United States v. Westervelt. act may be done against his will. He may be beguiled into it by the arts or power of others, until it is too late for him to extricate himself. The hands and subordinates of the ship may be deceived by the master and others engaged and interested in the crime, under pretext that the vessel is engaged, or is to be engaged, in a lawful trade, and may not be undeceived until they are in such a situation, on a semi-barbarous coast, as to be in a degree helpless, and obliged, or apparently obliged, to go on in the performance of their duty on the ship. Undoubtedly, in such cases, and under such circumstances, a Court and jury should look very deliberately and astutely into the facts and circumstances, and, before a conviction is had, should be satisfied that the prisoners acted freely, voluntarily, willingly, and without any restraint from the facts and circumstances surrounding them. These are considerations that will always enter into the deliberations of the Court and jury, in the case of the trial of subordinates of the crew of the vessel, and are fit and proper to influence the jury in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. They apply exclusively to the subordinates of a vessel, who are obliged to obey the orders of their superiors. We do not mean that an unlawful order is to be obeyed. We refer to the general condition of the subordinate, when he has not the power to disobey. The considerations referred to have no application to the master of a vessel, or to the owner of negroes, who engages in the slave trade. Now, with these views of the law, it will be for you to look into the evidence in the case, and examine and weigh it, and determine whether or not the prisoner voluntarily, freely, and willingly, without any restraint from the facts and circumstances surrounding him, participated in receiving the negroes on board of the vessel at the time mentioned, with the intent to make them slaves. The first inquiry naturally arising out of the facts in the case is, whether the prisoner had knowledge, at Liverpool, that the vessel was intended to engage in the slave trade; for, if he had, then undoubtedly this fact would have considerable influence upon your views of his subsequent acts VOL. V.--3 United States v. Westervelt. on board. On this point, no witness has brought home to the prisoner this knowledge; and the question rests, therefore, upon the character of the cargo and the fitting out of the vessel for her voyage to the African coast. In explanation of this part of the case, evidence has been given that the cargo and fitting out of the vessel corresponded with cargoes for a lawful trade on that coast. The cargo of the vessel, therefore, as to the intent and purpose of the voyage, is equivocal, and, of itself, may as well lead to the conclusion of a lawful as of an unlawful trade; and, if the evidence is equipoised, as to its effect in this respect, its bearing upon the case is very much. qualified, and perhaps neutralized. If you should find that the prisoner had no knowledge, at Liverpool, of the intention of the master of the vessel to engage in the slave trade, then your inquiry will be as to the time when he is chargeable with this knowledge, and whether, after that, he was in a condition to extricate himself from the vessel; or, in other words, whether or not you will hold him responsible, under his condition and the attending circumstances, for not escaping from the vessel, so as to avoid any participation in the offence. These are considerations which belong to you, and upon which it is your province to pass. The evidence before you, bearing upon this part of the case, has been very fully examined and discussed, and we are very sure that the whole of it is familiar to you, and shall not take up your time in going over it. The question you have to determine is, whether or not the prisoner did participate in the reception of the negroes, on board of the Nightingale, from persons who had seized them on the land, and brought them by force to the vessel, freely, voluntarily, and willingly, without any restraint from the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time, and with the intent to make them slaves. If you come to the conclusion that he did, then he is guilty; if not, then he is not. Evidence has been given of the good character of the prisoner previous to this charge. This is always admissible in behalf of the prisoner; and, though it will not overcome satisfactory proof of guilt, yet it is entitled to weight in a case United States v. Ruggles. which is left open to explanation on the evidence. With these remarks, we submit the case for your consideration. E. Delafield Smith, (District Attorney,) for the United States. Charles O'Conor and John McKeon, for the defendant. THE UNITED STATES vs. HENRY RUGGLES. IN EQUITY. Under the Act of the Legislature of New York, of April 10th, 1850, (Sess. Laws 1850, chap. 283,) authorizing the Commissioners of the Land Office of the State to grant lands under the waters of navigable rivers or lakes, and providing that no such grant shall be made to any person other than the proprietor of the adjacent lands, the grant must be confined to a line starting at the intersection with the shore, and extending at a right angle with the thread of the stream, or at a right angle into the lake, without any regard