become, in law, the end lines, and the end lines become the side lines.
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 683.
2. In an action, brought under the provisions of Rev. Stat. §§ 2324, 2325,
by an adverse claimant to a part of a mineral claim as located, the
plaintiff alleged a priority of location, and rested his right to recover
upon it. The defendant answered, but subsequently and before judg-
ment withdrew his answer, and amended his application for a patent
so as to exclude the tract in controversy. At the trial the defendant
did not appear, but the plaintiff introduced evidence, oral and docu-
mentary. The court made a finding of fact that the tract in contro-
versy had already been located by the plaintiff as a part of his mining
claim when the defendant located his claim upon it, and that, conse-
quently, it was not subject to location by the defendant. Upon that
finding it was adjudged that, by reason of the laws and premises, the
plaintiff was the owner of the disputed tract, that he was entitled to
the possession of it, and that he recover possession of it from the
defendant. Held, (1) That it appeared by the record that the court
had in that case passed upon and determined the question of priority
of location, and upon such determination had given judgment in favor
of the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant's withdrawal of his answer
did not operate to take the complaint out of the case, or the allega-
tions of fact contained in it, or to prevent a judicial determination of
those facts; (3) that the abandonment of his claim by the defendant
did not take the jurisdiction for the settlement of the question out of
the hands of the court, or restore it to the Land Department; (4) that
the judgment of the court was in all respects regular; was conclusive
as to the particular ground in controversy; and was binding by way
of estoppel as to every fact necessarily determined by it, including the
question of priority of location. Ib.
3. In view of the conclusions reached, it is not necessary to consider what
extra-territorial rights (if any) exist when a vein enters at an end
line, and passes out at a side line. Ib.
A note whose payment is guaranteed by a national bank is a liability of
the bank which is required by law (Rev. Stat. § 5211) to be shown in
the report to the Comptroller of the Currency. Cochran and Sayre v.
United States, 286.
Ambiguous or too forcible expressions in a charge may be explained or
qualified by other parts of it, and if the charge does not, as a whole,
work injustice to the party objecting, the use of such expressions will
not be cause for granting a new trial. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad
Co. v. Mackey, 72.
1. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 4887 respecting a "patent granted for an
invention which has been previously patented in a foreign country"
refers to foreign patents granted previously to the issue of letters
patent for the same invention by the United States, and not to
foreign patents granted previously to the application for the Ameri-
can letters. Bate Refrigerating Company v. Sulzberger, 1.
2. When such foreign letters issue before the United States letters issue,
the American patent is so limited as to expire at the same time with
the foreign patent having the shortest terin, but in no case is it to be
in force more than seventeen years.
3. One who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to
sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles,
unrestricted in time or place. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Com-
pany, 659.
4. Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before the
court and upon which it expresses no opinion. Ib.
5. The complainants were assignees, for the State of Massachusetts, of
certain letters patent granted to one Welch, for an improvement in
wardrobe bedsteads. The Welch Folding Bed Company owned the
patent rights for the State of Michigan. The defendants purchased a
carload of said beds from the Welch Folding Bed Company, at Grand
Rapids, Michigan, for the purpose of selling them in Massachusetts,
and afterwards sold them there and were still engaged in selling such
beds in Boston. Held, that the defendants having purchased the
patented articles in Michigan from the assignee of the patent for the
territory included in that State, had a right to sell them anywhere
within the United States, including Massachusetts, where the patent
rights had been assigned to another assignee. Ib.
6. The previous cases bearing on this point considered and reviewed. Ib.
In March, 1878, P. contracted to carry the mails three times a week for
four years on route 36,107, commencing July 1, 1878, and entered on
the performance of his contract. On the 5th day of the following
December, in consequence of false and fraudulent sworn statements
made by him concerning the number of horses and men that would
be required to expedite the service by reducing the time, a large addi-
tional compensation was allowed him by the Postmaster General for
that purpose. On the 13th of the same December he sublet his con-
tract to S. with the consent of the Department, and the service was
from that time performed by S. Further increased allowances, based
on like fraudulent statements by P., were made in January and July,
1879, and assented to by P. and S. The amount so fraudulently
received during the term of service was $99,556.20. The govern-
ment sued P. and S. to recover back that sum. In the first count the
above facts were set forth and it was alleged that the false statements
were designed to mislead and did mislead the Post Office Department.
A second count was for money had and received. A third count set
forth the same facts and averred that the money had been paid in
mistake of fact, and had been received contrary to the provisions of
Rev. Stat. § 3961. No process was served upon P., and he did not
appear. S. appeared and demurred, and the demurrer was sustained.
Each was cited in the writ of error, and service acknowledged by the
attorney for both. Held, (1) That the statements regarding the
"horses and men" required for the expedited service came within
the statement as to "stock and carriers" required therefor, as pro-
vided in Rev. Stat. § 3961; (2) that P. and S. were bound by these
statements and were estopped from asserting that it was not intended
thereby to bring the contract within the statute; (3) that the
demurrer admitted the fact that the increase had been allowed on
the basis of the false representation; (4) that the court below erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the third count; (5) that the de-
fendants having each participated in the transaction, were properly
sued jointly; (6) that the demurrer should have been overruled.
