Opinion of the Court. dutiable as such under the foregoing provisions. The imposition of a different duty on rugs of a particular kind is an exception to the general rule established by the statute. The exception is as "to rugs, screens, covers, hassocks, bedsides, and other portions of carpets and carpetings," which are made to pay the duty imposed on "carpets and carpetings of like character and description." The obvious construction of this language is that which makes the words "other portions of carpets and carpetings" qualify the enumerated articles, and of course if they be thus construed, only rugs made from "portions of carpets and carpetings" would be subject to the exceptional classification. It is urged that this interpretation is erroneous, because the limiting words "other portions of carpets and carpetings" simply qualify the last of the enumerated articles, that is, the word "bedside," and none other. It is self-evident that the qualifying words must be held to relate to some of the items embraced in the enumeration which they qualify. To hold otherwise would be to read them out of the statute. Do they qualify all or one is the question. To hold that they qualify only one of the items of the enumeration is to make that item an exception, and therefore make the statute operate an absurdity. If the qualifying words only apply to "bedsides," then all the other items enumerated, viz., "mats, rugs, screens, covers, and hassocks," are dutiable at the rate imposed on carpets and carpetings of like character and description," although they be not made from "other portions of carpets and carpetings," whilst "bedsides," whatever may be their similarity to "carpets or carpetings," will only be dutiable at the rate of carpets and carpetings if made from pieces of carpets. It cannot be supposed the intention of the statute was to operate this inequality or to work out this unjust result. The articles are all enumerated together, and the manifest purpose is that all of them shall pay a like duty under similar conditions. We cannot violate the express language in order to dissociate things classed together by the law, and thus make one of the class subject to a higher duty than the others, although they be of like character and description. Syllabus. We think the purpose of the statute, plainly conveyed by its text, was to tax carpets as enumerated therein. That the effect of its language and its intent were also to tax rugs, made as rugs, and clearly distinguishable as such, by reason of their process of manufacture, size, shape, pattern, etc., at the duty imposed on rugs, but to tax rugs made from pieces of carpets or carpetings at the rate imposed on the carpet from which they were made, since, although answering the purpose of a rug, they were really carpeting itself, being made from parts or portions thereof. A construction contrary to that which we thus reach having been adopted by the court below, its judgment is Reversed, and the case remanded with directions to grant a new trial. FRISBIE v. UNITED STATES. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. No. 811. Argued and submitted March 4, 1895. Decided March 18, 1895. The omission of the formal indorsement of an indictment as "a true bill," signed by the foreman of the grand jury, is not necessarily and under all circumstances fatal, although it is advisable that the indictment should be endorsed. Such a defect is waived if the objection be not made in the first instance and before trial. Pleading to an indictment admits its genuineness as a record. The provision in the act of June 27, 1890, c. 634, 26 Stat. 182, forbidding an agent, attorney, or other person engaged in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting a claim for a pension under that act from demanding or receiving a greater fee than ten dollars for his services is constitutional. An indictment for violating that provision which describes the defendant as a "lawyer" is sufficient. The offence against that act is committed when a sum greater than ten dollars has been taken, without regard to the fact whether the pension money has or has not been received. When the amount of the excess so taken is unknown to the grand jury, it is proper to allege that fact in the indictment. Statement of the Case. It is unnecessary to aver a demand for the return of the money wrongfully taken. The omission to charge that the offence was "contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the United States "is immaterial. ON June 27, 1890, Congress passed an act, 26 Stat. 182, c. 634, the fourth section of which is as follows: "That no agent, attorney, or other person engaged in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting any claim under the provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, contract for, demand, receive, or retain for such services in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting such claim a sum greater than ten dollars, which sum shall be payable only upon the order of the Commissioner of Pensions, by the pension agent making payment of the pension allowed, and any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section, or who shall wrongfully withhold from a pensioner or claimant the whole or any part of a pension or claim allowed or due such pensioner or claimant under this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall, for each and every such offence, be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned at hard labor not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:" Under this statute an indictment was returned to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the first count of which was as follows: "The grand jurors of the United States of America, duly empannelled and sworn, in and for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in the said Circuit Court, on their oath present that Henry N. Frisbie, late of the Eastern District of Louisiana, lawyer, on the third day of January, A.D. eighteen hundred and ninety-four, at the city of New Orleans, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and within the jurisdiction of this court, then and there being a person engaged in preparing, presenting, and prosecuting a claim for pension upon the said United States entitled 'An act granting pensions to soldiers and sailors who are incapacitated for the performance of manual labor, and providing for pensions to widows, minor VOL. CLVII-11 Opinion of the Court. children, and dependent parents,' approved June 27, 1890, to wit, a claim made by and on behalf of one Julia Johnson, under the said act of Congress, as the widow of Lewis Johnson, deceased, late a soldier in the military service of the United States during the war of the rebellion, to wit, a private in Co. C, 87 Reg., Co. B, 84 U. S. C. Vol. Inf., feloniously and wrongfully did violate the provisions of the fourth section of the said act of Congress, in that he did then and there feloniously and wrongfully demand, receive, and retain of and from the said claimant, Julia Johnson, for his said services in preparing, presenting, and prosecuting her said claim for pension aforesaid a sum of money greater than ten dollars, the exact amount thereof being to the jurors aforesaid unknown." To this indictment the defendant demurred "on the ground that the law under which said indictment was found is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that Congress has no power to regulate the price of labor nor impair the obligation of contracts. 2. That only the pensioner can make complaint. No case can be maintained unless affidavit is made by pensioner. 3. Charge is not sustained by the claim set out." The demurrer having been overruled he entered a plea of not guilty; a trial was had which resulted in a verdict of guilty. A motion for a new trial having been overruled, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for three months. To reverse such judgment he sued out this writ of error. Mr. O. B. Sansum for plaintiff in error submitted on his brief. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitney for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Neither the testimony nor the instructions are preserved in the record, and the only questions presented for our consideration arise on the indictment. Opinion of the Court. It is objected, in the first place, that the indictment lacks the indorsement, "a true bill" as well as the signature of the foreman of the grand jury. No objection was made on this ground in the Circuit Court, either before or after the trial. There is in the Federal statutes no mandatory provision requiring such indorsement or authentication, and the matter must, therefore, be determined on general principles. It may be conceded that in the mother country, formerly at least, such indorsement and authentication were essential. "The indorsement is parcel of the indictment and the perfection of it." King v. Ford, Yelv. 99. But this grew out of the practice which there obtained. The bills of indictment or formal accusations of crime were prepared and presented to the grand jury, who, after investigation, either approved or disapproved of the accusation, and indicated their action by the indorsement, "a true bill" or "ignoramus," or sometimes, in lieu of the latter, "not found," and all the bills thus acted upon were returned by the grand jury to the court. In this way the indorsement became the evidence, if not the only evidence, to the court of their action. But in this country the common practice is for the grand jury to investigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them, and after determining that the evidence is sufficient to justify putting the party suspected on trial, to direct the preparation of the formal charge or indictment. Thus they return into court only those accusations which they have approved, and the fact that they thus return them into court is evidence of such approval, and the formal indorsement loses its essential character. This matter is fully discussed by Beasley, C. J., in State v. Magrath, 44 N. J. Law, 227, 228; by Moncure, President of the Court of Appeals, in Price v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 846, 856; and by Merrick, J., in Commonwealth v. Smyth, 11 Cush. 473, 474, the latter saying, "this omission in an indictment is simply the omission of a form, which, if oftentimes found convenient and useful, is in reality immaterial and unimportant." In each of these cases it was held by the court that the lack of the indorsement was not necessarily and under all circumstances fatal to the indictment. In |