Resort to this bulwark of self-government is not had to preserve self-government but to cover assumptions of power by the State to regulate commerce, contracts, and personal rights guaranteed by the national government. Resort by the States to the police power in such cases is a waiver of control of these subjects upon any other ground.

"The police power embraces the protection of the lives, health, and property of citizens, the maintenance of good order, and preservation of good morals."1

This is not control of commerce.

"Commerce with foreign countries and among the States strictly considered, consists in 'intercourse' and 'traffic,' including in these terms, navigation and the commerce. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. A statute of a State regulating the delivery of telegrams in a foreign State cannot be defended on that ground, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347; but a statute to prevent "ticket-scalping" has been upheld, Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552; and a license-tax on telegraph poles and wires has been sustained as a return for police supervision. W. U. Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419; Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Phila., 190 U. S. 385: but not so of a requirement of a regular place of business for foreign corporations within the State and an officer upon whom process may be served, N. O. & M. Packet Co. v. James, 32 Fed. 21; and the failure to comply with such requirements is not a basis for enjoining business in a State, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mass., 125 U. S. 530. "Things which are so deleterious or injurious to the lives and health of the people as to lose all benefits of protection as articles or things of commerce, or to be able to claim it only in a modified way, are properly subject to the police power of the State." Bradley, J., in The License Cases (5 How. 504) citing Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; and in the absence of Congressional regulations local railway regulations protecting life and health are valid. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 482.

1 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27.

transportation of persons and property as well as purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. " 1

The police power is not a privilege of the State, but a duty imposed upon the State in behalf of the people.

"The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the will of the people of the State authoritatively expressed, in relation to the continuance of such business in their midst. The supervision of public morals is continuing in its nature, and is to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment require. "2

"The police power of regulating the operation of railways to conserve the public safety is inherent in the State, and cannot be irrevocably contracted away." "

3

"If a charter contains any provisions within the police power of the State, from which the legislature is not at liberty to part, the legislature may at will revoke the power."

$43. THE POLICE POWER CANNOT BE USED ΤΟ DEFEAT THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY NATIONAL LAW.-The most interesting exposition of the police power and the most closely concerning the control of the rights of citizens by a State, was given in the Slaughter House Cases. The court was divided five to four, and four dissenting opinions were

1 Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238.

2 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 517; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25; Toledo, etc. Ry. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37.

3 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kans. 573; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87.

Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Charles River

Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.

Crescent City, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 83 U. S. 36.

given. The decision of the Court given by Mr. Justice Miller is perhaps the most inconclusive ever handed down by the United States Supreme Court. As the dissenting opinions showed, the decision reduced itself to absurdity.

An abstract of the decision follows:

"The charter of the Slaughter-House Company, a corporation created by a statute of Louisiana, contained among other exclusive privileges, the right to establish and maintain stockyards and landing places and slaughterhouses for the city of New Orleans, at which all stock must be landed and all animals intended for food slaughtered. This grant of privilege guarded by proper limitations of the prices to be charged, and imposing the duty of providing ample convenience with permission to all owners of stock to land, and to all butchers to slaughter at those places, was a police regulation for the health and comfort of the people, the statute locating them where health and comfort required, within the power of the State Legislatures unaffected by the Constitution of the United States."

In the elaborate opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, the right of the State to pass such an act is based solely upon the "police power" of the State. The decision. is not conclusive of anything but the very narrow question decided, and not very conclusive of that, as is shown by the admission to which the judges were forced in order to establish this small point.

The action, it is to be noticed, was not brought by an individual or a corporation domiciled in another State, incorporated for the purposes of the Louisiana corporation.' Bearing upon this are parts of the opinion:

1 On the right of a corporation to act in other States, see Bateman v. Service, 6 App. Cases, 386; Bank of Augusta v. Earle,

"The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.

"It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of the State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.” 1

13 Pet. 519; Tombigbee Ry. v. Kneeland, 4 How. 16; Am. Waterworks v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 73 Fed. 956; Oregonian Ry. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 Fed. 277, 280; Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64; Webster v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 6 Idaho, 312; Frazier v. Willcox, 4 Rob. (La.) 517, 532; Life Association of America v. Levy, 33 La. Ann. 1203; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214; Williams v. Creswell, 51 Miss. 817; Taylor v. Alliance Trust Co., 71 Miss. 694; Blair v. Perpetual Ins. Co., 10 Mo. 559; Ferguson v. Siden, 111 Mo. 208; Curtis v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202; Moulin v. Trenton M. L. & F. Insurance Co., 25 N. J. L. 57; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Newburg Petroleum Co. v. Weare, 27 Oh. St. 343; Second Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 35 Oh. St. 158; Kerchner v. Gettys, 18 S. C. 521; Lytle v. Custead, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 490; Less v. Ghio, 92 Tex. 651; Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Bashford. 97 N. W. 940; Can. Pac. Ry. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 17 Can. 151; Bank v. Pindall, 2 Rand. (Va.) 465; Clarke v. Central Bkg. Co., 50 Fed. 338; Seamans v. Temple & Co., 105 Mich. 400; Van Steuben v. C. R. R. of N. J., 178 Pa. 367; Colwell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 356; Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Ill. 206; Carroll v. E. St. L., 67 Ill. 568; U. S. Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 Ill. 142; State v. N. O. Warehouse Co., 109 La. 64; Enterprise Brewing Co. v. Grimes, 173 Mass. 252; Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283; Rees v. Bk., 5 Rand (Va.)

Slaughter House Case, 83 U. S. 36.

But there is another citizenship,' a consideration of which obliterates the distinction between that citizenship to which one is born and that which can be changed almost as readily as the mind or the coat, that is, citizenship of another State. There are always the forty-four States against the one, and the citizens of the forty-four against the one State, and they are all citizens of the Union. No one who had this important consideration in mind could have approved the Slaughter House Cases, for the police power can only go to the extent of preserving peace, health, and comfort within the State, and it applies to any citizen or corporation of any one of the States, not only as citizens of the Union, but as citizens of the States, and it has no possible application to privileges and immunities and the rights of citizens.

A Kentucky case decides that a municipal ordinance discriminating against the residents of other States in respect to a license for commercial privileges is unconstitutional as a discrimination against citizens of other States, although the same discrimination is made against the residents of the State outside of such municipality. Fechheimer v. Louisville, 84 Ky. 306. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of United States Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2, giving citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the Several States. Phil. Fire Assoc. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pa., 125 U. S. 181; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121; Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 410; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 108 Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S., 10 Wall. 566; Ward v. Md., 12 Wall. 430; N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Pa., 136 U. S. 118. But corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Minneapolis &. St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205: Minneapolis & St. R. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210: Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394; Gulf C. & S. R. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155.