Opinion of the Court.

defendant goes upon the stand before you and he makes his statement; tells his story. Above all things, in a case of this kind you are to see whether that statement is corroborated substantially and reliably by the proven facts; if so, it is strengthened to the extent of its corroboration. If it is not strengthened in that way, you are to weigh it by its own inherent truthfulness, its own inherent proving power that may belong to it.'

"11th. It was error to give the following charge: 'The court charges you that in case of circumstantial evidence motive on the part of the defendant is an important element to be by the jury considered, and where the evidence clearly shows that the defendant had no motive to do the killing, when it is not certain he did the killing, then they may look to such absence of motive for the killing in finding their verdict. The court has already told you that the absence or presence of motive is not a necessary requisite to enable you to find the guilt of a party, because it is frequently impossible for the government or accusing power to find a motive; it is impossible for the jury to find it; it is so hidden, it is so trifling, it is so insignificant that it is apt to be overlooked from its very hidden character, its very hidden nature; it is something often that is so unfathomable that it cannot be found. Do not understand that by the giving of this instruction that proof showing the existence of motive is any requisite to enable you to find the defendant guilty.""

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitney for defendants in

error.

No appearance for plaintiff in error.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The assignments of error question the correctness of the instructions given to the jury, first, on the subject of a constructive, as distinguished from an actual, presence at the

Opinion of the Court.

scene of the murder; secondly, as to the effect to be given to the absence of proof of motive; and, thirdly, as to the weight to be attached to the testimony of the defendant in his own behalf.

Although the indictment charged Johnson with actual presence and participation in the felonious act, yet the evidence. disclosed that the fatal wound was inflicted by Woodard, and that Johnson, though near by, did not show himself till after the murder had been accomplished. This state of facts rendered it proper for the court to instruct the jury as to the legal effect of such evidence. This it did, at some length, with illustrations drawn from well-known cases. We are unable to see any misstatement of the law in the instructions given in this respect.

There was nothing in the evidence disclosing previous hostility to the deceased on the part of Johnson, or any reason or motive for the murderous attack. Thereupon the defendant's counsel asked an instruction that where the evidence shows that the defendant did not commit the actual killing, and when it is uncertain whether he did participate in it, then the jury may regard the absence of any proof of motive for the killing in finding their verdict. This instruction the court gave, but added to it the observation that the absence or presence of motive is not a necessary requisite to enable the jury to find the guilt of a party, because it is frequently impossible for the government to find a motive.

In thus qualifying the instruction the learned judge committed no error. The jury were, in effect, told that they had right to consider the absence of any proof of motive, but that such proof was not essential to enable them to convict.

Complaint is made of the instruction as to the weight to be given to the defendant's personal testimony. That instruction was in the following terms: "The defendant goes upon the stand before you and he makes his statement; tells his story. Above all things in a case of this kind you are to see whether that statement is corroborated substantially and reliably by the proven facts; if so, it is strengthened to the extent of its corroboration. If it is not strengthened in that way you are

Opinion of the Court.

to weigh it by its own inherent truthfulness, its own inherent proving power that may belong to it."

This instruction must be taken in connection with about a page of the charge which immediately preceded it, in which the court laid down certain general rules for weighing the evidence of any witness, naming among them his bearing and conduct in the presence of the jury, his manner in giving his testimony, the character of the story told by him, its harmony or contradiction with other testimony, the opportunities the witness had for knowing the facts of which he testifies, and the motive, by reason of interest or feeling, which may influence him, saying in conclusion that "if the interest is a very great one, if it is a very large one, it is more apt that he would be swayed-it might be unconsciously away from the truth

You are simply to

than if such interest did not confront him. weigh that evidence in connection with the statements of the other witnesses in the case, whether it is the defendant or anybody else." After these general observations follows the particular language which is objected to, but in view of that which preceded, it cannot be said that, by it, the defendant was deprived of any advantage to which he was justly entitled in having his personal statement considered by the jury. If such statement was corroborated by facts otherwise proved it was thereby strengthened; if it was not so corroborated it was still to be considered in and of itself, and in the light of "its own inherent proving power." Reagan v. United States ante, 301.

