ACT OF AUGUST 5, 1882.
See Pay and Allowances V.
ACT OF MARCH 3, 1899.
See Pay and Allowances IV.
ACT OF MAY 13, 1908.
See Pay and Allowances IV.
ACT OF AUGUST 29, 1916.
See Pay and Allowances IV.
ACT OF MARCH 4, 1921.
See Pay and Allowances IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.
ACT OF JUNE 16, 1934.
See National Industrial Recovery Act V, IX, XVII, XX, XXIII,
XXIV.
See National Industrial Recovery Act VI, VIII, IX, X, XVII,
XX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV.
ACT OF JULY 24, 1941.
See Pay and Allowances VI.
ACT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1942.
See Pay and Allowances II, III.
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.
See Contracts XLVIII, XLIX, L.
AGREEMENT TO PAY BY THIRD PARTY.
See Foreign Mails III.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.
I. Where, in carrying out the purposes of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act (48 Stat. 31) the
Government, through the Secretary of Agri-
culture, duly authorized the plaintiff, under a
"Marketing Agreement for Disposal of North
Pacific Wheat Surplus," to sell to the Chinese
Government, for export, at stated prices specified
quantities of wheat, in the form of wheat or
flour, and where it was further provided that if
the wheat or flour so sold was not accepted for
shipment and loaded on or before certain speci-
fied dates, in each sale, there should be collected
from the purchaser a carrying charge of % cent
per barrel per day; it is held that this carrying
charge was not a part of the sales price and it
was not the intention of the parties that such
carrying charges should be used to reduce or
offset any payments that might be made by the
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT-Continued.
Secretary under the Marketing Agreement out
of the proceeds from processing taxes.
Pacific Emergency Export, 414.
II. The purpose of the Marketing Agreement, under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was to dis-
pose, as speedily as possible, of the surplus 1932
and 1933 wheat crops; and the intention of the
parties thereto was that plaintiff should be paid
the difference between the purchase and sales
prices, as provided therein, and that no loss
should be suffered by members of plaintiff
Association in executing the terms of the
Agreement. Id.
III. In view of the facts established by the record, the
provisions of the Marketing Agreement and the
findings and conclusions of the Secretary of
Agriculture approving the instant claim; it is
held that plaintiff is entitled to recover the
amount of $12,172.94, representing the carrying
charges on the flour from and after September
30, 1933, up to the dates on which the various
shipments were made. Id.
ALLOTTED LANDS EXEMPT.
See Taxes I, II, III.
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM.
See Contracts XXX.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
It is a breach of contract for the other party to a contract, by
negligence, to involve a contractor in the problems and delays
of litigation about the site of the work. Fred R. Comb Co., 174.
See also Contracts XX, XXI, LI.
CHANGED CONDITIONS.
See Contracts LXI, LXII.
CLAIM FOR REFUND.
See Taxes XXII.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
See Information, Reward for, I, II.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, THE.
See National Industrial Recovery Act V, XX.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.
I. A communication from the contracting officer to
his superior, the Chief of Engineers, which was
not written in the form of a decision but of a
recommendation, and which was not addressed
to, or communicated to, the plaintiff, was not
a decision of the contracting officer within the
meaning of Article 15 of the contract. Clarke
Brothers, 57.
CONTRACTING OFFICER-Continued.
II. Under the provisions of the contract entered into
by the plaintiff with the Government, in case
No. 45544, to supply a quantity of rust com-
pound the question of whether the rust com-
pound met the required specifications was a
question of fact to be decided by the contracting
officer, whose decision was final under the
contract, and plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
Fleisher Engineering & Construction Company,
et al v. United States, 98 C. Cls. 139, 155.
Crystal Soap & Chemical Co., 166.
III. Following the decision in Plumley v. United States,
226 U. S. 545, and McShain v. United States
(No. 43084), 308 U. S. 512, 520, it is held that
the decision of the contracting officer was final
under the terms of the contract where such
decision was not arbitrary nor so grossly
erroneous as to imply bad faith, and where no
appeal was taken, as provided by the contract.
McCloskey & Company, 254.
IV. In the instant case it is held that not only was the
contracting officer's interpretation of the plans
and specifications not arbitrary nor so grossly
erroneous as to imply bad faith but, upon the
evidence adduced, the contracting officer's
decision was correct, and the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover. Id.
V. Where contractor accepted the instruction and
ruling of the inspector without requesting a
decision of the contracting officer, as required
by the provisions of the contract in such cases;
there is no ground for recovery. Fidelity and
Deposit Company, 340.
See also Contracts X, XL, XLI.
I. Where the plaintiff corporation made a contract
with the Government to clear lands on certain
forks of the Black Warrior River in Alabama,
which lands were to be covered with water upon
the completion of Dam 17, on the river; and
where the invitation for bids included a copy of
the proposed contract, a copy of the specifica--
tions, and a map, on which had been placed,
before it was reproduced to be sent to prospec-
tive bidders, an area of shading showing the
portion in which the water level was to be
raised by the impounding of the waters; and
where before submitting plaintiff's bid its
president personally visited and inspected the
site of the work, and later, after submitting its
bid but before the contract was signed, plain-
tiff's president conferred with the contracting
officer as to the character and extent of the work
to be done; it is held (1) that the plaintiff was
not misled by the map and (2) that if it was
misled, it was not reasonably misled, since the
map, together with the accompanying papers,
could not reasonably be interpreted as the plain-
tiff claims it interpreted them, and, hence,
plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Clarke
Brothers, 57.
II. A communication from the contracting officer to
his superior, the Chief of Engineers, which was
not written in the form of a decision but of a
recommendation, and which was not addressed
to, or communicated to, the plaintiff, was not
a decision of the contracting officer within the
meaning of Article 15 of the contract. Id.
III. Where the plaintiff, Berg Shipbuilding Company,
a corporation which had been incorporated in
1930 under the laws of the State of Washington,
became delinquent in the payment of its annual
license fees and was automatically dissolved on
July 1, 1938, for failure to remit its annual
license fees for 3 years, pursuant to Chapter 10,
Laws of 1937, State of Washington; and where
it is shown that the corporation has not been
reinstated in accordance with the Washington
State statute; it is held that the petition in the
instant case must be dismissed as to the Berg
Shipbuilding Company because it has no corpor-
ate capacity to maintain a suit. Berg Ship-
building Co., 102.
IV. Where the plaintiff, Nelson, had only some profit-
sharing interest in the contract and had made
a written agreement to save the surety company
harmless from its performance bond; and where
litigation ensued between Nelson and the surety
company, resulting in a judgment against Nel-
son in favor of the surety company, which
apparently was not paid; it is held that Nelson
was not a party to the contract, which was
signed by the Berg Company, and Nelson has
no legal basis for suit. Id.
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