ACT OF AUGUST 5, 1882. See Pay and Allowances V. ACT OF MARCH 3, 1899.
See Pay and Allowances IV. ACT OF MAY 13, 1908.
See Pay and Allowances IV.
ACT OF AUGUST 29, 1916.
See Pay and Allowances IV.
ACT OF MARCH 4, 1921.
See Pay and Allowances IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.
ACT OF JUNE 16, 1934.
See National Industrial Recovery Act V, IX, XVII, XX, XXIII, XXIV.
See National Industrial Recovery Act VI, VIII, IX, X, XVII,
XX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV.
ACT OF JULY 24, 1941.
See Pay and Allowances VI.
ACT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1942.
See Pay and Allowances II, III.
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.
See Contracts XLVIII, XLIX, L.
AGREEMENT TO PAY BY THIRD PARTY.
See Foreign Mails III.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.
I. Where, in carrying out the purposes of the Agri- cultural Adjustment Act (48 Stat. 31) the Government, through the Secretary of Agri- culture, duly authorized the plaintiff, under a "Marketing Agreement for Disposal of North Pacific Wheat Surplus," to sell to the Chinese Government, for export, at stated prices specified quantities of wheat, in the form of wheat or flour, and where it was further provided that if the wheat or flour so sold was not accepted for shipment and loaded on or before certain speci- fied dates, in each sale, there should be collected from the purchaser a carrying charge of % cent per barrel per day; it is held that this carrying charge was not a part of the sales price and it was not the intention of the parties that such carrying charges should be used to reduce or offset any payments that might be made by the
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT-Continued.
Secretary under the Marketing Agreement out of the proceeds from processing taxes. Pacific Emergency Export, 414.
II. The purpose of the Marketing Agreement, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was to dis- pose, as speedily as possible, of the surplus 1932 and 1933 wheat crops; and the intention of the parties thereto was that plaintiff should be paid the difference between the purchase and sales prices, as provided therein, and that no loss should be suffered by members of plaintiff Association in executing the terms of the Agreement. Id.
III. In view of the facts established by the record, the provisions of the Marketing Agreement and the findings and conclusions of the Secretary of Agriculture approving the instant claim; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of $12,172.94, representing the carrying charges on the flour from and after September 30, 1933, up to the dates on which the various shipments were made. Id.
ALLOTTED LANDS EXEMPT.
See Taxes I, II, III.
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM.
See Contracts XXX.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
It is a breach of contract for the other party to a contract, by negligence, to involve a contractor in the problems and delays of litigation about the site of the work. Fred R. Comb Co., 174. See also Contracts XX, XXI, LI.
CHANGED CONDITIONS.
See Contracts LXI, LXII.
CLAIM FOR REFUND.
See Taxes XXII.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
See Information, Reward for, I, II. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, THE.
See National Industrial Recovery Act V, XX. CONTRACTING OFFICER.
I. A communication from the contracting officer to his superior, the Chief of Engineers, which was not written in the form of a decision but of a recommendation, and which was not addressed to, or communicated to, the plaintiff, was not a decision of the contracting officer within the meaning of Article 15 of the contract. Clarke Brothers, 57.
CONTRACTING OFFICER-Continued.
II. Under the provisions of the contract entered into by the plaintiff with the Government, in case No. 45544, to supply a quantity of rust com- pound the question of whether the rust com- pound met the required specifications was a question of fact to be decided by the contracting officer, whose decision was final under the contract, and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Fleisher Engineering & Construction Company, et al v. United States, 98 C. Cls. 139, 155. Crystal Soap & Chemical Co., 166.
III. Following the decision in Plumley v. United States, 226 U. S. 545, and McShain v. United States (No. 43084), 308 U. S. 512, 520, it is held that the decision of the contracting officer was final under the terms of the contract where such decision was not arbitrary nor so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, and where no appeal was taken, as provided by the contract. McCloskey & Company, 254.
IV. In the instant case it is held that not only was the contracting officer's interpretation of the plans and specifications not arbitrary nor so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith but, upon the evidence adduced, the contracting officer's decision was correct, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Id.
V. Where contractor accepted the instruction and ruling of the inspector without requesting a decision of the contracting officer, as required by the provisions of the contract in such cases; there is no ground for recovery. Fidelity and Deposit Company, 340.
See also Contracts X, XL, XLI.
I. Where the plaintiff corporation made a contract with the Government to clear lands on certain forks of the Black Warrior River in Alabama, which lands were to be covered with water upon the completion of Dam 17, on the river; and where the invitation for bids included a copy of the proposed contract, a copy of the specifica-- tions, and a map, on which had been placed, before it was reproduced to be sent to prospec- tive bidders, an area of shading showing the portion in which the water level was to be raised by the impounding of the waters; and
where before submitting plaintiff's bid its president personally visited and inspected the site of the work, and later, after submitting its bid but before the contract was signed, plain- tiff's president conferred with the contracting officer as to the character and extent of the work to be done; it is held (1) that the plaintiff was not misled by the map and (2) that if it was misled, it was not reasonably misled, since the map, together with the accompanying papers, could not reasonably be interpreted as the plain- tiff claims it interpreted them, and, hence, plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Clarke Brothers, 57.
II. A communication from the contracting officer to his superior, the Chief of Engineers, which was not written in the form of a decision but of a recommendation, and which was not addressed to, or communicated to, the plaintiff, was not a decision of the contracting officer within the meaning of Article 15 of the contract. Id. III. Where the plaintiff, Berg Shipbuilding Company, a corporation which had been incorporated in 1930 under the laws of the State of Washington, became delinquent in the payment of its annual license fees and was automatically dissolved on July 1, 1938, for failure to remit its annual license fees for 3 years, pursuant to Chapter 10, Laws of 1937, State of Washington; and where it is shown that the corporation has not been reinstated in accordance with the Washington State statute; it is held that the petition in the instant case must be dismissed as to the Berg Shipbuilding Company because it has no corpor- ate capacity to maintain a suit. Berg Ship- building Co., 102.
IV. Where the plaintiff, Nelson, had only some profit-
sharing interest in the contract and had made a written agreement to save the surety company harmless from its performance bond; and where litigation ensued between Nelson and the surety company, resulting in a judgment against Nel- son in favor of the surety company, which apparently was not paid; it is held that Nelson was not a party to the contract, which was signed by the Berg Company, and Nelson has no legal basis for suit. Id.
« iepriekšējāTurpināt » |