United States v. Piatt and Salisbury, 113.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 10, 11, 12, 13.
1. The plaintiff's declaration claimed $10,000. He obtained a judgment in
the trial court for $8000. The appellate court affirmed this judgment,
and ordered that he recover "as in his declaration claimed." Held,
that these words did not have the effect of increasing the sum actually
recovered in the special term, and that the inaccuracy was not sufficient
ground for reversal. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 72.
2. A request made to the court by each 'party to instruct the jury to ren-
der a verdict in his favor, is not equivalent to the submission of the
case to the court without the intervention of a jury, within the intent
of Rev. Stat. §§ 649, 700. Beuttell v. Magone, 154.
3. When each party asks the court to instruct a verdict in his favor, it is
equivalent to a request for a finding of facts, and if the court directs
the jury to find a verdict for one of them, both are concluded on the
finding of facts. Ib.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 20;
JURISDICTION, B, 1;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
WRIT OF Error, 2.
PREFERENCES.
See CORPORATION.
1. In view of the treaties between the United States and the Osage Indians,
and the laws affecting their lands, enacted prior to December 15, 1880,
it must be held that the lands which were, by the act of that date, 21
Stat. 311, directed to be opened for entry under the homestead laws,
were lands within the abandoned Fort Dodge military reservation,
subject to disposition under general laws relating to "other public
lands," and not lands of an exceptional class, that were affected with
a trust established for the benefit of Indians by treaty. Frost v.
Wenie, 46.
2. The Commissioner of the General Land Office may direct the proper
local land officer to hear and pass upon charges of fraud in the final
proof of a preemption claim upon which the requisite cash entry has
been paid, and has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the local
land officer in respect thereof; and the Secretary of the Interior has
jurisdiction to review such judgment of the Commissioner, and to
order such an entry, shown to be fraudulent, to be cancelled. Orchard
v. Alexander, 372.
1. Knowledge of a defect in a car brake cannot be imputed to the employé
charged with keeping it in order, when he has had no opportunity to
see it.
Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 72.
2. A railroad company, receiving the cars of other companies to be hauled
in its trains, is bound to inspect such cars before putting them in its
trains, and is responsible to its employés for injuries inflicted upon
them in consequence of defects in such cars which might have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection before admitting them to a
train. Ib.
3. In an action by an executor of a deceased person against a railroad
company to recover damages for the killing of the intestate, an em-
ployé of the company, brought under the act of February 17, 1885,
c. 126, 23 Stat. 307, which provides that "the damages recovered in
such action shall not be appropriated to the payment of the debts or
liabilities of such deceased person, but shall inure to the benefit of his
or her family, and be distributed, according to the provisions of the
statute of distributions," it is not error to charge the jury that in esti-
mating damages they may take into consideration the age of the de-
ceased, his health and strength, his capacity to earn money as-disclosed
by the evidence, his family, who they are and what they consist of,
and from all the facts and all the circumstances make up their minds
how much the family would probably lose by his death. Ib.
4. A bridge carpenter, employed by a railroad company, who is injured
through the negligence of employés of the company while assisting in
loading lumber, taken from an old bridge, on a car for transportation
over the road, is an employé of the company within the meaning of
§ 93. c. 23, of the General Statutes of Kansas which makes a railroad
company in that State liable to its employés for damage done them
through the negligence of its agents or the mismanagement of its
employés. Chicago, Kansas & Western Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 209.
5. The Pennsylvania Company notified the Wabash Company that after
a date named no ticket sold by that company would be recognized as
entitling the holder to pass over the Pennsylvania road. The Wabash
Company after that date sold a ticket for a passage over the Pennsyl-
vania road. When the purchaser reached that road he offered his
ticket to the conductor. The conductor refused to take it, and, when
the holder of it declined to pay his fare, caused him to be put off the
train. Held, That the refusal to recognize the ticket was within the
right of the Pennsylvania Company, and that that closed the matter,
as between the two companies in respect of the unauthorized sale;
but that the ejection from the train was done by the Pennsylvania
Company on its own responsibility, and was not made legally neces-
sary by anything done by the Wabash Company which the Pennsyl-
vania Company was bound to recognize or respect. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co., 225.
REASONABLE DOUBT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 17.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has not the power to appoint a
receiver of property already in the possession of a receiver duly and
previously appointed by a state court, and cannot rightfully take the
property out of the hands of the receiver so appointed by the state
court. Shields v. Coleman, 168.
2. The mere forcible continuance of possession wrongfully acquired by the
Federal court does not transform that which was in the first instance
wrongful, into a rightful possession. Ib.
When a defendant in a state court removes the cause to a Circuit Court of
the United States on the ground of diverse citizenship, and the Cir-
cuit Court gives judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff below
brings the case here, and it appears, on examining the record, that the
pleadings do not disclose of what State the plaintiff was a citizen, this
court will of its own motion reverse the judgment, remand the cause
to the Circuit Court, with costs against the defendant in error, and
further adjudge that defendant must also pay costs in this court.
Neel v. Pennsylvania, 153.
SMUGGLING.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 18;
WITNESS, 2.
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