468 Opinion of the Court. people." Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 684177 Ct. Cl., at 771, 369 F. 2d, at 1006– 85. Since the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims erroneously held that the United States is not liable for its failure to invest the proceeds that would have been received had the United States not violated the treaty, they had no occasion to determine the measure of damages resulting from this liability. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of Claims for further remand to the Indian Claims Commission in order to determine that question.R The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. "The respondent did not brief or argue the question of how to measure these damages. The petitioner suggested that these damages might be measured by looking to the rate of interest which the United States has paid on Indian funds over the same period, arguing for this approach by analogy to private trust law. The petitioner also points out that Congress at one time considered the United States' treaty obligations to "invest in safe and profitable stocks" satisfied by an annual appropriation for the Indians of an amount equivalent to an interest payment. See Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 30, 1852, S. Doc. No. 1, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 293, 300-301; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 26, 1853, supra, n. 2. Because the United States is not liable for interest on judgments in the absence of an express consent thereto, it cannot be liable for interest on the annual income payments not made. Therefore, if an interest rate measure is adopted by the Commission, it must be simple and not compound interest. Syllabus. 390 U.S. AVERY v. MIDLAND COUNTY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. No. 39. Argued November 14, 1967.-Decided April 1, 1968. The Midland County, Texas, Commissioners Court is the governing body for that county, and like other such bodies is established by the State's Constitution and statutes. It consists of five members-a County Judge, elected at large from the entire county, and four commissioners, one elected from each of the four districts (precincts) into which the county is divided. Commissioners courts exercise broad governmental functions in the counties including the setting of tax rates, equalization of assessments, issuance of bonds, and allocation of funds; and they have wide discretion over expenditures. One district of Midland County, which includes almost all the City of Midland, had a population of 67,906, according to 1963 estimates. The others, all rural areas, had populations respectively, of about 852; 414; and 828. In this action challenging the County's districting petitioner alleged that the gross disparity in population distribution among the four districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Three of the four commissioners testified at trial that population was not a major factor in the districting process. The trial court ruled for petitioner that each district under the State's constitutional apportionment standard should have "substantially the same number of people." An intermediate appellate court reversed. The State Supreme Court reversed that judgment, holding that under the Federal and State Constitutions the districting scheme was impermissible "for the reasons stated by the trial court." It held, however, that the work actually done by the County Commissioners "disproportionately concerns the rural areas" and that such factors as "number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads, and taxable values" could justify apportionment otherwise than on a basis of substantially equal populations. Held: Local units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area may not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). Pp. 478-486. 474 Opinion of the Court. (a) The Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power, whether exercised by the State or a political subdivision. P. 479. (b) Although the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned the Fourteenth Amendment requires that citizens not be denied equal representation in political subdivisions which also have broad policy-making functions. P. 481. (c) The commissioners court performs some functions normally thought of as "legislative," and others typically characterized in other terms; but, regardless of the labels, this body has the power to make a large number of decisions having a broad impact on all the citizens of the county. Pp. 482-483. (d) Though the Midland County Commissioners may concentrate their attention on rural roads, their decisions also affect citizens in the City of Midland. P. 484. 406 S. W. 2d 422, vacated and remanded. Lyndon L. Olson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. W. B. Browder, Jr., and F. H. Pannill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer and Assistant Attorney General Doar. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Daniel M. Cohen and Robert W. Imrie, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a taxpayer and voter in Midland County, Texas, sought a determination by this Court that the Texas Supreme Court erred in concluding that selection of the Midland County Commissioners Court from singlemember districts of substantially unequal population did Opinion of the Court. 390 U.S. not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted review, 388 U. S. 905 (1967), because application of the one man, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), to units of local government is of broad public importance. We hold that petitioner, as a resident of Midland County, has a right to a vote for the Commissioners Court of substantially equal weight to the vote of every other resident. Midland County has a population of about 70,000. The Commissioners Court is composed of five members. One, the County Judge, is elected at large from the entire county, and in practice casts a vote only to break a tie. The other four are Commissioners chosen from districts. The population of those districts, according to the 1963 estimates that were relied upon when this case was tried, was respectively 67,906; 852; 414; and 828. This vast imbalance resulted from placing in a single district virtually the entire city of Midland, Midland County's only urban center, in which 95% of the county's population resides. The Commissioners Court is assigned by the Texas Constitution and by various statutory enactments with a variety of functions. According to the commentary to Vernon's Texas Statutes, the court: "is the general governing body of the county. It establishes a courthouse and jail, appoints numerous minor officials such as the county health officer, fills vacancies in the county offices, lets contracts in the name of the county, builds roads and bridges, administers the county's public welfare services, performs numerous duties in regard to elections, sets the county tax rate, issues bonds, adopts the county budget, and serves as a board of equalization for tax assessments." 1 1 Interpretive Commentary, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Const., Art. V, §18 (1955). See also W. Benton, Texas: Its Government and 474 Opinion of the Court. The court is also authorized, among other responsibilities, to build and run a hospital, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 4492 (1966), an airport, id., Art. 2351 (1964), and libraries, id., Art. 1677 (1962). It fixes boundaries of school districts within the county, id., Art. 2766 (1965), may establish a regional public housing authority, id., Art. 1269k, § 23a (1963), and determines the districts for election of its own members, Tex. Const., Art. V, 8.18. Petitioner sued the Commissioners Court and its members in the Midland County District Court, alleging that the disparity in district population violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that he had standing as a resident, taxpayer, and voter in the district with the largest population. Three of the four commissioners testified at the trial, all telling the court (as indeed the population statistics for the established districts demonstrated) that population was not a major factor in the districting process. The trial court ruled for petitioner. It made no explicit reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, but said the apportionment plan in effect was not "for the convenience of the people," the apportionment standard established by Art. V, § 18, of the Texas Constitution. The court ordered the defendant commissioners to adopt a new plan in which each precinct would have "substantially the same number of people." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court and entered judgment for the respondents, 397 S. W. 2d 919 (1965). It held that neither federal nor state law created a requirement that Texas county commissioners courts be districted according to population. Politics 360-370 (1966); Municipal and County Government (J. Claunch ed. 1961); C. McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (1966). |