The learned judge has included in the bill of exceptions the evidence in the case, and we have carefully read it in connection with the portions of the charge and instructions excepted to.

The impression has been made upon us, by our examination of the evidence, that there was room for a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. But the jury that found him guilty saw and heard the witnesses, and we must infer from the conduct of the court in overruling the motion for a new trial that it was satisfied with the verdict; and as we have found no error in the rulings of the court, the judgment in the case is

Affirmed.

Syllabus.

BARDON v. LAND AND RIVER IMPROVEMENT COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.

No. 188. Argued January 18, 1895. Decided March 28, 1895.

Although section 3186 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin may have enlarged the ordinary equitable action to quiet title and remove a cloud, the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in that District, may take jurisdiction of a bill properly brought under its provisions.

A person in possession, claiming under a tax deed, under which he had obtained title, may institute such a suit.

The jurisdiction of a suit so instituted is not affected by the provision in section 1197 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1878 conferring for three years a right of action by the grantee in a tax deed against the owner to bar him and his grantees from claiming the land, nor by the provisions of § 22, c. 138, of the Revised Statutes of 1858.

Questions affecting the validity of a tax deed of real estate in a State must be disposed of in accordance with the interpretation of the statutes of the State by its highest judicial tribunal.

In Wisconsin when a tax deed is in due form and recorded in the proper office, and the lands described therein remain vacant and unoccupied for three years or more after the recording thereof, the tax title claimant is deemed to be in constructive possession, the statute of limitations runs in his favor, and the original owner is barred from attacking the validity of the tax deed.

The introduction of certain evidence by the appellee held not to be a waiver of its right to rely on the statute of limitations.

In considering the acts and proceedings of county boards acting under Rev. Stats. Wis. of 1858, c. 13, § 28, they must be liberally construed. The Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1858 provided that the register of deeds should keep a general index, each page of which should be divided into eight columns, with heads to the respective columns, as follows: "Time of reception. Name of grantor. Name of grantee. Description of land. Name of instrument. Volume and page where recorded. To whom delivered. Fees received;" that such register should make correct entries in said index of every instrument or writing received by him for record, under the respective and appropriate heads, entering the names of the grantors in alphabetical order; and should immediately, upon the receipt of any such instrument or writing for record, enter in the appropriate column and in the order in which it was received the day, hour, and iinute of its reception, and the same should be considered as recorded

Statement of the Case.

at the time so noted. By section 759 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 it is directed that the division shall be into nine columns, the first column being headed: "Number of instrument," and the others as in the act of 1858. In this case the tax deed was entered in the index under the name of Douglas County by which it was issued, although running in the name of the State as well as of the county. The original index had the eight divisions required by the statute, but the fourth column, under the heading "Description" was subdivided as shown in the opinion. This index becoming dilapidated was laid aside, and a new one was prepared under the provisions of the laws of 1860, c. 201, which complied with the provisions of the statute in that respect, and was substituted for the original. Held,

(1) That it was not necessary to insert in the index the name of the State as a grantor;

(2) That taking the page of the original index as a whole, no one could be misled by it who was not wilfully misled, and it was sufficient to set the statute of limitations in operation;

(3) That the new and correct index, having been properly certified to according to law, was from that date as effective as the original; (4) That the appellant could not question the complainant's title on the ground of informality in the original.

THIS was a bill in equity, filed under section 3186 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin, by the Land and River Improvement Company, a corporation of New Jersey, against Thomas Bardon, a citizen of the State of Wisconsin, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin, to have certain conveyances declared void and to quiet the title to the southeast quarter of section 28, township 49 N., range 14 W., in Douglas County, Wisconsin. The section in question is as follows:

"SEC. 3186. Any person having the possession and legal title to land may institute an action against any other person setting up a claim thereto, and if the plaintiff shall be able to substantiate his title to such land, the defendant shall be adjudged to release to the plaintiff all claim thereto, and to pay the costs of such action, unless the defendant shall, by answer, disclaim all title to such land, and give a release thereof to the plaintiff, in which case he shall recover costs, unless the court shall otherwise order. It shall be sufficient to aver in the complaint in such action the nature and extent of the plaintiff's estate in such land, describing it as accurately