Good bill brings up a subject which we have never considered. I do not know whether that is good or otherwise. You gentlemen should have a very good knowledge on that subject. In section 7 of the Good bill there is a requirement for holding hearings in "each section" of the country. Those words are a little too definite. I think it might make trouble to have a requirement for them to hold hearings in "each section," and I think a broader construction there, that they should hold public hearings in "different sections" of the country, would probably be wiser. Mr. NEEDHAM. They can do that without any authority being given, can they not? Mr. COBB. Yes; but it might be desirable to put in some words showing that they were required to give public hearings, in order that the public might feel that they were to be in touch with the commission. But I think a provision that they shall hold them in "each section" would be very hampering. Now, I want to say a word about the other bill. I think the provision in section 4 of the Lenroot bill in regard to the summoning of witnesses is a very interesting compromise of a very difficult question, and one which would appeal, I think, to every man-both in the Senate and in the House-who has a bill before Congress, as solving a great point of difference. As to section 5 of the Lenroot bill, it may be a desirable provision to have, but it seems to me to be out of the province of a tariff commission bill. That is the section providing that the commission shall investigate and find out any firms, copartnerships, and so forth, which are cooperating by agreement to hold up prices, and so forth. It seems to me that this section encroaches on the province of the antitrust laws and goes into a field that is distinctly being covered by the Department of Commerce and Labor; and while it might be that Congress or the Executive would call on the commission for a report on such matters, it seems to me that to require this duty of the commission would be rather unwise-that is to say, it seems to us that this section really is not germane to the bill, although its intent that such examinations should be made by the Government is good. As to the salaries, one bill provides for $7,500 and the other $10,000. That is a matter of detail for you gentlemen, and the question of the amount of the appropriation is a matter as to which we should not want to express an opinion that is to say, whether $250,000 or $200,000 or $300,000 should be appropriated. In closing, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to say just one word again as to the public sentiment and feeling on this subject, and the importance of it. I think that the action asked of you can do no harm. The creation of a tariff commission can do no harm, and it certainly will tend to allay a feeling of unrest which exists throughout this country to-day. I have been over the country probably more than any other man in connection with this subject. I am in touch all the time with these different boards of trade and chambers of commerce, and I know that there is an earnest and a widespread desire on the part of the people of this country that this should be tried, and I hope you gentlemen, even if you don't feel the confidence we do, that it will accomplish the results we expect, will look at it not from that point of view, but from the point of view that we come to you and ask for it. Can it do any harm? Will it upset things? Will it be a serious disturbing factor? That is to say, if you will look at it from the standpoint that there is a general widespread desire for a tariff commission, even if you do not feel it is going to do everything we think, if you feel it is not going to do any serious harm we ask you to give it a trial. I thank you very much, gentlemen. The CHAIRMAN. Does any gentlemen of the committee desire to ask Mr. Good any questions? Mr. GOOD. If no one has any questions to ask, I have nothing further to say. The CHAIRMAN. Then we will hear Mr. Lenroot. STATEMENT OF HON. IRVINE L. LENROOT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN. Mr. LENROOT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, as the committee is aware, there are two bills pending before it, one known as the Good bill and the bill introduced by me. I want to say, in the first place, that in introducing the bill I have it has not been in any spirit of hostility toward Mr. Good's bill. I should be very glad to vote for it if it should be reported by this committee. I should be very glad to vote for any bill reported by this committee that contains what seems to me three fundamental elements: A permanent tariff commission, ample powers of investigation, and the duty to report to Congress its findings of fact. But in reference to Mr. Good's bill and my own I would like to very briefly call attention to some of the differences in the two bills. I will say first that the bill I have introduced is not original with me. It is rather a composite of all the bills that have been introduced in Congress touching a tariff commission and consists of, what seem to me, to be the best features of each. The first difference or distinction between Mr. Good's bill and this bill is in the term of office of the commission. Mr. Cobb, I think, has covered the ground completely as to why it would be desirable that the tenure of office should