 126,000. The increase is due primarily to allowances for the crews of the Saratoga and Lexington, an increase of fleet aviation, and minor adjustments in the complements of ships they consider should be in commission or in reserve. The object of the General Board's recommendation is to determine yearly the enlisted strength which they think is necessary to hold the fleet in a reasonable state of readiness for war. The General Board's numbers permit (a) every battleship, every modern cruiser, 10 in number, and 152 destroyers to be fully manned; (b) every serviceable submarine to be fully manned; and (c) all other modern vessels of the Navy to be manned with greatly reduced crews, but still with enough men to maintain the vessels in readiness for quick mobilization; (d) a suitable complement of aviation personnel for training and for operations afloat as a part of the active fleet. The department had hoped in preparing the budget for 1926 that there would be provided at least sufficient funds to average 89,000 men during that fiscal year in order to provide for increases contemplated for the new carriers and for aviation and to initiate a policy of gradually bringing the enlisted strength closer into adjustment with the recommendations of the General Board. The Budget allotment sent to Congress for "Pay of the Navy" is based upon the assumption that it will provide funds to pay 86,000 men. I might say in passing that it will be necessary for Congress to increase the authorized expenditures res for the two aircraft carriers before they can be completed, and an act of Congress for that purpose will be presented. The limit fixed by the legislation already in force will not permit the completion of them. The general status of enlisted personnel is very satisfactory. The Navy is stablized at the allowed enlisted strength, the percentage of reenlistments is high, the losses from preventable causes have been materially reduced, selective recruiting measures have been instituted insuring the high-class recruit, men are being trained in increasing numbers to carry on the many duties of the Navy. The number of desertions for the first four months of the fiscal year 1925 was reduced over 17 per cent as compared with the records of the first four months of 1924. Mr. FRENCH. Mr. Secretary, would you like to make a general statement touching that situation? It is very encouraging, and we will go into it more fully later on, but would you care to make a general statement in regard to it now? DESERTIONS Secretary WILBUR. The feeling of the department is that increased care in the selection of men has had a great deal to do with decreasing the number of desertions that is to say, the more attention that is paid to their mentality, the better the situation will be as to desertion. We are now enlisting them at older ages. There has been an effort by those in charge of the recruiting and handling of the men to reduce the percentage of those who might desert. I might say that I personally visited all the naval prisons, with the exception of the one at Charleston, S. C., with a view of ascertaining, if I could, some of the causes of desertions. In visiting the prisons, I took the rather novel course of addressing the men, without however offering any hope of release from confinement. I said to them that I would be glad to get a statement from them concerning the reasons for their enlistment and desertion, and I spoke of it only as influencing the future development of the Navy, although I had in mind the possibility that we might be able to release some of the men who showed particularly noteworthy cases for lenient treatment. We have already released some of those men, partly on account of facts then stated, but more because of a reexamination of their records on file. The response of the prisoners was rather surprisingly good. I asked all of them to write at least a page of foolscap stating why they joined the Navy and a second page stating why they left the Navy, believing that if this statement was made without any previous knowledge on their part of what was expected of them, and without any opportunity of thinking it over beforehand, that under the impulse of writing a whole page they would probably tell a pretty complete and truthful story. I think that it appears from an examination of those papers by Captain Gherardi, who was with me, and Admiral Latimer we have secured a truthful and clear statement from them regarding their attitude, which will be helpful to us in the solution of the problem. We will continue the studies along that line, not only because of the effect on the Navy but also because of the effect on the men who are in prison or who have been dishonorably discharged. I believe that some improvement can be made there. However, speaking as a man who has come to the Navy from civil life and who has been interested in that line of work as a judge and who has had an apportunity for a close-up inspection of the naval method of administering justice, I will say that I have been very much pleased with the method of administering justice in the Navy to-day. I think the naval prisons are very well conducted indeed, and that the men who leave there ought to be better men than when they entered, because of having undergone a system of discipline which is esse essential to the welfare of the Navy itself. The problem of naval discipline is, of course, somewhat differentiated from the problem of enforcement of law generally, due to the fact that the men in the Navy constitute a comparatively small group, who are quickly informed concerning what is done with the men who are charged with offenses, and are able to watch more closely the carrying out of sentences imposed upon them than is possible for the general public in the administration of criminal law. That factor is one which requires very careful consideration, and has been given such consideration by those in charge of naval discipline. Admiral Latimer, who is here, was with me in these inspections, and he is primarily charged with the administration of justice in the Navy. As far as I could discern, there was very little resentment on the part of the men in prison, although we occasionally had complaints of injustice. I may say also that very few gave as a reason for desertion any dissatisfaction with the Navy. Of course, some did. Those statements have been classified and will be available for the committee, if desired, at any time. Mr. FRENCH. The members of the committee are, of course, interested, as you are, in this problem, and a little later on, in the proper place in the hearings, we wish to hear more in detail on this subject. Secretary WILBUR. Except for one feature, that of the high percentage of first enlistment men and the consequent shortage of trained petty officers in certain ratings, the personnel situation could hardly be better at this time considering our relatively short enlistment. There are still about 1,900 fewer petty officers in the Navy than are required to man properly the fleet and the shore establish ment. To illustrate the relation I consider the skill, stability, and permanence of personnel of an organization bears to its success I quote you remarks, recently made in New York by the president of the Westinghouse Co., showing what he thinks of the men of his organization and their relative value as compared with material. If you burned up all our buildings and broke up all our electrical machinery and threw it into the river, we could repair the loss within a year or two and be as well off as before. But if anything happened to destroy this organization of men, built up in the course of a quarter of a century, there would be no way of replacing it, and the company would not survive the loss. APPROPRIATION FOR PAY OF ENLISTED MEN The estimates for the appropriation "Pay, Navy," which provides for the pay and allowance of personnel as presented to Congress have been subject to reduction in the past few years. It is hoped that the amount appropriated by Congress will be sufficient for the allowed number of men. If it ever should occur that sufficient money was not appropriated in any year for "Pay, Navy," I would be faced with the necessity of reducing the enlisted total and restricting the promotion of the Neither course would be conducive to good spirit or contentment, and I would regret, when the enlisted personnel situation had been stabilized by hard and consistent work, to be compelled to place it in a state of confusion, and disappoint the men recruited with the hope that the Navy offered a chance for a career. men. On the 30th of September, 1924, the personnel consisted of 8,148 officers and 86,189 men. These numbers are insufficient to maintain all the first-line vessels of the Navy in commission. On September 1 a total of 171 destroyers, 8 light mine layers, and 11 submarines, all of the first line, were out of commission, primarily for lack of funds and personnel to man them. In addition a large number of second-line vessels and auxiliaries of all classes were similarly out of commission. Mr. FRENCH. Mr. Secretary, I noticed in the report of Admiral Eberle a paragraph of about 2 inches that listed the vessels of all kinds that you expect to have in commission next year; that is, 1926. Would it break the continuity of your statement if at this point you would insert that or any corrected list, showing the vessels that will be in commission? Secretary WILBUR. We will be glad to do that. It is as follows: Proposed operating force plan of seagoing forces, fiscal year 1926 Mr. FRENCH. Mr. Secretary, having in mind the general statement that you made touching the number of officers and enlisted men and the number of ships of the different types that you expect to have out of commission during the fiscal year 1926, the committee does not understand that you are here recommending a program of |