1. A statement that a steamship, in the harbor of New York, with no
fog, meeting a tug with a tow, starboards after receiving two whistles
from the tug and subsequently ports and attempts to pass between
the tug and her tow, is grossly improbable. The Ludvig Holberg, 60.
2. A steamship, running in a fog at dead slow and coming in contact with
a tug, cannot be held responsible simply because, a few minutes before
the collision, she had been running full speed. Ib.
3. A steamer running in a fog is not obliged to stop at the first signal
heard by her unless its proximity be such as to indicate immediate
danger. lb.
4. The remarks of the court in The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 698, held not
to apply to this case. Ib.
5. The findings show that the tug was in fault in failing to send three
blasts of whistle, in quick succession. 1b.
6. When, in a collision case, uncontradicted testimony establishes fault
on the part of one vessel, the mere raising a doubt touching the con-
-duct of the other will not overcome its effect.
7. For reasons stated in the opinion, the court regrets that the tug could
not be brought into this case, and it affirms the decree of the court
below. Ib.
8. In every contract for the carriage of goods by sea, unless otherwise
expressly stipulated, there is a warranty on the part of the shipowner
that the ship is seaworthy at the time of beginning her voyage, and
not merely that he does not know her to be unseaworthy, or that he
has used his best efforts to make her seaworthy; and this being so,
his undertaking is not discharged because the want of fitness is the
result of latent defects. The Caledonia, 124.
9. A bill of lading whereby a steamship owner undertakes to deliver live
cattle at a foreign port, loss or damage from delays, steam boilers
and machinery or defects therein excepted, does not exempt him from
liability under such warranty for injury happening to the cattle
through an unexpected prolongation of the voyage, in consequence
of a breaking of the shaft caused by a latent defect in it, which
existed before and at the commencement of the voyage. Ib.
10. Exceptions in a bill of lading are to be construed most strongly
VOL. CLVII-45
against the shipowner; and when they form, in the contract, part of
long enumerations of excepted causes of damage, all the rest of which
relate to matters subsequent to the beginning of the voyage, they
must be treated as equally limited in their scope. Ib.
11. As between the shipper and the shipowner, the bill of lading only can
be considered as the contract. Ib.
AMENDMENT.
See WRIT OF Error, 1.
An appeal will not lie from an order of a Circuit Judge at chambers.
Lambert v. Barrett, 697.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
United States v. Piatt and Salisbury, 157 U. S. 113, followed. United States
v. Salisbury, 121.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 17;
JURISDICTION, B, 7, 10;
STATUTE, A, 2.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, distinguished from this case. Bal-
timore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 72.
CONSPIRACY.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 10.
1. The act of the legislature of Louisiana of July 12, 1888, No. 133,
authorizing the enforcement by mandamus without a jury of con-
tracts by corporations with municipal corporations in that State with
reference to the paving, grading, repairing, etc., of streets, highways,
bridges, etc., simply gives an additional remedy to the party entitled to
the performance, without impairing any substantial right of the other
party; does not impair the obligation of the contract sought to be
enforced; and is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States. New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Co. v. Louisiana ex rel.
New Orleans, 219.
2. The denial by a state court of an application to amend a petition for
the removal of the cause to a Federal court is not the denial of a right
secured by the Constitution of the United States. Stevens' Admiņis-
trator v. Nichols, 370.
3. In the cases referred to in the opinion of the court in this case, begin-
ning with Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, (February Term, 1796,)
and ending with Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, (October
Term, 1880,) taxes on land are conceded to be direct taxes, and in
none of them is it determined that a tax on rent or income derived
from land is not a tax on land. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Company, 429.
4. A tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax, within the
meaning of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States.
5. A tax upon income derived from the interest of bonds issued by a
municipal corporation is a tax upon the power of the State and its
instrumentalities to borrow money, and is consequently repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
6. So much of the act "to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the
government, and for other purposes," 28 Stat. 509, c. 349, as provides
for levying taxes upon rents or income derived from real estate, or
from the interest on municipal bonds, is repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States and is invalid. Ib.
7. Upon each of the other questions argued at the bar, to wit: 1, Whether
the void provision as to rents and income from real estate invalidates
the whole act? 2, Whether as to the income from personal property
as such, the act is unconstitutional as laying direct taxes? 3, Whether
any part of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for
want of uniformity on either of the grounds suggested? the justices
who heard the argument are equally divided, and, therefore, no opin-
ion is expressed. Ib.
8. When a prisoner is indicted in a state court for murder, it is for the
courts of the State to decide whether the indictment sufficiently
charges that crime in the first degree. Bergemann v. Backer, 655.
9. In view of the decisions by the highest court of New Jersey, referred
to in the opinion, declaring the meaning and scope of the statutes of
that State under which the accused was-prosecuted, it cannot be held
that he was proceeded against under an indictment based upon stat-
utes denying to him the equal protection of the laws, or that were
inconsistent with due process of law, as prescribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Ib.
In June, 1887, the Pullman Car Company of Chicago wrote to the Metro-
politan Street Railway Company of Kansas City, proposing to build
for it 25 cable cars according to specifications attached, and to deliver
them free on board at Pullman Junction in Illinois, the cars to be
inspected and accepted at the Pullman works, and to be paid for on
delivery, the written acceptance of the railway company to constitute
a contract mutually binding. Nothing was said about brakes, except
that they were to be operated by gripmen with lever, both trucks.
The railway company accepted in writing. The details of construc-
tion were then considered and agreed upon between the two com-
panies. Nothing further was said about brakes except that the
railway company required them to be heavy and extra powerful.
Brakes were then designed by the car company, but no designs of
them were furnished to the railway company. When 12 cars were
finished, but before any had been delivered, the agent of the railway
company went, at the request of the car company, to the shops of the
latter in Illinois, and there made a thorough examination of the 12
cars, working the brakes and carefully watching their operation. He
expressed himself entirely satisfied with them, and ordered the others
to be finished in the same way, and all to be forwarded. This was
done in five shipments between February 24 and March 30, 1888.
Before the last shipment was made the railway company, on the 23d of
March, tried the cars and found that the brakes would not work sat-
isfactorily. They notified the car company at once, and it sent its
engineer to Kansas City. When he left Kansas City he claimed that
he had remedied the trouble. On the 5th of April the car company
presented its bill for payment. On the 11th the railway company
declined to pay it unless the brakes were first made right, and asked
the car company to send a man to make the necessary changes, add-
ing that if this were not done it would make the changes itself and
charge the car company with the expense of them. The car com-
pany did send a man, who worked upon the brakes for some time,
but without remedying the difficulty. On the 12th of May the rail-
way company declined to accept the cars, and so notified the car
company. It stored the 25 cars in Kansas City, and ordered a supply
of cars elsewhere. The car company thereupon sued the railway
company, to recover the contract price for the cars. Held, (1) That
the title to the first 12 cars passed to the railway company when its
agent inspected and accepted them at the shops of the car company;
(2) that the title to the remainder passed to the railway company
when they were put on cars at Pullman Junction, to be forwarded to
that company; (3) that under the circumstances the most that the
railway company could claim was the reasonable cost of obtaining
new brakes adapted for use on the cars constructed under the con-
tract. Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Metropolitan Street Railway
Company, 94.
See POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT.
1. A corporation, acting in good faith and without any purpose of de-
frauding its creditors, but with the sole object of continuing a busi-
ness which promises to be successful, may give a mortgage to directors
who have lent their credit to it, in order to induce a continuance of
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