be 10 years. This commission, if it is to be of value to Congress and the country, should be permanent, both as to the creation of the commission itself and to a very large degree in its membership. It should not be subject to frequent change. In both bills the commissioners are to be appointed by the Fresident. This forenoon several suggestions were made that if we had a commission at all it should be appointed by Congress, or by the lower House of Congress. It seems to me that it must be apparent that we could not expect to have commissioners qualified to the same extent appointed or selected by 391 members of Congress as would be commissioners selected by one man, the President of the United States. I think it must be apparent that other considerations, to some extent at least, would prevail in the selection of the members of that commission than mere fitness to perform the duties imposed under the law; and so I think, without any question, if we have a tariff commission at all it ought to be appointed by the President. Now, one distinction between the two bills with reference to the appointment of the commission is this: The bill I have introduced provides that but three members of the commission shall belong to the same political party. I want to say very frankly that I do not believe any commission that can be created can be or will be a nonpartisan commission or that the members of that commission will not have decided views upon the theories of protection or free trade, or a tariff for revenue only. But so far as the duties imposed upon this commission are concerned, it seems to me it can make no difference whether they be epublicans or whether they be Democrats; for their only powers are to ascertain facts and those facts are necessary in the making of any tariff bill, whether that bill shall be made by Democrats upon the theory of a tariff for revenue only, or by epublicans upon the protective theory; for in either case you must have, if you are to apply your theory, the very information that is sought to be derived by this bill. Mr. HARRISON. Right in that line, Mr. Lenroot, of what particular interest would it be to a party devoted to reducing the tariff to make it one for revenue only, to ascertain the cost of production abroad, which seems to be one of the principal things here? Mr. LENROOT. I will be very glad to answer that question. If you are making a Democratic tariff bill, whether a given rate shall be a revenue rate or not depends wholly upon the question of the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad. The very maximum of a revenue rate is the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad; and if you apply a higher rate than that maximum you have not a revenue rate at all. You have not even a protective rate. You have a prohibitive rate. Mr. HARRISON. That is, counting in the cost of transportation. Mr. LENROOT. All of those elements, of course, come into consideration; certainly. Mr. FORDNEY. What di Terence would it make whether it is high or low, if you put it on tea and coffee? Those are articles that must be imported. Mr. LENROOT. I am speaking of things that are produced in this country. Mr. LONGWORTH. You are speaking of things produced in competi tion. Mr. LENROOT. Yes, sir; so that it seems to me clear, upon the Democratic theory, that you must have this information or you can not apply intelligently a tariff rate to any article that is produced in this country in competition with an article produced abroad. Mr. HARRISON. The practical fact whether an article comes in through the customhouse in conformity with our custom laws is of primary importance. Mr. LENROOT. But we have many articles that have not come in because of a prohibitive rate. Mr. HARRISON. Precisely. Mr. LENROOT. And you might consider that if you had the power to reduce that rate; but if you did not make sufficient reduction and it was still a prohibitive rate, you would not have tariff for revenue only. It would still be a prohibitive rate, and would not be even a protective rate. Mr. FORDNEY. For the purpose of revenue would you lower the duty, then, to encourage the importation of foreign articles, far enough to interfere with the industry in this country? Mr. LENROOт. I would not. Mr. FORDNEY. Then you would not get revenue from it. Mr. LENROOT. I would not for that purpose, so far as revenue is concerned. Whenever you apply the Republican doctrine of tariff, covering the difference in production at home and abroad, you get some revenue, because it does allow some competition. The Republicans do not believe in a prohibitive tariff upon any article, as I understand it. Mr. FORDNEY. I would. [Laughter.] I do not think that is the theory of the Republican platform. Mr. LONGWORTH. That is the first chance you have had to say that. Mr. FORDNEY. Yes. Mr. LENROOT. With reference to the first section, the qualifications of these different commissioners, I think Mr. Cobb's criticism of one of the qualifications contained in the bill that I have introduced is very well taken, and that is that one should be a representative of labor. I thoroughly agree with him that if the qualifications are to be imposed, it should rather be designated as one who has knowledge of and is familiar with those conditions. With reference to the qualifications generally, I think that we would