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an action for refusal to carry;' whether by wagon, ship, lighter, barge, or towboat, or a ferry, or a bridge;2 as an innkeeper for failure to receive applicants as guests,' but not to receive them as boarders or lodgers.' A water-supply company is in the same class; and a public or common irrigation company; and a gas-supply company; and a lighting company; or a light and power company; but a lighting company is not obliged to keep appliances for the possible service of a former customer who has discontinued to be a patron, having adopted a new public method of lighting; 10 but a telephone company cannot refuse to install a telephone where the apparatus of a rival company is installed." And warehousemen are obliged to receive goods and at a reasonable charge.12

Those private employments which by their nature are prope ly subject to limitations in the public interest are not subject to regulation by rules of common law, but must be and may be, within constitutional limitations, dealt with specifically by statute. This is the

1 Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341.

Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. & K. 61; Bussey v. Mississippi Valley Transportation Co., 24 La. Ann. 165; but see The Neaffie, 1 Abb. C. C. 465; Pate v. Henry, 5 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 101; Thompson v. Matthews, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 212.

• Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 2134.

Lamond v. The Gordon Hotels, Limited, 1897, 1 Q. B. 541.

Haugen v. Albina Light and Water Co., 21 Ore. 411.

Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 65 Pac. Rep. 332.
Portland Natural Gas and Oil Co. v. State, 135 Ind. 54.

Fleming v. Montgomery Light Co., 100 Ala. 657.

• Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 57 Oh. St. 336.

10 Williams v. Mutual Gas Co., 50 Am. Rep. 266, 52 Mich. 499; Fleming v. Montgomery Light Co., 100 Ala. 657.

"State v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 61 S. C. 83.

12 Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East, 257; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

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basis of necessity of the police power. It may be exercised over the businesses of physicians;1 plumbers; bread bakers; milk dealers; brewers; imitators of dairy products; employers of labor, especially that of women and children.'

"The principle seems to be that when a few persons are engaged in an extensive business, and they have a multitude of customers or dependent employees, and it appears that the business is of such a character that the parties do not deal upon an equal footing, and that the many are at the disadvantage of the few, the legislature may regulate these occupations, with a view to prevent fraud, oppression, or undue advantage. Familiar illustrations are contracts for the loan of money, for transportation of persons and freight, for insurance of life and property, for the manufacture and sale of artificial butter and lard, for measuring and inspecting lumber, grain, tobacco, flour, etc."8

§ 137. PERSONS EXERCISING

PUBLIC EMPLOY

MENT MUST SERVE ADEQUATELY ALL WHO APPLY. While there is an obligation upon those engaged in a public employment to serve all who apply to them,9

1 Richardson v. State, 47 Ark. 562; Iowa College v. Schrader, 87 Ia. 659; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84; but see Rex v. Master and Wardens of the Company of Surgeons in London, 2 Burrow, 891.

Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464.

3 Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137.
State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402.

Boston Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25.
People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 380.

' Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383; Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431.

State v. Peel Splint Coal Company, 36 W. Va. 802.

9 Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Shower, 327.

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an exception may be made if it is reasonable and necessary to promote the objects of the public employment, as to exclude from steamboats the agents of a competing line,' to give preference in accommodations on a stage coach to through passengers, to exclude stowaways, drunken or insane persons, or persons of bad character if they have not been admitted and the fare accepted. A railroad may exclude women from men's cars if suitable separate accommodations are provided for women

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The peculiar mode in which express companies perform their service does not exempt them from any of the obligations of common carriers, and a railroad company may delegate all its express business to one company, and a railroad may regulate the use of station grounds consistently with public use by licensing certain transfer, cab, or restaurant.companies,' but a telephone company may not restrict the use of its service to certain telegraph or messenger companies. A gas-supply company is not obliged to supply several meters to one consumer, and a sleeping-car company 1 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221.

2 Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481. 3 Pearson v. Duane, 4 Wall. 605.

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Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; see for a statute properly requiring separate accommodations for white and colored passengers, Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 132 U. S. 587.

5 Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124.

The Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1; but see McDuffee v. Portland and Rochester Railroad, 52 N. H. 430.

' Old Colony Railroad v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35; Kates v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Companies, 107 Ga. 636; Fluker v. Georgia R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 461.

People v. Hudson River Telephone Co., 19 Abb. N. C. 466; Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. B. & O. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399.

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• Ferguson v. Met. Gas Light Company, 37 How. Pr. 189.

is not liable for exclusion of a passenger by servants of the railroad company.1 A gas company cannot be compelled to furnish gas to one against whom the company has an unpaid judgment for former service in supplying gas, but a telephone company must furnish a telephone to one who has reasonably refused to pay for defective service;3 yet the possession of a railroad ticket will not protect a passenger from exclusion if he declines to present it, nor an expired special low-rate ticket on a regular train, and the regulation requiring cash fares on a railroad to be accompanied by a ten cent deposit returnable at a ticket office is reasonable." But a passenger may not be excluded without liability to an action where the railroad provided no reasonable opportunity for purchasing a ticket.?

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A person exercising a public employment must perform the services required in his calling adequately; liability attaches for failure to serve, for inadequate service, and for negligence in performing the service. But there is no obligation to provide special facilities, as a selected room, at an inn, with candles, so that the guest may sit up all night, or a special type of extension telephone,1o but adequate lighting must be made

1 Lawrence v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 144 Mass. I.
People v. Manhattan Gas Light Co., 45 Barb. 136.
State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126.
State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. Law, 309.

• Pennington v. Philadelphia W. & B. R. R. Co., 62 Md. 95.
Reese v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 131 Pa. 422.

Forsee v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad, 63 Miss. 66.

8 Anonymous, Y. B. 22 Lib. Assis., pl. 41; Bremner v. Williams, I C. & P. 414; Louisville, etc., v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 435; Searles v. Mann Boudoir Co., 45 Fed. 330.

Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269.

10 Gardner v. Providence Telephone Co., 50 Atl. Rep. 1014.

by a railroad of stations and restaurants to be used in the course of transportation even if located on private property and operated as a private enterprise,' and the railroad is liable for violence and insults by its servants, but not for acts of strangers in stations,3 nor for violence on a train brought by a passenger upon himself. The nature of certain traffic requires that it be given a preference, and a carrier is liable for damages resulting from non-compliance with this requirement; so of special space and accommodations, and for damages occasioned by an unnecessary deviation by a boat from the regular direct course."

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§ 138. THE COMMON LAW PROHIBITS UNJUST

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DISCRIMINATION. - Facilities cannot be so withheld as to produce an unjust or avoidable discrimination as to places, but "railroad companies, in the absence of statutory provisions limiting and restricting their powers, are vested with a very broad discretion in the matter of locating, constructing, and operating their railways, and of locating and maintaining their freight and passenger stations. This discretion, however, is not absolute, but is subject to the condition that it must be exercised in good faith, and with a due regard

1 Peniston v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 34 La. Ann. 77. Craker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wisc. 657.

3 Batton v. S. & N. Ala. R. R. Co., 77 Ala. 591.

Pounder v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 1892, 1 Q. B. 385.
Tierny v. N. Y. Central, etc., Co., 76 N. Y. 305.

Coupland v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 61 Conn. 531.

7 Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716.

Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Pearson v. Duane, 4 Wall. 605; Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester Railroad, 52 N. H. 430.

Ballentine v. North Missouri R. R. Co., 40 Mo. 491; Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co., 71 Wisc. 372.

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