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103 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

buildings plus the value of the trees, sprinkler
system and sanitary toilets, installed by plain-
tiff during the life of the lease. Hele, 474.
XLVI. Although the parties agreed that the determina-
tion of the Governor of the Canal Zone was
final, unless arbitrary or palpably erroneous; it
is held that the decision of the Governor was
not final, since he was not the agency desig-
nated by the Act to determine the value of the
improvements. See Hele v. United States, 100
C. Cls. 289. Id.

XLVII. The Act of February 27, 1909, contemplated re-
imbursing a lessee for all expenditures made
by him for improvements, less depreciation.
Id.

XLVIII. In a contract with the Government for the making
of certain aerial photographs, including contact
prints, enlargements, index maps and negatives,
covering a designated area, it is held that the
provision for liquidated damages for delay in
the delivery of "contact prints with maps"
does not apply to the late delivery of original
flying prints and maps, submitted for approval,
and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Tobin, 480.
XLIX. A provision in contract for liquidated damages
cannot be based upon an implication unless the
implication is plain. Id.

L. Where provision in contract for taking aerial
photographs expressly provided that there
should not be liquidated damages for time
between dates of delivery and acceptance or
rejection of contact prints with index maps; it
is held that there can not be implied from the
language of the contract that there could be
liquidated damages before such delivery. Id.
LI. Where contractor entered into a contract with
the Government September 14, 1940, for the
construction of certain buildings, on a lump sum
basis; and where, thereafter, the Government
entered into cost-plus contracts with other con-
tractors for the construction of other Govern-
ment facilities in the immediate vicinity, which
resulted, as alleged, in making it difficult to
obtain an adequate supply of labor and also
in increasing the cost of materials; it is held
that there was no breach of the contract in suit
by the defendant, and defendant's demurrer is
sustained. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 607.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

103 C. Cls.

LII. The contract in suit contains no express stipula-
tion that contracts on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis
would not be made, if necessary, and none
can be implied. Id.

LIII. Both parties to the contract in suit knew of the
existence of the National Defense Acts and
Appropriation Acts of June 28, July 2 and
September 9, 1940, when the lump-sum con-
tract of September 14, 1940, was made, and it
must be assumed that they knew that the
carrying out of these Acts, by contract or
otherwise, would be a sovereign act and not a
breach of the contract then being made.
LIV. The contract in suit, by deletion from its provi-
sions of article 11 of the standard Government
construction contract form, prohibiting the
working of any laborer or mechanic more than
8 hours in any calendar day, recognized the
existence and effect of the National Defense
Acts of 1940 and the Appropriation Act
enacted in accordance therewith.

Id.

Id.

LV. As early as Jones and Brown v. United States, 1 C.
Cls. 383, the Court of Claims held that: "What-
ever acts the Government may do, be they legis-
lative or executive, so long as they be public
and general, cannot be deemed specifically to
alter, modify, obstruct, or violate the particular
contracts into which it enters with private
persons." See also Horowitz v. United States,
58 C. Cls. 189, affirmed 267 U. S. 458; Maxwell
v. United States, 3 Fed. (2d) 906, affirmed 271
U. S. 647. Id.

LVI. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with the
Government in August 1935, to build a lock
and dam in the Allegheny River in a rural area
in Pennsylvania; and where article 19 of the
contract stipulated that the contractor, with
certain exceptions, should obtain at least 90
percent of the labor from the relief rolls, through
the United States Employment service; and
where labor not on the relief rolls was referred
to plaintiff by the Employment Service when
relief roll labor was found to be not available;
it is held that delay in completion of the con-
tract due to shortage of labor was not caused
by a breach of the contract by the defendant
and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. York
Engineering and Construction Co., 613.

103 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

LVII. Article 19 of the contract in suit was not an agree
ment by the Government to supply to the con-
tractor all the labor needed, and failure to
supply labor from the relief rolls or from outside
the relief rolls when sufficient labor was not
available was not a breach of the contract.
Young-Fehlhaber Pile Company v. United States,
90 C. Cls. 4, distinguished. Id.

LVIII. Where the contractor's requests to the United
States Employment Service for labor contained
specifications as to the skill and experience of
the laborers desired that could not reasonably be
met with in a rural community; and where the
work was disagreeable and unusual in nature;
it is held that it was not reasonable to expect,
in the time and place, that the United States
Employment Service could supply, either from
the relief rolls or other sources, labor so quali-
fied and in the amount necessary to complete the
job. Id.

