Opinion of the Court. v. United States, 154 U. S. 154; Bond v. The People, 39 Illinois, 26; State v. Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71; State v. Curtis, 6 Ired. (Law) 247; State v. Tuller, 34 Connecticut, 280; State v. Morris, 104 N. C. 837. The verdict being general and not special, any words attached to the finding "guilty on the first count" are clearly superfluous and are to be so treated. In Trials per Pais (8th ed. 1766, p. 287) the rule is thus stated: "If the jury give a verdict of the whole issue and of more, . that which is more is surplusage and shall not stay judgment, for 'utile per inutile non vitiatur."" Bishop on Criminal Procedure, p. 623, section 1005 a, is, substantially, to the same effect: "The words being the finding of lay people,' need not be framed under the strict rules of pleading, or after any technical form. Any words which convey the idea to the common understanding will be adequate. And all fair intendments will be made. to support it. To say, therefore, that the defendant is 'guilty,' or guilty of an offence named which is less than the whole alleged, is sufficient, without adding 'as charged in the indictment;' for the latter will be supplied by construction. So, likewise, a general finding of 'guilty' will be interpreted as guilty of all that the indictment well alleges. plusage in a verdict may be rejected, being harmless, the same as in pleading. And the verdict must be construed as a whole, not in separate parts." In Patterson v. United States, 2 Wheat. 221, 225, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Washington, said: "If the jury find the issue and something more, the latter part of the finding will be rejected as surplusage." Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; Armstrong v. The People, 37 Illinois, 459; State v. Yocum, 117 Missouri, 622; Arnold v. State, 51 Georgia, 144; Henry v. Raiman, 25 Penn. St. 354. Sur Reading the verdict, here considered, by the light of these elementary principles, the words "for having in possession. counterfeit minor coin," attached to the words "guilty in the first count," are obviously superfluous, and striking them from the verdict leaves it, in all respects, complete and responsive to the charge. The wisdom and justness of the rule is shown, Opinion of the Court. by applying it to the verdict rendered in this case. The plea made by the defendant having admitted the possession by him of the counterfeit coin, the only issue submitted to the jury was the intent to defraud. To presume that the verdict which found the defendant "guilty under the first count" was predicated on the mere possession without the intent, involves the conclusion that the jury found the defendant guilty, because of the existence of a fact from which it was admitted no guilt could result. To allow the superfluous words which were attached to the finding of guilty to have the effect here claimed for them, would compel us to read the verdict as saying, "We find the defendant guilty because he concedes that he possessed the counterfeit coin, although it is admitted he cannot be guilty from the fact of such possession alone," that is, "We find him guilty although he is not guilty." The record leaves no room for doubt that the words "for having in possession counterfeit minor coin," which were attached to the verdict, were merely words identifying the first count, and were not and could not have been intended to qualify the verdict of guilty. The indictment was endorsed as follows: "Indictment for having in possession counterfeit minor coin; second, attempting to pass same; third, passing the same." The words attached to the verdict are simply those found on the back of the indictment describing the first count, and this fact indicates that the jury affixed them simply as words of description of the first count, and therefore did not intend by their use to qualify in any way the conclusion of guilt expressed in their verdict. Affirmed. In computing the time of service which entitles an officer in the army to longevity pay, service in a volunteer regiment is not service "in the army of the United States" within the meaning of the 15th section of the act of July 5, 1838, c. 162, 5 Stat. 256. THIS was a petition originally filed by Thomas W. Sweeny, brigadier-general on the retired list of the army, to recover the sum of $182.05, charged against him by the United States, as to which amount he was claimed to be in arrears, and paid by him under protest. The petitioner having died after the commencement of the action, the appellee was admitted to prosecute the claim, as administratrix. The case was argued and submitted in May, 1893, and the petition dismissed. Claimant applied for a rehearing, which was granted, and the case again submitted and decided by a majority of the court in her favor. Judgment was thereupon entered in the sum of $182.05, and the court made a finding of facts, of which the following is a summary: On December 3, 1846, Thomas W. Sweeny, appellee's intestate, being at that time