get a more expert commission if Congress did lay down certain qualifications. It seems to me that Congress is better qualified than the Presidentthat this committee would be better qualified than the President-to determine just what kind, in a broad way, of experts are best fitted for this work; and so I think that is entitled to very serious consideration by your committee, as to whether or not the qualifications should not be laid down. One of the most important differences in the two bills, and really the meat of both bills, will be found in the sections directing the tariff commission to ascertain the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad, and the different provisions in both bills upon that subject. The distinction between the bill I have introduced and Mr. Good's bill might well be compared to the difference between the general verdict of a jury and a special verdict. I believe that in the findings of this commission, Congress should have those findings in detail upon all of the different phases of investigation that it makes, rather than general conclusions of the tariff commission; and, as has already been said, there is in Mr. Good's bill a discretion in the commission as to how broad its investigations shall extend, the language being "so far as the same may be necessary or helpful to Congress.' I do not believe that that should be left to the commission to determine. I think Congress in this bill should determine the scope of the investigation of this commission, and then if this commission shall report facts broader than are necessary in applying tariff rates, Congress may, of course, exclude that part of the commission's findings; but if anything be omitted or if the findings of the commission be open to the charge that they have not considered this thing or that thing that Congress or your committee might decide ought to have been considered, then the findings of the commission become largely valueless in reference to that particular thing, because if one material element be omitted by the commission in its investigation, then, of course, its findings upon other elements going to the general conclusion can not be as beneficial as if you had all of the information before you. Mr. LONGWORTH. In your bill, as I understand it, in case any individual, corporation, or firm should refuse, after request by this commission, to produce any books or papers there is no direct penalty? Mr. LENROOT. No, sir. Mr. LONGWORTH. For such refusal, but merely a report of their names? Mr. LENROOT. Yes, sir. Mr. LONGWORTH. To Congress, by the commission? Mr. LENROOT. Yes, sir. I would say in that connection that I think as a legal proposition-I have been looking it up somewhat, but have not completed the investigation that I wanted to make of it-there is some question as to the power of the commission to go into a factory in a State engaged only in domestic production-not in interstate commerce or importing and compel the production of the books and papers of that factory; and so I think the same thing would be accomplished in the provision that is contained in my bill-the publicity of their refusal, and the report of the article as to which the refusal is made—and if the tariff commission can ascertain no facts from any manufacturer in this country with reference to that particular article, then the presumption ought to be, in making tariff rate upon that article, against them rather than for them, with reference to applying a particular rate. Mr. HARRISON. I think I observe a difference between your bill and that of Mr. Good's in the body or person to whom the reports of the commission shall be made. This seems to require it to report to Congress, and the other bill seems to make it its duty to report either to the President or to the Congress. Mr. LENROOT. Yes, sir. In the bill, as I introduced it, it was my thought that this commission should be wholly an aid to Congress. Mr. HARRISON. Have you in the bill any provision for the direction of this commission? Mr. LENROOT. Yes, sir; in this way only; that either House of Congress may call upon the commission for special reports at any time. Mr. HARRISON. I beg your pardon. As I read it, it says they may demand a report of all testimony and information upon which its reports are based. Mr. LENROOT. I beg your pardon. The amendment that we talked over this morning, and that I said I would be very glad to urge before the committee, provides for Congress calling for special reports at any time that Congress may deem advisable, which would give Congress control and direction of the commission. Mr. HARRISON. It does not give the Executive any direction as to which schedules of the tariff shall be investigated? Mr. LENROOT. It does not; and I want to say with reference to section 6 of the printed bill that it has in it the words "and recommendations." I want to say that that never should have been there. One of the original drafts of the bill did contemplate recommendations by the commission. The final draft did not; and my stenographer, instead of getting the final draft of section 6, got a previous one. And so, in the clause "that said commission shall make annual reports to Congress of its investigations and recommendations," etc., those words "and recommendations" should be stricken out. I do not believe that this commission should |