Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

SAVING AMERICA'S

activities constitute a "take"; facilitation of species recovery with plan deadlines; and increased participation by relevant stakeholders, such as private landowners and local governments.

Contrary to common political rhetoric, economic impacts are explicitly allowed to be considered under the ESA for all significant regulatory management decisions,

including critical habitat designations, take prohibitions and consultation procedures. In fact, the only procedural step in which economics is not allowed to play a part during ESA implementation is listing. The rationale for relying solely on science for the listing process is that the United States at least needs an accurate inventory of its threatened and endangered

species. Policy decisions on how best to protect listed species may then be based on sound science, tempered by consideration of economic and other real world impacts. In any event, listing itself does not mandate any one particular management approach. Listing merely sets into motion regulatory requirements that explicitly allow economic balancing.

NOTES

1. US. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Technical Bulletin 20(3) (May/June 1995), p. 24.

2. U.S. Department of the Interior, Inspector General, Audit Report, September, 1990.

3. The scope of these regulations appears to be limited to protecting threatened species, not authorizing further take. See Sierra Club u Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).

4. Ser 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. Harm in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.

5. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).

6. No. 92-5255 (D.C. Cir. March 11, 1994).

7. Michael J. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (New York: Pracger Publishing: 1983), p. 335.

8. World Wildlife Fund, For Conserving Listed Species. Talk Is Cheaper than We Think, 2 ed., 1994.

9. See "Saving the State's Lifeblood: That Historic Water Accord," Los Angeles Times, December 20, 1994; 59 Fed. Reg. 810 (January 6, 1994).

10. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Report to Congress: Endangered and Threatened Species Recovery Program, 1992.

11. Jeffrey Cohn, "Defenders of Biodiversity,” Government Executive National Journal, April, 1993, pp. 18-22. 12. For a more in-depth discussion of how recovery plans should be improved, see Tear, T. H., J. M. Scott, P. H. Hayward, and B. Griffith. 1995. Recovery Plans and the Endangered Species Act: Are Criticisms Supported by Data? Conservation Biology 9:182-195.

SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE

SECTION THREE

Recommendations for Improving
The Endangered Species Act

D

uring the last several years, Expand the Role of Science

conservationists have

called upon Congress to

strengthen the Endangered

Species Act (ESA). At the same time, many opponents of the Act who believe the law is inefficient and costly have urged Congress to alter it in ways that would severely weaken it. While these two sides may seem mutually exclusive, in fact some proposals to make the ESA more effective also will improve its efficiency, thus simultaneously satisfying both sides in the reauthorization debate. The following recommendations would serve the overarching goal of making the Act more effective in conserving species while enhancing flexibility to deal with specific economic concerns.

To measure accurately the need for endangered species pro

tections, policy makers must understand the social and environmental problems that stem from widespread extinctions. This understanding depends on reliable scientific research on vanishing species and on the causes of extinction. Defenders suggests the following measures to expand the role of science in implementing the ESA.

Create a National Commission on Species Extinction

Congress or the President should establish immediately a National Commission on Species Extinction to investigate scientifically the urgency of the endan

gered species issue. This commission would complement the Bush administration's Science Advisory Board, which in 1990 identified species extinction and habitat loss as two of the planet's most pressing environmental challenges. The commission also would complement a recent National Research Council report that evaluates the effectiveness of the ESA in achieving its scientific mission.' The commission should:

• Review the scientific basis of the original ESA legislation and rigorously review and evaluate data on trends in species extinction, population extirpation and related considerations.

⚫ Determine the quality of exist ing scientific data on extinction and investigate the implications

SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE

of species loss for human welfare. •Communicate its findings to the nation's decision-makers and the general public.

Use Science to Set Priorities

Several critics of the ESA have suggested that not all the species that the law protects are equally worthy of protection. This view is premised on a political valuation of species rather than on a scientific valuation. However, politics is a poor guide for making decisions about scientific issues. Political interference in ESA implementation has weighted recovery work toward a few large, popular species

and led to the neglect of other, less visible but no less ecologically important species. Politics also has

hindered the recovery process, prolonging the expense of conserving listed species such as the Mexican gray wolf.

Science should play the piv otal role in ranking species for protection. In general, keystone and other species critical to ecosystem character and health should receive highest priority regardless of their public appeal. However, because scientific

knowledge of the ecological importance of individual species is often limited, recovery efforts must err on the side of caution.

Ensure Adequate Peer Review

During the last two years, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service have announced a series of administrative changes to help ensure that sound science is applied to ESA implementation. These changes include peer review for all listing and recovery plan actions and a mandate that ecosystem and multi-species considerations be accounted for in the listing, consultation and recovery processes. These changes should be incorporated into the Act. Since the intricacies of ecosystems and the interrelationships between organisms within those ecosystems are complex, management actions relating to ecosystems also should be peer-reviewed.