a lieutenant in the Second New York Volunteers, was mustered into the military service of the United States, under the act of May 13, 1846, authorizing the President to accept the services of 50,000 volunteers for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States 66 1 This case was commenced in the Court of Claims by a petition in which the plaintiff was styled Sweeny." After his death his administratrix appeared under the same name. In the government's traverse the case was entitled Sweeney v. United States, and under that title went to judgment in the court below. The United States as appellants brought it here under the title of United States v. Sweeney, and under that title it went to judgment here. The name of the appellee is here restored to its original spelling. Statement of the Case. and Mexico. He served in this capacity until March 17, 1848, when, having received a commission as second lieutenant in the Second United States Infantry, he was mustered into the regular service of the United States. Some time after March 3, 1853, five years from the date of his commission in the regular army, he charged for and was paid his first longevity ration for five years' prior service, under the act of July 5, 1838. In September, 1855, he charged, in his voucher for pay, one longevity ration for the period from December 4, 1851, (five years from his muster into the service as a volunteer,) to March 3, 1853, and was paid this item by the paymaster, October 15, 1855. The disbursement of this longevity ration from December 4, 1851, to March 3, 1853, was never approved or allowed by the accounting officers, but was disallowed by them upon the first examination of the paymaster's voucher. The matter was reported by the Secretary of War to the Second Comptroller, who, on July 4, 1856, filed a written opinion to the effect that the time spent in the military service as a volunteer under the act of May 13, 1846, could not be counted in the longevity rations under the act of July 5, 1838. In accordance with this decision, the voucher was disapproved by the Second Auditor and by the Second Comptroller, and the amount charged against Lieutenant Sweeny. On August 31, 1857, he was paid the amount of the second longevity ration from December 3, 1856, to August 31, 1857, and after that date he was successively paid his second ration for the respective months down to February, 1858. But these payments were disallowed in due course by the accounting officers, and the appellee's intestate was again required to refund. In 1892, he was informed that he was in arrears to the United States in the sum of $182.05, which he paid under protest, and subsequently began this suit to recover the amount so paid, upon the ground that he ought to have been credited with longevity rations due on account of his service as a volunteer in the Mexican war, the first two of which rations he had been required to refund, while the last two had never been paid to him. Opinion of the Court. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Dodge and Mr. Charles C. Binney for appellants. Mr. Joseph W. Stryker for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. This case involves the question whether, in computing the time of service which entitles an officer to longevity pay, service in a volunteer regiment is service "in the army of the United States," within the meaning of the act of July 5, 1838, c. 162, 5 Stat. 256, the fifteenth section of which (p. 258) enacts "that every commissioned officer of the line or staff, exclusive of general officers, shall be entitled to receive one additional ration per diem for every five years he may have served or shall serve in the army of the United States." Claimant was an officer of a New York volunteer regiment, and was mustered into the service of the United States December 3, 1846, and so remained until March 17, 1848, during the Mexican war, when he accepted a commission as second lieutenant in the regular army. After serving in the army of the United States five years, he became entitled to the extra ration provided by the act of 1838; and the question is, whether that term of five years began to run from the day he was first mustered into the service as a volunteer, or from the day he received his commission as a lieutenant in the regular army. That the act of 1838 was passed with special reference to the regular army is evident, not only from the fact that there were no volunteers at that time in the service of the United States, but from the title of the act, "To increase the present military establishment of the United States, and for other purposes," and from its numerous provisions, all of which bore upon its manifest purpose to increase and reorganize the regular army. By the act of May 13, 1846, c. 16, 9 Stat. 9, a state of war was recognized to exist between the United States and Mexico, and for the purpose of prosecuting such war to a successful termination, the President was authorized to call for and accept the services of any number of volunteers, |