buildings plus the value of the trees, sprinkler system and sanitary toilets, installed by plain- tiff during the life of the lease. Hele, 474. XLVI. Although the parties agreed that the determina- tion of the Governor of the Canal Zone was final, unless arbitrary or palpably erroneous; it is held that the decision of the Governor was not final, since he was not the agency desig- nated by the Act to determine the value of the improvements. See Hele v. United States, 100 C. Cls. 289. Id.
XLVII. The Act of February 27, 1909, contemplated re- imbursing a lessee for all expenditures made by him for improvements, less depreciation. Id.
XLVIII. In a contract with the Government for the making of certain aerial photographs, including contact prints, enlargements, index maps and negatives, covering a designated area, it is held that the provision for liquidated damages for delay in the delivery of "contact prints with maps" does not apply to the late delivery of original flying prints and maps, submitted for approval, and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Tobin, 480. XLIX. A provision in contract for liquidated damages cannot be based upon an implication unless the implication is plain. Id.
L. Where provision in contract for taking aerial photographs expressly provided that there should not be liquidated damages for time between dates of delivery and acceptance or rejection of contact prints with index maps; it is held that there can not be implied from the language of the contract that there could be liquidated damages before such delivery. Id. LI. Where contractor entered into a contract with the Government September 14, 1940, for the construction of certain buildings, on a lump sum basis; and where, thereafter, the Government entered into cost-plus contracts with other con- tractors for the construction of other Govern- ment facilities in the immediate vicinity, which resulted, as alleged, in making it difficult to obtain an adequate supply of labor and also in increasing the cost of materials; it is held that there was no breach of the contract in suit by the defendant, and defendant's demurrer is sustained. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 607.
LII. The contract in suit contains no express stipula- tion that contracts on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis would not be made, if necessary, and none can be implied. Id.
LIII. Both parties to the contract in suit knew of the existence of the National Defense Acts and Appropriation Acts of June 28, July 2 and September 9, 1940, when the lump-sum con- tract of September 14, 1940, was made, and it must be assumed that they knew that the carrying out of these Acts, by contract or otherwise, would be a sovereign act and not a breach of the contract then being made. LIV. The contract in suit, by deletion from its provi- sions of article 11 of the standard Government construction contract form, prohibiting the working of any laborer or mechanic more than 8 hours in any calendar day, recognized the existence and effect of the National Defense Acts of 1940 and the Appropriation Act enacted in accordance therewith.
LV. As early as Jones and Brown v. United States, 1 C. Cls. 383, the Court of Claims held that: "What- ever acts the Government may do, be they legis- lative or executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specifically to alter, modify, obstruct, or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons." See also Horowitz v. United States, 58 C. Cls. 189, affirmed 267 U. S. 458; Maxwell v. United States, 3 Fed. (2d) 906, affirmed 271 U. S. 647. Id.
LVI. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with the Government in August 1935, to build a lock and dam in the Allegheny River in a rural area in Pennsylvania; and where article 19 of the contract stipulated that the contractor, with certain exceptions, should obtain at least 90 percent of the labor from the relief rolls, through the United States Employment service; and where labor not on the relief rolls was referred to plaintiff by the Employment Service when relief roll labor was found to be not available; it is held that delay in completion of the con- tract due to shortage of labor was not caused by a breach of the contract by the defendant and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. York Engineering and Construction Co., 613.
LVII. Article 19 of the contract in suit was not an agree ment by the Government to supply to the con- tractor all the labor needed, and failure to supply labor from the relief rolls or from outside the relief rolls when sufficient labor was not available was not a breach of the contract. Young-Fehlhaber Pile Company v. United States, 90 C. Cls. 4, distinguished. Id.
LVIII. Where the contractor's requests to the United States Employment Service for labor contained specifications as to the skill and experience of the laborers desired that could not reasonably be met with in a rural community; and where the work was disagreeable and unusual in nature; it is held that it was not reasonable to expect, in the time and place, that the United States Employment Service could supply, either from the relief rolls or other sources, labor so quali- fied and in the amount necessary to complete the job. Id.