LIX. The Government does not, in its contracts, agree
to pay any new or increased taxes of general
application imposed by a State or by itself.
Compare United States v. Standard Rice Co.,
323 U. S. 106, affirming 101 C. Cls. 85. Id.
LX. Where the Government, by its action in raising
the wages of WPA laborers in the vicinity made
it necessary for the plaintiff to increase wages,
in order to hold its workmen; it is held that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover, following the
decision in Beutlas v. United States, 101 C. Cls.
748.

Id.

LXI. Where plaintiff contracted with the Government
to perform dredging work in the Cape Cod Canal
upon a unit price basis; and where before the
formal contract had been signed a hurricane
occurred which caused the current to scour the
area of a large amount of the material that was
to be dredged by plaintiff; it is held that this
action of the hurricane was not a changed con-
dition under Article 4 of the contract which
would entitle plaintiff to an increase in the unit
price because of the increased costs due to the
decreased amount of work and plaintiff is not
entitled to recover. Arundel Corporation, 688.

103 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

LXII. The Government, by the "Changed Conditions"
clause, did not assume an obligation to com-
pensate plaintiff for any increase in dredging
costs brought about not by any act or fault of
the Government but caused by a hurricane, an
act of God, which neither party expected or
could anticipate. It is a general principle of
law that neither party is responsible to the other
for damages brought about by such a cause un-
less such an obligation has been expressly as-
sumed. In the absence of any contract pro-
vision affording relief in the instant case, the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover and the peti-
tion must be dismissed. Id.

See also Information, Reward for, I, II.

CORPORATION DISSOLVED

I. Where the plaintiff, Berg Shipbuilding Company,
a corporation which had been incorporated in
1930 under the laws of the State of Washington,
became delinquent in the payment of its annual
license fees and was automatically dissolved
on July 1, 1938, for failure to remit its annual
license fees for 3 years, pursuant to Chapter 10,
Laws of 1937, State of Washington; and where
it is shown that the coporation has not been
reinstated in accordance with the Washington
State statute; it is held that the petition in the
instant case must be dismissed as to the Berg
Shipbuilding Company because it has no cor-
porate capacity to maintain a suit. Berg
Shipbuilding Co., 102.

II. Where the plaintiff, a Vermont corporation, filed its
petition in the Court of Claims on December 15,
1938, pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1938 (52
Stat. 1197); and where thereafter, on December
16, 1942, the plaintiff filed with the proper State
officials a declaration of dissolution, in accord-
ance with the laws of the State of Vermont
(Sections 1008 and 1009, Public Laws of Ver-
mont, 1933), the effect of which was that the
corporation no longer existed; it is held that the
petition must be dismissed. Oklahoma Gas
Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257, 259, cited
Woodbury Granite Company, 226.

103 C. Cls.

CORPORATION DISSOLVED-Continued.

III. A corporation in existence when suit was instituted
but going out of existence before judgment and
not being represented in court by an assignee
or liquidator, cannot become a judgment cred-
itor. Under these circumstances, the only
judgment possible is a judgment of dismissal.
Id.

COST-PLUS CONTRACT.

See Contracts LI, LII.

DAMAGES.

See Contracts XXXVI, XXXVII.

DELAY.

See Contracts XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXXVI, XXXVII.
DIVIDENDS.

See Taxes XV, XVI, XVII.

DREDGING.

See Contracts XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, LXI, LXII.
EVIDENCE.

See National Industrial Recovery Act I, IV, V, VII, XII, XIII,
XVI, XVII, XIX, XXII; Expenses, Suit For, II, III.
EXPENSES, SUIT FOR.

I. Where plaintiff, an employe of the Veterans'
Bureau (later Veterans' Administration) during
the period from September 20, 1921, to and
including August 21, 1923, performed travel
duty pursuant to proper travel orders, but
submitted no claim for transportation or sub-
sistence expenses until September 9, 1931, which
was more than 6 years after the last travel
had been performed in 1923; and where plain-
tiff's petition in the instant suit was filed in
the Court of Claims April 23, 1943; it is held
that the suit is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, U. S. Code, Title 28, section 262.
Wascher, 747.

II. Where it is not established by the evidence that
plaintiff was insane or incompetent during the
period of his employment in the Veterans'
Bureau, or from the time of his resignation
therefrom until March 26, 1932; it is held that
the suit is not timely under the provisions of
section 262 of Title 28, U. S. Code, that claims
of insane persons shall not be barred if the
petition be filed in the court within three years
after the disability has ceased. Id.

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