to the course, or direction of the line upon the land. A party who has obtained a grant in violation of the statute, as thus interpreted, will be restrained by injunction, at the suit of the proprietor of the land adjacent to the land under water so granted, from erecting docks on the land under water, so granted. Where such adjacent land was owned by the Government and used as a Navy Yard, an injunction was granted to restrain the erection of docks on other land under water properly granted to such party, until it should be shown that such erection would not seriously interfere with the rights of the Govern ment as proprietors of the Navy Yard, and it was referred to a Master to inquire into the effect of such erection. (Before NELSON, J., Southern District of New York, November 19th, 1861.) United States v. Ruggles. NELSON, J. The bill in this case is filed to restrain the defendant from obstructing the free navigation of the East river, and thereby seriously interfering with ingress and egress to and from the Navy Yard at Brooklyn. The government purchased the site of the yard on the East river, and obtained from the State a cession of the jurisdiction some sixty years ago, and have since expended upon it millions of dollars, said to amount to five millions, in erections and improvements in fitting it for the uses and purposes for which the purchase was made. The defendant is the owner of a lot of land lying adjacent to and west of the yard, fronting also upon the river, and has procured from the Commissioners of the Land Office of the State of New York, a deed of the land in front, covered with water, extending into the river between six and seven hundred feet. The boundary line of the parties is not at a right angle with the thread of the river, but strikes the shore in an oblique direction. The general course of the river at this place is nearly east and west, and the course of the boundary line, extended into the river, is north forty-two degrees and thirty minutes east, the effect of which is to carry the line thus extended into the water across a part of the water frontage of the Navy Yard, which, it is claimed, will, when the docks are erected, as contemplated by the defendant, interfere with the free ingress and egress of vessels, and otherwise seriously impair the use of the yard, and will also have the effect to alter the channel of the river, and of the waters of the Wallabout Bay, by deposits of silt and sand, and render access to the yard difficult and hazardous. The grant to the defendant by the Commissioners was made under an Act of the Legislature of the State, passed April 10th, 1850, (Sess. Laws 1850, chap. 283,) which authorizes them to grant lands under the waters of navigable rivers or lakes, as they shall deem necessary to promote the commerce of the State, or proper for the beneficial enjoyment of the same by the adjacent owner, but provides that no such grant shall be made to any person other than the proprietor of the adjacent lands, and that any such grant that shall be made to any other person shall be United States v. Ruggles. void. In my judgment, the true construction of this statute is, that the grant of the water lots, authorized to be made to the adjacent proprietor of the land, must be confined to a line starting at the intersection with the shore, and extending at a right angle with the thread of the stream, or at a right angle into the lake, without any regard to the course or direction of the line upon the land. It is apparent that this is the only construction upon which the intent and purpose of the statute can be carried into effect. The case in hand illustrates the practical difficulty attending any other construction. The government, as well as the defendant, is an adjacent proprietor, within the meaning of the statute, and is entitled to the grant of water lots in front, or, at least, according to the express terms of the statute, no other party is entitled to such grant. And yet, the grant to the defendant, if allowed, has already appropriated a considerable portion of this very water frontage. I shall, therefore, restrain the defendant from erecting his dock upon any portion of the water lots granted, lying east of a line drawn from the intersection of his eastern line with the shore, in conformity with the interpretation given to the statute, as above explained. And, even with this modification, I shall not at present interfere with the provisional injunction, inasmuch as I am not sufficiently advised, from the proofs in the case, that, with the line drawn in conformity with the true meaning of the statute, as above given, and the docks to be erected confined to the remaining portion of the grant, the effect would not be to seriously interfere with the fair and full enjoyment of the rights and privileges belonging to the government, as proprietors of the Navy Yard. The large amount of money expended in its erections and improvements, as well as its great public importance and use, and the danger of imperilling them, lead to caution and hesitation upon a question involving all these considerations. A mistake might result in a public calamity. Before, therefore, I shall interfere with the provisional injunction heretofore granted, the case must go before a master pro hac vice, whom I shall appoint, to inquire into the effect of the docks to be erected, even |