LIX. The Government does not, in its contracts, agree to pay any new or increased taxes of general application imposed by a State or by itself. Compare United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U. S. 106, affirming 101 C. Cls. 85. Id. LX. Where the Government, by its action in raising the wages of WPA laborers in the vicinity made it necessary for the plaintiff to increase wages, in order to hold its workmen; it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, following the decision in Beutlas v. United States, 101 C. Cls. 748.
LXI. Where plaintiff contracted with the Government to perform dredging work in the Cape Cod Canal upon a unit price basis; and where before the formal contract had been signed a hurricane occurred which caused the current to scour the area of a large amount of the material that was to be dredged by plaintiff; it is held that this action of the hurricane was not a changed con- dition under Article 4 of the contract which would entitle plaintiff to an increase in the unit price because of the increased costs due to the decreased amount of work and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Arundel Corporation, 688.
LXII. The Government, by the "Changed Conditions" clause, did not assume an obligation to com- pensate plaintiff for any increase in dredging costs brought about not by any act or fault of the Government but caused by a hurricane, an act of God, which neither party expected or could anticipate. It is a general principle of law that neither party is responsible to the other for damages brought about by such a cause un- less such an obligation has been expressly as- sumed. In the absence of any contract pro- vision affording relief in the instant case, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover and the peti- tion must be dismissed. Id.
See also Information, Reward for, I, II.
I. Where the plaintiff, Berg Shipbuilding Company, a corporation which had been incorporated in 1930 under the laws of the State of Washington, became delinquent in the payment of its annual license fees and was automatically dissolved on July 1, 1938, for failure to remit its annual license fees for 3 years, pursuant to Chapter 10, Laws of 1937, State of Washington; and where it is shown that the coporation has not been reinstated in accordance with the Washington State statute; it is held that the petition in the instant case must be dismissed as to the Berg Shipbuilding Company because it has no cor- porate capacity to maintain a suit. Berg Shipbuilding Co., 102.
II. Where the plaintiff, a Vermont corporation, filed its petition in the Court of Claims on December 15, 1938, pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 1197); and where thereafter, on December 16, 1942, the plaintiff filed with the proper State officials a declaration of dissolution, in accord- ance with the laws of the State of Vermont (Sections 1008 and 1009, Public Laws of Ver- mont, 1933), the effect of which was that the corporation no longer existed; it is held that the petition must be dismissed. Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257, 259, cited Woodbury Granite Company, 226.
CORPORATION DISSOLVED-Continued.
III. A corporation in existence when suit was instituted but going out of existence before judgment and not being represented in court by an assignee or liquidator, cannot become a judgment cred- itor. Under these circumstances, the only judgment possible is a judgment of dismissal. Id.
COST-PLUS CONTRACT.
See Contracts LI, LII.
DAMAGES.
See Contracts XXXVI, XXXVII.
See Contracts XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXXVI, XXXVII. DIVIDENDS.
See Taxes XV, XVI, XVII.
DREDGING.
See Contracts XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, LXI, LXII. EVIDENCE.
See National Industrial Recovery Act I, IV, V, VII, XII, XIII, XVI, XVII, XIX, XXII; Expenses, Suit For, II, III. EXPENSES, SUIT FOR.
I. Where plaintiff, an employe of the Veterans' Bureau (later Veterans' Administration) during the period from September 20, 1921, to and including August 21, 1923, performed travel duty pursuant to proper travel orders, but submitted no claim for transportation or sub- sistence expenses until September 9, 1931, which was more than 6 years after the last travel had been performed in 1923; and where plain- tiff's petition in the instant suit was filed in the Court of Claims April 23, 1943; it is held that the suit is barred by the statute of limita- tions, U. S. Code, Title 28, section 262. Wascher, 747.
II. Where it is not established by the evidence that plaintiff was insane or incompetent during the period of his employment in the Veterans' Bureau, or from the time of his resignation therefrom until March 26, 1932; it is held that the suit is not timely under the provisions of section 262 of Title 28, U. S. Code, that claims of insane persons shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court within three years after the disability has ceased. Id.
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