Encourage Work of the
National Biological Service

Ecologically appropriate management of public lands administered by the Department

of the Interior is crucial to the

survival of a large percentage of endangered species as well as to the survival of many nonlisted species enjoyed by both nonconsumptive and consumptive wildlife users. Long-term research and data collection that support such management are conducted by scientists of the National Biological Service (NBS), an agency created in 1994 to tabulate the distribution and status of the nation's wild species. The NBS was created by combining research units from various Interior Department agencies, a move intended to cut costs, increase government efficiency and improve the government's ability to collect important scientific information.

The new congressional majority has signaled an intention to disband the NBS, primarily out of concern that identifying areas where vanishing species remain will hinder business. In fact, however, knowing where species in danger of extinction exist will help in the design of projects that better integrate the interests of both

33

SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE

[blocks in formation]

Georgia and South Carolina. Developers have been known to fill gopher tortoise burrows with concrete and to pave them over, harming not only the tortoises but also the many other animals that live in the holes, such as indigo snakes. The gopher tortoise is a candidate for listing partly because its habitat is disappearing and partly because the reptiles have been needlessly killed by worried developers. The timely provision of information and technical assistance could help prevent situations such as this and could even reduce the need to list species.

Scientifically and economically feasible solutions to conflicts between landowners and wildlife are available and could be improved. For example, Congress should fund FWS field technicians and representatives who can provide sound species and habitat advice to landowners. Creation of an ombudsman's office or a similar office of technical assistance could help resolve many conflicts

Reduce the Need for Listings

Congress should expand ESA protections to keep species from declining to levels that require listing. This can be done by developing and implementing management plans before species require listing. Sections 2(c)(1) and 7(a)(1) should be amended to require federal agencies and states to conserve all species. Section 5 of the ESA should be amended to authorize cooperation among federal agencies and the states in protecting all naturally occurring wildlife species, inventorying all species and habitats in the nation and identifying and protecting keystone and umbrella species, which serve as indicators of broader ecosystem health. Taking preventive conservation measures can preclude the need for more regulatory safeguards. For example, the Gap Analysis Program (GAP) uses satellite and land maps to identify "gaps" in habitat protection —particular types of habitat that have been little protected or even left unprotected under present

[blocks in formation]

SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE

to target conservation actions where they are needed most.

Provide Incentives for Private Landowners

Because approximately 70 percent of all currently listed species spend at least part of their

existence on private land, Congress should provide incentives that encourage private landowners to conserve species. Indeed, one major complaint about the ESA is that not only does the law fail to provide incentives for endangered species stewardship on private lands, but it also creates major disincentives. To understand this issue, we must visit the roots of the controversy, the much-argued conflict between economic growth and ecological well-being.

Because the purpose of much private land ownership is to produce economic return, it is essential that Congress develop economically feasible mechanisms for preserving the biotic community. Properly designed economic incentives would not reward private landowners for doing what they are required to do by law,

but would offset burdensome or inequitable costs of private conservation efforts.

Potential for economic incentives under the ESA can be broken down into four categories: voluntary incentives, dedicated funds, tax incentives and credit systems.

Voluntary incentives are perhaps the easiest to implement, because they require no legislative changes and are the result of voluntary efforts on behalf of endangered species. For example, the Wisconsin Bureau of Endangered Resources enrolls private landowners in a voluntary species and habitat protection program. Fifty-seven landowners have agreed to "make every reasonable effort" to avoid activities detrimental to species living on their properties and to notify the bureau of any significant changes in the health of such species or their habitat. In return, each landowner receives a certificate of recognition and a watercolor of the species being protected.

Dedicated funds use private or public money to pay landowners to perform or abstain

from certain actions. A prime example is Defenders of Wildlife's Wolf Compensation Fund, which reimburses livestock owners for verified losses to wolves and, with financial rewards, encourages private landowners to allow breeding wolves on their property.

Dedicated funds also might finance initiatives that restrict land use, such as fee-simple purchases or purchase of restrictive easements. Another approach could include funding to encourage small private landowners to participate in regional conservation efforts.

Tax incentives operate on the premise that private landowners can sometimes manage habitat more cost-effectively than can federal or state governments. Examples of such incentives include income-tax credits for expenses attributable to management of listed species and property-tax credits for landowners committed to temporary or permanent land-use restrictions. Some tax incentives could be developed within the ESA, but most would require modifications

92-528 96-9

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »